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I Introduction 
 
When I decided to write a Ph.D. thesis on Ethiopia in international relations in the 1920’s and 
the early 1930’s, I was aware of the fact that on one hand there is no similar publication in the 
Czech language from last several decades but, on the other hand, that there is a number of 
researchers who have dealt with many different aspects of mutual Ethiopian-Italian relations 
in different periods. After a series of discussions I decided to write the thesis in English 
having a persuasion that only limited work has been done on this particular theme, thus this 
effort may be presented as a contribution to the specific history of Ethiopia in the 1920’s and 
the 1930’s. Though many scholars have dedicated their work to the occupation period (1936-
1941),1 I felt that it was necessary to discover roots of the Italian occupation in Ethiopia. The 
reason for this may be more personal than it can seem at first sight.  
 
Being a Czech Ph.D. student with a sufficient historical knowledge, I was convinced having 
found many similarities between the Ethiopian and Czechoslovak modern history. Although 
very different in its history, politics, culture and economic position in the 1930’s, the fate of 
Ethiopia since the Wal Wal incident in 1934 as well as the fate of Czechoslovakia since the 
Munich affairs in 1938 can be viewed in the same manner filled by the topics of marginality, 
distrust, desperation, intolerance, expansionism, prejudice, racism, appeasement and passivity 
of international body represented by the League of Nations. These aspects formed the scope 
of international diplomacy during the examined period. Certainly, every historical event has 
its multiple and complex set of aspects, reasons, roots and consequences. Multiplicity and 
complexity of the historical period between 1923 and October 1935 is the main content of this 
work.  
 
No historical episode can be examined without further and detailed knowledge of the 
preceding acts and events, as well as the consequences that may furthermore form their 
results. I was aware of these implications and, in order to make a complex study on the period 
                                                
1 See e.g. Sbacchi, A. (1989): Ethiopia under Mussolini. Facsism and the Colonial Experience. London: Zed 
books Ltd.; Sbacchi, A. (1997): Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935 – 1941. Asmara: Red Sea 
Press.; or Del Boca, A. (1969): The Ethiopian War, 1935-1941. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.; 
Del Boca, A. (1976): Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale. Dall’Unità alla marcia su Roma. Vol. I. Roma: Gius, 
Laterza e Figli.; Del Boca, A. (1979): Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale. La conquista dell’impero. Vol. II. Roma: 
Gius, Laterza e Figli.; Del Boca, A. (1982): Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale. La caduta dell’impero. Vol. III. 
Roma: Gius, Laterza e Figli.; Del Boca, A. (1984): Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale. Nostalgia delle colonie. Vol. 
IV. Roma. Gius, Laterza e Figli.; Del Boca, A. (2007): I gas di Mussolini. Il fascismo e la guerra d’Etiopia. 
Roma: Editori Riuniti. 
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preceding the Italian invasion, it was necessary to examine not only the relations between 
Ethiopia and Italy, but also the relations between Ethiopia and other countries which in 
numerous ways influenced the outcome. Furthermore, it was obligatory to pay attention to the 
role of Britain and France as well as some smaller but important countries that had established 
more or less intensive relations with Ethiopia, such as Sweden, Belgium, Czechoslovakia or 
Austria. Last but not least, it was essential to focus on the Ethiopian-Italian relations in the 
examined period on the background of the League of Nations. As it has already been said, the 
Ethiopian (as well as Czechoslovak) destiny was shaped by passivity of the League caused by 
a number of reasons – prevailing colonialism of the major powers, non-engagement of the 
United States, increasing power of Hitler’s Germany and the will of France and Great Britain 
to keep Italy as far from Hitler as possible.   
 
Ethiopia, as a member of the League of Nations, believed in a peaceful solution of the Wal 
Wal incident. Having the world public opinion on his side, the Emperor became a symbol of 
fight for freedom and independence in the pre-war period. Internally heterogenous – 
ethnically, linguistically and politically – Ethiopia was seen as a logical target in the Italian 
colonial planning, pointing at its “racial” inferiority, “barbarity” and uncivilized slavery.  
 
From the methodological point of view, the work is composed of seven major components 
which are arranged logically and which correspond to the aforementioned brief assessments 
that will be discussed further. Basically, I use an analytic-synthetical method, generally used 
for this kind of texts. My analyses are based on a study of a huge amount of primary sources 
(including Documenti diplomatici italiani, Documents on British Foreign Policy, The Wal 
Wal Arbitration, Map of Africa by Treaty and many more)   and literature.  
 
After giving a brief account on the previous research on the modern Ethiopian political 
history or the Italian-Ethiopian relations and diplomacy (chapter II) as well as ethnological 
and historical survey of Ethiopia (chapter III), I had to discuss a crucial moment in the 
modern Ethiopian history that foreshadowed further processes leading to invasion in 1935-
1936. Without a deeper look at the battle of Adwa and the Treaty of Wichale, any publication 
on the international aspects of the modern history of Ethiopia would be rather incomplete 
(chapter IV). The Adwa campaign had its remarkable place both in the Ethiopian and the 
Italian consciousness and propaganda (not only) of the 1930’s. The result of the campaign led 
to European engagement in Ethiopia based on economic concessions and prerogatives.  
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Since Italy played a major role in the Ethiopian international relations, in order to understand 
the motives and roots of Italian colonialism, it is necessary to analyze the Fascist political idea 
that formed a basic conception of the Italian expansionist policy and justified its racially 
prejudiced rhetoric. Chapter V thus analyses one of the major aspects of the work and tries to 
answer a question how Ethiopia was imagined in the then Europe. Besides all the 
abovementioned aspects of the Italian expansionism and colonialism, it was its Fascist 
doctrine that added a driving force to Italy’s ambitions and plans in Africa. Facsism gave 
Italians a warrant of colonialism and strongly affected every aspect of daily life emphasizing 
heroism of an Italian soldier and ridiculing the barbarity of Ethiopia. Creating an image of 
Italian greatness and an image of Ethiopian barbarity corresponds to contemporary colonial, 
anthropological, political and thus also public view on Ethiopia, or Africa in general. It is this 
chapter that shifts the scope of the work into its multi-dimensionality and inter-disciplinarity.  
 
As for the examined period of 1923-1935, it is more or less logical, that Mussolini’s decision 
for invasion was developing for a long time although perhaps not in every detail. Scholars 
usually cannot find mutual agreement as for when the date of the final decision for the 
invasion to Ethiopia was made. If there is an agreement between the scientific fields that the 
Wal Wal incident presented the starting point terminating in October 1935, it is rational to 
consider the Wal Wal incident as the very final phase of creating of the invasion plan. Not 
only in my opinion, the Wal Wal incident was the breaking point in the Italian-Ethiopian 
relations of the 1930’s (chapter VI). It started a period of increased diplomatic efforts on both 
the European and the Ethiopian side.  
 
Chapter VII presents a complementary addition to the preceding chapter focused on the image 
of Ethiopia in many parts of the world, from Europe through the United States, the world of 
Islam, India, Australia, Africa, to the League of Nations. This chapter was supposed to put my 
findings into a comparative point of view. As we go through every single region and its 
relations with Ethiopia, it is evident that the process of imagining Ethiopia varied from region 
to region according to itsa historical, political or anthropological context. It is also 
understandable that relations of Ethiopia with some regions (mainly Europe and the world of 
Islam) in the context of imagining Ethiopia had to be examined more deeply than some other 
regions (including India and Australia, or the United States of America). 
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For an analysis of “creating myths and images”, which is also the subtitle of this work, it was 
essential to focus primarily on European newspapers, which can best help to find answers to 
our questions. A certain space is given to correspondence written by Czechoslovak citizens 
living in Ethiopia as well. The main questions we have to deal with are: What was the 
position of Ethiopia in the European press? Was there any difference between the Italian 
(represented mainly by Il Popolo d’Italia, La Tribuna, etc.) on one hand, and Czechoslovak 
press on the other? Were there any differences between the images of Ethiopia in Europe and 
in other parts of the world? Was there evident development of these images since the early 
1920’s until the invasion? All these questions are discussed and they are seen as the major 
contribution to understanding of the processes preceding the war and occupation.  
 
When examining the Ethiopian international relations in this period, it is necessary to pay 
attention also to “secondary” aspects that helped to form an image of Ethiopia as a barbarous 
country. My research in the National Archive of the Czech Republic in Prague enabled me to 
make a sufficient overview of the development of European opinions on Ethiopia. I have to 
stress the fact that such an analysis of the European “public opinion” on Ethiopia is the first 
one that has ever been written.  
 
To sum up, there are some main arguments and questions that this work should bring up. 
First, the thesis should answer the question of the position of Ethiopia in the international 
relations in 1923-1935. Second, was there a way to change the course of history and to stop 
the conflict or was Ethiopia in such an unequal position that it had no possibility to change 
anything? Third, the work deals with the image of Ethiopia in Europe in the period of the 
1920’s and the 1930’s and the development of attitudes in regard to escalating tensions 
between Italy and Ethiopia. Fourth, throughout the work I tried to stress also the racial aspects 
of the international dimension of the Ethiopian situation, since it was not only Italy but also 
other European countries, especially Great Britain, which stressed the questions of European 
supremacy over the African kingdom. My argument is that with the existence of colonial 
system, (latent) racial thought, historical burdens (for Italians the battle of Adwa), the 
ineffectiveness of the international political system, the unfortunate international situation 
(the growth of Hitler’s Germany), the weak economy dependent on trade with Europe, 
Ethiopia had no imaginable mode of being able to control the situation, and the Italian 
invasion of 1935 was, from the international point of view, as inevitable as the Munich events 
of 1938 as well as the following German occupation of Czechoslovakia. The questions and 
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answers leading to the invasion as described in this thesis then formed a major part of the 
overture of World War II. As it can be seen, the work may be taken not only as a contribution 
to the modern history of Ethiopia, but also as a contribution to the modern history of Europe.  
 
I should also explain why I have chosen the given dates, 1923 to 1935, for the purpose of my 
thesis. Ethiopia has had a long tradition of contacts with Europe and the Mediterranean and, 
with adopting Christianity in the 4th century, it became part of the then world. Since the 15th 
century, the relations with Europeans increased because for Christians in Europe Ethiopia was 
the land of “Prester John”, which gave Ethiopia a certain credit as compared to the so far 
unknown (and thus “dangerous”) rest of Africa south of the Sahara. With the help of 
Portuguese soldiers, Ethiopia defended its independence and coherence over the Muslim 
intrusion in the first half of the 16th century. After consolidation of the central power during 
the 19th century, Ethiopia, through its rulers, sought to gain a place among the great powers of 
the then world. This dream partly came true due to the battle of Adwa (discussed later in this 
work) but this still was not enough. A symbolic date is the year 1923 when Ethiopia became 
part of the great international chessboard. Ethiopia as a member of the League of Nations was 
the only “black independent country” with the same rights and privileges as its European 
counterparts. Ras Tafari’s reliance on the League did not correspond with the then political 
and international situation.  
 
Since 1923, Ethiopia played a role of the country which not only defeated the European 
imperialism but also wanted to modernize itself with the help of its European partners. We 
should rather say that this was only an ideal state, not the real one. In the world, strongly 
affected by the Scramble for Africa, when the European colonial powers divided Africa, when 
the United States stayed aside with no intention to intervene in any part of the world, when 
Europe was facing the direct threat of growing totalitarian tendencies in Germany and Italy, it 
was an utopia to think of equal position of Ethiopia in the world. The following years then 
showed that Ras Tafari’s (or Haile Selassie’s) hopes declined as the war was getting nearer.  
 
The reason for having chosen the date of 1935 is probably more understandable and clearer 
than the previous one. On October 3, 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia and finished the process of 
preparations of the international game on the chessboard where Ethiopia was not an equal 
partner. The destiny of Ethiopia was not written in Addis Ababa but in the centers of the 
“great” world - Rome, Paris and London. The way Ethiopia was depicted, described, viewed 
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and imagined can tell us more about this era of the Ethiopian as well as the European history 
than huge amounts of diplomatic documents and theses. The symbolical dimension of the 
period of 1923-1935 is of great importance also for the former Czechoslovakia. While 
Czechoslovakia was one of the most developed countries in the then world, its position 
among the great powers was rather weak and corresponded to the division of the world 
between the colonial powers and the non-colonial states. The fate of Czechoslovakia – though 
a very different story – can be imagined in the same way as the Ethiopian case. Its story was 
not written in Prague but rather in Berlin, Paris, London and later Moscow.  
 
Being a sub-Saharan country with no sufficient economic background and relying on help of 
the European colonial powers shortly after World War I, in a certain sense could not result in 
any other solution than occupation of the power seeking for its “place in the sun”. There is 
also one practical reason why I wrote the story of imagining Ethiopia in the period of 1923 to 
1935. While for the period of the Battle of Adwa, the Italian-Ethiopian war or the occupation 
in 1936-1941, there is a huge amount of scientific and also popular literature, for the time of 
the 1920’s and the 1930’s only a small number of studies are available. Moreover, imagining 
Ethiopia in the world has been so far limited mostly to the period of the war and occupation.   
 
In this work, I used some new approaches. First, it is the discussion of the role of non-military 
and non-economic aspects of Italy’s desire to gain Ethiopia. Second, it is the discussion over 
general Czechoslovak-Ethiopian relations as documented on narrative stories written by direct 
participants living in Ethiopia or those who have in some other ways dealt with the history of 
Ethiopia. Third, this is one of the first works concerning the Italian-Ethiopian tensions in 
terms of race and racial supremacy. In my opinion, this was an unseparable part of the whole 
crisis, though maybe not so visible in everyday actions, but documented in many diplomatic 
documents and journals as well as scholarly works of that time. The clash between “the 
white” and “the black” was also one of the most debated problems of the time shortly before 
the war in many parts of the world. The multidimensionality of imagining Ethiopia is 
something that needs further discussion and analysis. In this thesis, I give the first attempt to 
fulfill a certain gap in understanding and “discovering” the modern history of Ethiopia.  
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Notes on transcription and structure 
 
In order to unite the transcription of Ethiopian names, I followed the model used by Zewde in 
his book A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991.2 Names that are not present in Zewde’s 
book are modified according to his style of transcription. Since the main focus is given to 
international (more specifically European) sphere, these names are mostly written in the Latin 
script and so there was no need to consult it with specialists. Titles as Ras, Fitawrari, Negus, 
Dajjach are unified according to Zewde as well. Ethiopian names are unified according to 
Zewde’s style as well, except for the name of Haile Selassie I, which seems to me more 
popular than Hayla-Sellasse, although some authors use the version with ll: Haile Sellassie. 
This version is thus used only in those cases when it is a part of quotation or a title of a book. 
On the other hand, Menilek and Taytu are used instead of Menelik and Taytu, or Adwa 
instead of Adowa, to quote only a few of the most important names. Only when it is a 
quotation or a part of a book title, the form may differ in order to keep the original form 
unchanged.  
 
For the formal side of the thesis, when using quotations from non-English written materials, I 
give my English translation in the text and the original version as a footnote, because the 
reason for this was coherence of the text since the monolingual version makes it more 
transparent but the original version is necessary to make it more accurate. There are few 
exceptions, especially in Italian, that I have left in the text untranslated in order to maintain 
the relevance of the work, since the acuracy of some expressions depends on every single 
word which can be modified by translation into another language. It is mainly an expample of 
the Treaty of Wichale where the famous Article 17 and some other passages need to be cited 
in the original language. Longer quotations are separated from the text and formatted in a 
different mode while shorter ones are left in the text again in order to keep a good 
arrangement, and, of course, to make it clear what is my own analytic work and what is a 
quotation. The names of journals, newspapers and books in the text are written in italics. No 
underlining is used as well as no bold print in the text (except for the headlines of the 
individual chapters and subchapters).  
 
                                                
2 Zewde, B. (2001): A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991. Oxford: James Currey. 
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II Previous Research 
 
Until the early 1980’s, there was only a limited scope of literature on the causes of Italian 
invasion to Ethiopia. Unlike the modern history of Ethiopia,3 the Italian-Ethiopian relations in 
the 1920’s and the 1930’s are still insufficiently analyzed. Several authors dealt with general 
principles of Italian colonialism in Africa,4 but only a limited effort was done in rationalizing 
motives and preparations for the Italian-Ethiopian war.5 In the last twenty years, the number 
of works on Italian colonialism has increased,6 but the only complete publication dealing with 
the expansionist motives leading from the Wal Wal incident to the invasion in detail is Baer’s 
account on Italian diplomacy.7 One of the latest attempts to analyze the Italian colonialism 
from a general point of view is made by Arrufo,8 who tries to emphasize in a readable manner 
a violent character of Italian colonialism and thus follows a revisionist tendencies of Italian 
historiography. Adejumobi,9 on the other hand, accents the multi-dimensionality of 
“discovering” the modern history of Ethiopia, as he states that “Ethiopia is prominently 
featured in the iconography of both classical and modern era cultural, religious, and political 
                                                
3 Darkwah, R. H. K. (1975): Shewa, Menilek and the Ethiopian Empire 1813 – 1889. London.; Gabre-Sellassie, 
Z. (1975): Yohannes IV. A Political Biography. Oxford: Clarendon Press.; Greenfield, R. (1965): Ethiopia: A 
New Political History. Pall Mall Press. London.; Levine, D. N. (1972): Wax and Gold. Tradition and Innovation 
in Ethiopian Culture. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.; Marcus, H. G. (1975): The Life 
and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844-1913. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; Marcus, H. G. (1995): The 
Politics of Empire. Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941-1974. Asmara: Red Sea Press.; Marcus, 
H. G. (1998): Haile Sellassie I. The Formative Years. Asmara: Red Sea Press.; Marcus, H. G. (2002): A History 
of Ethiopia. Updated Edition. University of California Press.; Rubenson, S. (1991): The Survival of Ethiopian 
Independence. Addis Ababa: Kuraz Publishing Agency.; Tibebu, T. (1995): The Making of Modern Ethiopia. 
Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press.; and many others. 
 
4 Del Boca 1969; Hess, R. L. (1966): Italian Colonialism in Somalia. University of Chicago.; Trevaskis, G. K. N. 
(1960): Eritrea. A Colony in Transition 1941 – 1952. Oxford University Press. London. 
 
5 Baer, G. W. (1967): The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.; to some 
extent Lowe, C. J.; Marzari, F. (1975): Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940. London and Boston: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul., and Åkerblom, L. (1976): Sir Samuel Hoare och Etiopienkonflikten 1935. Uppsala., more readable 
Mockler, A. (2003): Haile Selassie’s War. Oxford: Signal Books. 
 
6 Ben-Ghiat, R.; Fuller, M. (eds.) (2005): Italian Colonialism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.; Sbacchi, A. 
(1997): Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935 – 1941. Asmara: Red Sea Press.; Negash, T. 
(1987): Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882-1941. Policies, Praxis, and Impact. Uppsala.; good general view in 
Zewde 2001. 
 
7 Baer 1967. 
 
8 Aruffo, A. (2007): Storia del colonialismo italiano. Da Crispi a Mussolini. Roma: I Rubini. 
 
9 Adejumobi, S. A. (2007): The History of Ethiopia. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
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development and therefore is fertile territory for the enthusiast of both ancient and modern 
Africa.”10 
 
The following work is an attempt to supplement this deficiency and to look deeply into the 
backstage of Ethiopian international relations in the period from 1923 to October 1935, i. e. 
the period immediately preceding the invasion of the Italian army to Ethiopia. We can surely 
assume that the Italian fascist diplomacy in this period was led by various motives - on one 
hand to persuade the European powers of their peaceful intensions, and on the other to do 
everything possible to deepen the tensions between Ethiopia and Italy by accusing Ethiopia of 
aggressiveness. Of course, the Italian relations with Ethiopia are the main scope of this thesis 
since it was Italy who mostly influenced not only the Ethiopian politics, but through various 
agreements also the Ethiopian economy.  
 
As for Ethiopia’s relations with other countries, there is a certain amount of works focused on 
Ethiopia and the United States,11 Ethiopia and Sweden,12 Ethiopia and Austria, and Ethiopia 
and Germany,13 but others are missing or are rather incomplete. Focusing on creating myths 
and images, I had to deal with published materials that needed reinterpretation in order to 
reach the goal and newspaper (journal) articles that had never been analyzed before.14 The 
great advantage I see in the thesis is an analysis of the Czechoslovak press and its opinion on 
Ethiopia and the Ethiopian-Italian tensions. Since there had never been a similar attempt, my 
research tended to present a new view on a country that had undergone similar processes as 
Czechoslovakia. A certain space is also given to newspapers from other European countries.  
 
                                                
10 Adejumobi 2007: 1. 
 
11 Harris, B., jr. (1964): The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
12 Norberg, V. H. (1977): Swedes in Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia 1924 – 1952. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of 
African Studies. 
 
13 Tafla, B. (1981): Ethiopia and Germany. Cultural, Political and Economic Relations, 1871-1936. Wiesbaden: 
Franz Steiner Verlag Gmbh.; Tafla, B. (1994): Ethiopia and Austria: a history of their relations. Wiesbaden: 
Harrasowitz.  
 
14 See bibliography at the end.  
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III Ethiopia, a brief ethnological and historical survey 
 
There is no other country in Africa with such a remarkable and long history as Ethiopia. This 
statement can be seen in many sources focused on Ethiopian history, and although it sounds 
like a cliché, its truthfulness is indubitable. Before we get to the analysis of the Ethiopian 
position in the international relations in the 1930’s, a brief ethnological and historical survey 
should be done. This chapter is thus not meant as a complete survey of languages, cultures 
and history and presents only a short introduction before further detailed interpetation will be 
done in the following chapters. 
 
Peoples and languages 
 
Ethiopia is inhabited by people speaking languages of four major linguistic groups: Cushitic, 
Omotic, Semitic and Nilo-Saharan. Cushitic languages are divided into five (or six) 
subgroups, four of them being spoken in Ethiopia: 1) Northern Cushitic, whose only 
representative is the Beja, living in the Sudan, Egypt and Eritrea; 2) Central Cushitic contains 
the Agaw languages, a group of varieties (Bilin, Kemant, Xamtanga, Awngi and others) 
spoken in northern Ethiopia and Eritrea; 3) Highland East Cushitic, mostly spoken in central 
southern Ethiopia includes Burji, Kambaata, Sidama, Hadiyya and many others; 4) Lowland 
East Cushitic includes close Saho and Afar, Oromo, Konso and the Omo-Tana group 
comprising eastern and western divisions with its main languages being Dassanatch, Rendille, 
Somali, Bayso, Arbore and many others; 5) Southern Cushitic languages are spoken in 
Tanzania and Kenya; 6) Dullay is sometimes presented as an independent linguistic chain in 
the vicinity of the Woito Valley.  
 
The Omotic group is composed of northern and southern subfamilies. The southern subgroup 
comprises Aari, Hamar-Banna, Karo and Dime; The northern subgroup contains Dizoid and 
Gonga-Gimojan divisions with languages such as Yemsa and Gimira. Semitic –in Ethiopia 
sometimes called Ethio-Semitic – languages belong to the most often studied Afroasiatic 
branches. The main languages in Ethiopia are Amharic, Tigrinya and Tigre (now Eritrea) – 
the last two being descendants of Ge’ez, an ancient Ethiopian language. Other languages are 
Harari and Gurage clusters. 
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Nilo-Saharan languages are spoken in a line along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border and in 
Eritrea. The northernmost group is the Kunama. The southernmost languages are Majangir, 
Anuak and Nuer, both spoken mainly in the Sudan.15  
 
Proto-Ethiopians began to separate around 2000 B.C. and remained more or less constantly 
along the previously suggested lines. Levine presented his own classification of the peoples of 
Ethiopia, in many ways differing from linguistic classifications. He suggested nine categories, 
being as follows: 1) the North Eritrean Group consisting of nomadic pastoralists with its 
largest unit of Beni Amer; 2) the Agaw as a dominant northern Ethiopian population before 
the rise of Axum; 3) the Amhara-Tigrean group, usually presented as the historical bearer of 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity and of the Solomonid monarchy; 4) the Core Islamic peoples 
inhabiting mainly the eastern parts of Ethiopia as well as Eritrea are often viewed as a 
historical opposition to the preceding group; 5) the Oromo (Galla in older literature) are the 
largest group in the Horn of Africa; 6) the Lacustrine group got its name name because it 
inhabits the chain of lake area in and around the Great Rift Valley; 7) the Omotic peoples 
inhabit a not very large region around the Omo river; 8) the Sudanic peoples live along the 
Sudanese border in the western parts of Ethiopia; 9) the Caste groups consist, according to 
Levine, of a number of despised peoples scattered all over Ethiopia.16 Levine’s classification, 
as it is clear, may present a certain challenge to the classifications of Ethiopian peoples and 
languages which had been made until then, because from the anthropological point of view, 
there have never been any strict borders between these groups of people and it is always 
difficult to make categories as such since it usually does not fully correspond to reality.  Since 
the main scope of this work is Ethiopia in international relations in the 1920’s and the 1930’s, 
and thus mainly Italian-Ethiopian relations, for an Italian-written ethnography and ethnology, 
see Grottanelli.17 
                                                
15 For further linguistic and ethnological overview, see e.g. works of Lionel Bender, Bernd Heine, Richard 
Hayward, Luigi Vinigi Grotanelli, Enrico Cerulli and many others. Since this is not the scope of the work, I did 
not add the linguistic and ethnological bibliography at the end.  
 
16 Levine, D. N. (1974): Greater Ethiopia. The Evolution of Multiethnic Society. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
17 Grottanelli, L. V. (1976): Gerarchie Etniche e Conflitto Culturale. Saggi di etnologia nordest-africana. 
Milano: Franco Angeli Editore. 
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Concise political history from the medieval times until 1889 
 
Ethnic complexity and plurality dominated Ethiopian history up to the present. The Zagwe 
dynasty of the Agau origin ruled over Ethiopia in the 12th and the 13th century. They 
attempted to adapt and incorporate into the Christian Semitic heritage, but they were never 
completely accepted by the Semitic and Semitized Christian population. The Oromo, for 
centuries called Galla, never truly accepted this heritage and became independent or semi-
independent rulers. An official Ethiopian historiography presented the Oromo as “savage” 
warlike groups threatening the Ethiopian modernity and integrity.18 Several authors explain 
the modern history of Ethiopia as an opposition of the Amhara and the Oromo societies.19  
 
Ethiopian integrity was threatened in the first half of the 16th century by the Muslim invasion 
led by famous Ahmad Ibrahim al-Ghazi known as Ahmad Gragn.20 The Emperor’s request for 
help reached the Portuguese, who finally arrived in Ethiopia in 1541 and killed Ahmad Gragn 
near Lake Tana.21 Ahmad Gragn’s invasion changed the ethnic map of Ethiopia pushing the 
Oromo far into the Ethiopian interior. Ethiopia’s contacts with European missionaries and 
increasing Muslim presence worked as a challenge to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church causing 
a series of conflicts and tensions between the court and the church and resulting in a number 
of crises.22  
 
The period between 1769 and 1855 is called Zemane Mesafint or the era of the princes. 
During that time Ethiopia was divided into a lot of independent or quasi-independent 
kingdoms and principalities. The Emperor was not more than a puppet in the hands of local 
lords and chiefs. Some authors also stress the rising importance of the Oromo power in the 
                                                
18 See Taye, A. (1927): Itijoppia hizib tarik. Addis Ababa. 
 
19 Levine 1974. 
 
20 See Shihab ad-Din Ahmad bin Abd al-Qader (2003): Futuh al-Habasha. The Conquest of Abyssinia [16th 
century]. Hollywood: Tsehai Publishers.; Robinson, D. (2004): Muslim Societies in African History. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
21 Pankhurst, R. K. P. (ed.) (1967): The Ethiopian Royal Chronicles. Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press.; 
Marcus 2002. 
 
22 For further reading, see e.g. Marcus 2002. 
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imperial court of Gondar.23 This does not mean that Ethiopia was during the Zemane Mesafint 
period an isolated state without any contacts with European partners, though the main era of 
mutual relations was going to come dozens of years later. The Treaty of Friendship and 
Commerce concluded in 1841 between King Sahla-Selasse of Shawa and Queen Victoria was 
meant to be the first offcial instrument exchanged between both states.24  
 
The recovery of the Ethiopian Empire began under the reign of Tewodros II (1855 – 1868), 
who established a policy of uniting, enlarging and modernizing the country, though he at the 
same time remains one of the most controversial rulers. The discussion over his status as the 
last of the Judges (Zemane Mesafint), or the first king of the new era seems to be still 
unfinished and unresolved.25 Although his expansionist policy was successful and he 
eventually replaced local warlords by his own administrators, modernizing and development 
policy lacked sufficient resources. Likewise, the Emperor failed with his foreign and internal 
policy, alienating the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and claiming their land and causing a 
conflict with Great Britain after capturing and imprisoning the British envoy and other staff at 
his court. Sir Robert Napier’s expedition symbolically ended the Emperor’s life.  
 
After a short time of uncertainty when provincial authorities fought for the throne,  
Yohannes IV (1872 – 1889) became the Emperor. Three major aspects affected his reign: 1) 
fights against the Egyptians and the Sudanese Mahdists; 2) Menilek’s challenge; 3) the Italian 
threat caused or eased by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. In 1885 Italian troops 
occupied the Red Sea port of Massawa and planned to move inland. Menilek of Shawa 
became a major challenge to the Emperor as he was campaigning in Gojjam against Ras Adel, 
Yohannes’s ally, in 1876. Yohannes’s decision to give Menilek relative freedom in the south 
made Shawa the center of further Ethiopian expansionism. Menilek employed several foreign 
advisors and engineers to modernize the country. It was Menilek who first initiated contacts 
with Italians and their Geographic Society. Despite many different opinions on the colonial 
                                                
23 See Abir, M. (1968): Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes. The Challenge of Islam and the Re-unification of the 
Christian Empire 1769-1855. London and Harlow: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. 
 
24 Ullendorff, E. – Beckingham, C. F. (1964): The First Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty. Journal of Semitic Studies 9: 
187 – 199. 
 
25 See Crummey, D. (1969): Tewodros as Reformer and Modernizer. Journal of African History 10 (3): 457-469. 
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history of Menilek’s Ethiopia, the period from 1855 has to be considered an era of increasing 
modernization of army, administration and infrastructure.26 
 
 
                                                
26 See Abir 1968; Levine 1972; Marcus 2002; Zewde 2001. 
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IV From Article 17 to the year 1923 
 
The early actions of Italian missionaries in the 19th century (1837) are connected with 
Giuseppe Sapeto who, accompanied by d’Abbadie brothers, as the first Italian, began 
exploring the Ethiopian and Eritrean coast and hinterland. Italian trading activities were 
ratified by the 1859 Treaty between the rulers of Ethiopia and Sardinia.27 Moreover, the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 extended trade and strategic importance of the Red Sea 
and the Italian presence in Eritrea as well. Italian interests in the Horn of Africa thus had in 
the early phase mainly missionary and trade denotation. A lot of merchants, missionaries, 
travelers and adventurers who were discovering the Ethiopian and Eritrean hinterland in the 
19th century are known.  
 
This stage might be considered a primary phase of Italian colonialism, because it established 
the first relations necessary for further – mainly territorial - expansion. The second period, 
from 1885, is defined by concrete efforts leading to territorial gains and establishment of the 
first Italian colony – Eritrea. On  February 3, 1885, Rear-Admiral A. Caimi presented a 
proclamation to the population of Massawa: “The Italian Government, in accord with the 
English and Egyptian, and without doubt also with the Abyssinian, have ordered me to take 
possession of the Fort of Massowah this day, and to hoist the Italian flag by the side of the 
Egyptian. By this occupation our troops will protect you; and we are ready to pay for all we 
want. We shall respect your customs and religion.”28 Caimi emphasized the friendship of the 
Italian government and its constructive role that Italy wished to play in Africa. 
 
Among those who were discovering the shores and lands of the Horn was an Apostle vicar 
Guglielmo Massaia, whose main activities were held among the Oromo. Orazio Antinori, a 
scholar of aristocratic origin founded a meteorological station and scientific base on the 
Shawan Plateau sponsored by Societá Geografica Italiana. Others were e.g. Antonio Cecchi or 
                                                
27 On February 10, 1859, Commercial Treaty was concluded between His Majesty the King of Sardinia and  
Dajjach Negussie, the “King of Ethiopia”. No boundaries were defined in the Treaty and it was only to remain in 
force for 10 years.; MAT 1967: 450. 
 
28 Text taken from MAT 1967: 446. 
 
 18 
Pietro Antonelli, a diplomat who is sometimes viewed as the instigator of the Treaty of 
Wichale trickery.29 
 
A certain number of Italian officers advocated that the Eritrean highlands were ideal for 
European colonization and that the “native“ territorial rights should be regulated in favor of 
the white settlers. In 1893, the first agreements were signed in order to reserve the state land 
for Italian colonialists. One year later, Italians owned more than one fifth of the fertile land. 
As a result, several revolts and rebellions occurred against the Italian presence and behavior in 
Eritrea. The rebellions in Akele Guzay or Seraye were often connected with the general 
Italian attitude preceding the Adwa campaign. Bahta Hagos, with his brother Sengal and his 
son Gebra Medhin, belonged to the main opponents of the Italian occupation. Bahta Hagos 
even considered himself as an avenger of Eritrean rights trampled by the Italians.30  
 
Ethiopian politics and integrity were challenged not only by European encounters, but also by 
neighboring powers. In the first half of the 19th century, the main challenge was presented by 
Muhammad Ali’s Egypt, as Egyptians were extending their authority into the Sudan, a 
country rich in minerals as well as a region for centuries dedicated to slave hunts.31 The 
following period leading to the battle of Adwa can be in a certain sense regarded as an 
overture to the invasion of Italy to Ethiopia in 1935. Without Adwa, there would have been 
probably a very different development of the Italian-Ethiopian relations, but also a very 
different position of Ethiopia in the international sphere. In the next chapter, we can also see 
how the myth of Adwa remained in the Italian colonial thinking until the 1930’s and became a 
component of military planning as Adwa was one of the first bombarded places in 1935. 
                                                
29 Hess 1966, 1973; Pateman, R. (1998): Eritrea. Even the Stones Are Burning. Revised and Updated. Amsara: 
Red Sea Press.  
 
30 Pankhurst, E. S. (1951): Ex-Italian Somaliland. London: Watts&Co. ; 1952: 95. 
 
31 Abir 1967. 
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The Treaty of Ucciali and the Adwa campaign 
 
Italian interests in Ethiopia are discussed especially in connection with the Treaty of Wichale 
(Ucciali), signed on May 2, 1889, between both sides. Much has been written about its 
consequences connected mainly with Article 17.32 The diplomatic effort was accompanied by 
Italian as well as British economic and territorial claims on the coast.33 European interests in 
Ethiopia in the late 19th century were based on firearms, their result was that Ethiopia had a 
quite sufficiently equipped army that could be used not only for defense of the country but 
also for territorial expansion during Menilek’s reign.34  
 
In the anarchy after the death of Yohannes IV,35 Italians tried to disintegrate Ethiopia as 
much as possible. They removed the Eritrean capital from Massawa to Asmara, though at 
the beginning of his reign, Menilek II established the new Ethiopian capital in Addis Ababa. 
Empress Taytu was impressed by the landscape around the current capital and the city 
began to be built since 1886. Addis Ababa became the Ethiopian capital officially in 1889. 
As compared to the previous capitals, Addis Ababa differed in several ways. Particularly, 
some European engineers took part in the building. Especially, a Swiss Alfred Ilg played a 
major role in the modernization of the country.   
 
                                                
32 Hess, R. L. (1963): Italy and Africa: Colonial Ambitions in the First World War. Journal of African History 4 
(1): 105-126.; Rubenson, S. (1964): The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichale Treaty. Journal of African 
History 5 (2): 243-283.; Rubenson, S. (1966): Professor Giglio, Antonelli and Article XVII of the Treaty of 
Wichale. The Journal of African History 7 (3): 445-457. 
 
33 Galbraith, J. S. (1970): Italy, the British East Africa Company, and the Benadir Coast, 1888-1893. The Journal 
of Modern History 42 (4): 549-563. 
 
34 The Treaty of Wichale belongs to the most discussed topics of the modern history of Ethiopia and colonialism 
in general. It became a symbol of trickiness and arrogance of European colonial powers in the Scramble for 
Africa. For a long time, it even discredited European plans and interests in Africa. Emperor Menelik II, and 
Count Pietro Antonelli signed the Treaty on September 29, 1889; Caulk, R. A. (1972): Firearms and Princely 
Power in Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century. The Journal of African History 13 (4): 609-630.; Caulk, R. A. 
(1978): Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia c. 1850-1935. The International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 11 (3): 457-493.; Caulk, R. A. (2002): “Between the Jaws of Hyenas“. A Diplomatic 
History of Ethiopia (1876-1896). Edited and with an introduction by Bahru Zewde. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz 
Verlag.; Pankhurst, R. (1977): Guns in Ethiopia. Transition 20: 26-33. 
 
35 Yohannes IV – formerly Ras Kasa Mercha – reigned over Ethiopia since 1872 until 1889. His aim was to 
maintain equilibrium between Menelik of Shawa and Adal of Gojjam. It soon became evident that his main rival 
was Menelik. The Emperor’s policy had a religious aspect, since his foreign enemies were Egypt and the 
Mahdist Sudan, with whom he led several clashes. Yohannes died one day after the battle of Matamma against 
the Mahdist Sudan. Menelik followed in the process of territorial expansion ans soon became the supreme ruler 
of Ethiopia. For more about Yohannes, see Gabre-Selassie 1975; for a readable historical development in the 19th 
century Ethiopia, see Zewde 2001. 
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We may put the initial phase of Menilek’s contacts with Italians in 1876; his partner in 
negotiations was Marquis Orazio Antinori. Shawa represented a logical continuity for the 
Italian mission in its expansionist efforts. The first agreement related to guns for Ethiopia in 
exchange of Let Marafya where Italians built their base. In the following years this outpost 
served as an information center.36 Friendly relations continued until the Treaty of Wichale, 
the possible highpoint of mutual contacts, which at the same time foreshadowed the 
beginning of mutual animosity and mistrust leading to Adwa. Article 3 of the Treaty pre-
defined the creation of Eritrea as an Italian colony delineating the border with Ethiopia. In 
order to gain some remarkable impact in the Horn, Italians needed a base for their following 
actions. This was meant to be made in Eritrea. Another paradox in the history of Ethiopia is 
that the colonial period which formed Eritrea as a state under the Italian rule, helped to form 
Eritrea as an independent country one hundred years later.  
 
The Treaty allowed Italy the possession of the Massawa harbor, the lowlands occupied 
during the reign of Yohannes IV as well as highlands including Asmara. In Tigré, 
dissatisfaction with such a solution was so tangible that even many years after, people were 
accusing Menilek of simply having sold Eritrea.37 Article 17was the most critical point of 
the Treaty. Though it differed only in several words, the Amharic version only expressed a 
possibility to use Italy’s intermediation in international acts, while the Italian version shifted 
Ethiopia towards an Italian protectorate: “Sua Maestà il Re d’Etiopia consente di servirsi del 
Governo di Sua Maestà il Re d’Italia per tutte le trattazioni di affari che avesse con altre 
Potenze o Governi.”38 Article 17 was pre-defined by Articles 12 and 13. The former gave 
Italian citizens extra-territorial rights; the latter gave Shawa the possibility of using the 
Italian consul in Assab for international negotiations.39   
 
After ratification of the Treaty the Italian side did not want to lose time and informed all 
European powers about its claims, boosted by Article 19 of the Treaty stating that both 
Italian and Amharic Texts of the Treaty have to be considered official and of the same 
                                                
36 Zewde 2001: 74. 
 
37 Greenfield 1965: 117. 
 
38 Rubenson 1964: 243-244. 
 
39 Rubenson 1964: 245. 
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authority.40 During the general talks in Berlin on October 11, 1889, all countries agreed with 
the Treaty except for Turkey having its interests in the Red Sea area, and Russia disagreeing 
with the concept of Orthodox Ethiopia being controlled by Catholic Italy.41 The basic 
question of the Wichale – “Was Ethiopia a real Italian protectorate?” – emerged already 
during December 1889 when Menilek sent letters to several European governments without 
using Italy as his intermediate. His letter to Queen Victoria had a strong political and even 
emotional character: “I ought now, more than at any other time before, to enter into friendly 
relations with all the European powers, so as to cause them to look on us with a favourable 
and friendly eye. But we are obliged to address ourselves with such a declaration to the 
great English Monarchy, even more than to others, because you, through your occupation of 
Zeilah and Berbera and through the Egyptian interests you take care of…have become our 
neighbours. And when I now address myself to you, I do not doubt that your great nation 
will listen to my just appeal.”42 Menilek asked for ammunition and weapons in his fight 
against Muslims supported by Turkey. Letters to president Carnot and Emperor Wilhelm 
were written in a similar manner asking withdrawing the embargo on the import of 
weapons.  
 
The response of Queen Victoria was obliging, but for Menilek it brought the last moment 
when he recognized the uneven position of his country among the concert of powers. Queen 
Victoria assured him that: “We note further your Majesty’s intention to send someone to us 
hereafter to discuss matters of common interest to our Kingdoms. Inasmuch, however, as 
the Italian Government have notified to us that by a Treaty concluded on the 2nd of May last 
between Italy and Ethiopia ‘it is provided that this Majesty the King of Ethiopia consents to 
avail himself of the Government of His Majesty Powers of Governments.’ We shall 
communicate to the Government of Our Friend Majesty the King of Italy copies of Your 
Majesty’s letter and of this Our reply.”43  
 
Menilek had gotten a promise on arms delivery to Zeila, mediated by Italy. Dajjach 
Mekonen got a permission on delivering two thousand rifles from Zeila, where he received 
                                                
40 See MAT 1967: 455. 
 
41 Rubenson 1964: 245. 
 
42 Rubenson 1964: 247. 
 
43 Ibid. 
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ratification of the Treaty of Wichale. Menilek could not reconcile with such a fate and 
began to negotiate with Ambassador Salimbeni who admitted a slight difference between 
both versions of the Treaty saying: “C’é una bella differenza!” In order to settle the 
diplomatic crisis, Pietro Antonelli arrived at Addis Ababa in December 1890. Nevertheless, 
in spite of his great effort, Antonelli had to leave the capital in February 1891 with no clear 
result. Subsequently, Menilek wrote a letter to the Italian King Umberto asking for 
annulling the Treaty.44   
 
Menilek had to persuade local authorities in the provinces not to defend their own particular 
interests but to face the danger together. The existing mistake of the government and the 
Orthodox Church was that they perceived Islam as the main enemy and underestimated the 
danger of European colonialism being in its highest point during the Scramble for Africa. 
Incomprehension of the impact of the European colonial endeavor sprang in the fact that 
Europeans were Christians, thus fellow-believers, while Muslims were clearly defined as 
“traditional” ideological and political enemies. The backward opinions of the Church 
exponents confirmed his conviction embraced already by Tewodros that not the Church, but 
the central government has to be a symbol of “national unity”.45 For the African country it 
was not easy to gain credit in Europe. Moreover, the heterogeneity of Ethiopian local 
politics might be another aspect worsening its international reputation. 
  
In 1893, Menilek finally voided the Treaty. Since this moment, the conflict was getting 
nearer and nothing seemed to prevent Ethiopia from it. The Italian governor in Eritrea, 
Antonio Baldissera attempted to gain opposing Ethiopian leaders on his side. His first 
success occurred already on December 6, 1891, after signing the Marab Treaty between him 
and princes led by Ras Mangasha Yohannes, the son of Yohannes IV. The Marab Treaty 
gave Italy the first indication of success and brought loyalty of several important Ethiopian 
leaders. Nevertheless, the success did not last long, as Dajjach Bahta Hagos revolted in 
Akele Guzay. His example was followed by Ras Mangasha, whose decision ended up in an 
open clash with Italians. Mangasha’s approach was seen as a gesture towards Menilek and 
was of great importance. Several influential potentials – like Ras Sebhat Aragawi or Dajjach 
                                                
44 Rubenson 1964. 
 
45 Greenfield 1965: 119. 
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Bahta Hagos Tafari – turned to Menilek’s side before or during the Adwa campaign 
precipitating the Battle of Adwa.46  
 
On September 26, 1895, general Baratieri arrived in Massawa and with his eight thousand 
men crossed the river Marab and seized Addigrat. With the exception of the officers and the 
“white” cavalry, the majority of the people were formed by askari, the native soldiers, well 
equipped and disciplined. In the following weeks, Menilek gathered an army composed of 
more or less one hundred thousand soldiers. The Emperor’s desire for national unity was 
fulfilled because almost each region had its representation in the army.47 On October 9, the 
Ras Mangasha troops met violently the vanguard of general Baratieri. Ras Mangasha got 
into panic and moved back to southern Tigré. On the contrary, Baratieri planned to fortify 
three strategic points in the province: Mekelle, Addigrat and Adwa. The situation went 
better for general Baratieri who did not consider the Ethiopian army a strong enemy due to 
lack of internal support that Menilek had to deal with.48  
 
Baratieri hoped for insufficient loyalty of Menilek’s opponents, especially of his age-old 
rival Takla Haymanot, the ruler of Gojjam, or Ras Mikael from Wallo. Except for Ras 
Alula, secret communication was in progress between the provincial leaders and Italians in 
order to create alliance on the line north of Shawa.49 The ambivalent attitudes of several 
exponents were fully shown when Menilek ordered Ras Mikael to attack the enemy and an 
Italian ally, the sultan of Awssa. The order took him by surprise and Ras Mikael sent a letter 
to the sultan where he warned him from the attack. Ras Mangasha cancelled the loyalty 
declared not a long time before and sent a friendly note to general Baratieri apologizing 
himself for the preceding clash. He argued that it was a stroke of devil.50 On the other hand, 
as suggested by Levine,51 the collaboration of the Tigrean elites was essential for the 
                                                
46 Caulk 1978; Zewde 2001. 
 
47 Zewde 2001. 
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concerted combat at Adwa. The formation of the cooperative Amhara-Tigrean effort 
restructured and resurged the power of the Ethiopian state. 
 
The first real clash between both armies occurred at Amba Alagi, a natural fortification near 
the southernmost Italian point. The Italian troops were led by major Toselli. The lack of 
coordination in the Ethiopian army is well documented by the following events. While Ras 
Makonnen negotiated with Italians about their peaceful evacuation, Fitawrari Gabayyahu 
did not hesitate and despite disfavor of the hilly terrain, his troops defeated the army of 
major Toselli.52 The Ethiopian army seized Makelle and prevented Italians from reaching 
goods and ammunition from the coast. Ras Makonnen on his way to the north defeated a 
small Italian regiment at Lasta. Ethiopians thus had a free way to the Awssa sultanate.53  
 
After the battle of Amba Alagi and the capture of Makalle, Menilek offered Italians peace 
talks, but they persisted on unrealizable conditions. Moreover, Francesco Crispi (the Italian 
prime minister) asked the cabinet for mounting the army budget of twenty more million 
liras.54 Menilek kept on moving towards Adwa. On February 29, 1896, general Baratieri 
decided to a surprising attack in three ways under the coordinated leadership of generals 
Albertone, Arimonde and Dabormida. The Ethiopian troops were led by Ras Mikael 
from Wallo, Ras Makonnen Walda-Mikael, Ras Mangasha and Negus Takla-Haymanot. 
The historical battle of Adwa took place on March 1, 1986. The tactics of the Ethiopian 
army was experienced by many victories, at Gura (1885, against Egypt), at Kufit or Matama 
(1886, 1889 against the Mahdists). The basic effort was to maneuver the enemy into an open 
space, shoot on the mass scale from a distant place and then send a cavalry to complete the 
fight.55  
 
Albertone’s brigade had bad orientation and was left in isolation in the terrain, subsequently 
it became an easy object for the Ethiopian troops. General Dabormida, in his effort to help 
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the comrades-in-arms, made a wrong maneuver to the right instead of to the left.56 At nine 
o’clock in the morning, the result was evident. Four thousand Europeans and two thousand 
Eritrean askaris died. 1482 of Baratieri’s soldiers were injured and another 1800 were 
captured. The number of the dead on the Ethiopian side varies from four to seven thousand 
with another ten thousand wounded. The difference was in percentage, while among the 
Italian troops the number of the dead comprised 70%; on the Ethiopian side the percentage 
was much lower. The battle resulted in total decimation of the colonial army having also a 
strong symbolical implicit meaning.  
 
The Adwa victory is also described in the Royal Chronicle of Menilek II57 with grace and 
glory. It is worth to quote the following passage including the Emperor’s return to Addis 
Ababa after the successful campaign: “When he [Menilek] arrived all the canyons fired a 
salute. The clergy of the five churches of Addis Ababa were waiting for him in the plain, 
and chanted: ‘The earth today celebrates the feast of Easter because she has been washed 
with Italian blood.’ Despite the inevitable sadness caused by the death of the chiefs and 
soldiers who had fallen in the battle of Adwa, the entire people trembled with joy to see the 
kingdom strengthened and Atse Menilek and Etege Taytu return safe and sound.”58 Some 
scholars59 consider the Ethiopian insufficient press on Italy after the battle as a possible root 
of the later Italian Fascist plan for invasion, because Eritrea remained Italy’s basis in the 
Horn after the Peace Treaty of Addis Ababa (1896).  
 
Italy, or better to say the Italian Prime minister Francesco Crispi, the first Italian imperialist 
statesman, as affirmed by Seton-Watson “believed that colonies were a necessity of modern 
life”. The same author considers the Adwa defeat as an imperial hangover as well as the 
forthcoming colonial ambitions in the 1930’s. The truth is that within some twenty years the 
loss was changed due to Italian nationalist movements in a challenge of Italians to create a 
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“virile, bellicose nation, which would wipe out the shame of Adwa and force the plutocratic 
imperialist powers to give justice to Italy”.60 
 
The interpretation of the meaning of Adwa became an important aspect of scientific and 
political discourse. The colonial powers perceived the result somewhat sheepishly, when e. 
g. the British pro-Italian historian George F. H. Berkeley wrote in 1902: “From the broader 
standpoint of politics and history, it seems possible that it [Adwa] heralds the rise of a new 
power in Africa – we are reminded that the natives of that continent may yet become a 
military factor worthy of our closest attention. The suggestion has already been made – 
absurd as it appears at present – that it is the first revolt of the Dark Continent against the 
domineering Europe.”61 It is often stated that the battle at Adwa pushed Ethiopia on the map 
of the modern world, though it was more the result of European engagement in Africa and 
in particular, the Italian underestimated preparation for the war. Despite the contemporary 
prejudice and European sovereignty, Menilek and Ethiopia were recognized as a real 
military power. Its racial symbolism is indubitable.  
 
The battle of Adwa did not finish the European attempt in extending the influence 
throughout the Horn. Menilek, of course, inclined to modernize his country and carefully 
listened to his European advisors. The French had the greatest influence at the Ethiopian 
court thanks to the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway construction. For France, it was a 
possibility to thwart the British plans to control Africa from Cairo to Cape Coast.62 As 
suggested by Zewde,63 Ethiopia’s post-Adwa independence was not as absolute as it would 
seem. The treaties signed at the beginning of the 20th century reminded Ethiopia that the 
European powers tried to achieve economic gains that the Adwa battle seemed to deny. On 
the other hand, neither the British nor the French directly strained to occupy Ethiopia, 
though there was previously at least one possibility to do so.64 
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64 The Adwa clash was preceded by the British campaign in 1868. The British Consul Captain Charles Duncan 
Cameron and his companions were captured by Emperor Tewodros in 1867. A year after, Sir R. Napier led the 
troops to rescue the diplomatic corps. After a decisive battle, Tewodros committed suicide, causing three years 
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To assess the reasons leading to the bond between Ethiopia and Italy in 1889, we may find a 
possible answer in Menilek’s letter sent to the European powers after the Adwa victory: “In 
order to put an end to the state of continual war which reigned in my country, I had been 
waiting to equip my soldiers with more firearms so that the enemies which surrounded me 
should be too frightened to attack; in this hope, I initiated friendly relations with [the kings 
of Italy] … In those days, an Italian traveler, Count Antonelli, promised that he could buy 
many firearms for me if I gave him enough ivory and gold and I rejoiced that I had met 
him.”65 An effort to extricate Ethiopia from a land-locked limitedness was a major aspect in 
Ethiopia’s foreign policy since Tewodros’s rule. The equipment of the Ethiopian army had 
always been dependent on foreign advisors and donors.66 
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Ethiopia and international politics during and after the reign of Menilek 
 
The Ethiopian economy during and after Menilek’s rule was strongly influenced by its close 
relation to Italy, France and Great Britain. According to several treaties on financial and 
economic help leading to creation of the National Bank of Abyssinia in 1905, several foreign 
banks were interested in its initiation.67 Ethiopia’s relations with Europe were based on a 
number of treaties defining their mutual borders and affairs. The treaties signed on October 
28, 1902, between Great Britain and Ethiopia, and between Great Britain, Italy and Ethiopia 
define borders between Ethiopia and the neghboring European colonies.68 The agreement 
between Great Britain, France and Italy signed on December 13, 1906 (the so-called Tripartite 
Treaty), defined European strategy and policy in Ethiopia. Article 3 of the Treaty presumed 
non-interventionist policy of the European powers in the case of possible internal changes in 
Ethiopia.69  
 
Article 4 presupposes the maintenance of Ethiopia’s integrity on the basis of the previous 
article and defines the areas of interests of all three countries.70 The following articles deal 
with specific aspects of economic interests, including the construction of Addis Ababa-Jibouti 
railway and the railway from British Somaliland to the Sudan. It is clear that the European 
officials increased their interest and turned their eyes to Ethiopia more after Menilek II came 
to power as it coincided with the Scramble for Africa. As for Menilek’s deteriorating health, 
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European diplomats feared Ethiopia would be separated into several regions governed by 
quarrelling factions and leaders.71 
 
When on November 2, 1930, the Emperor Haile Selassie I was unveiling Menilek’s Statue, he 
expressed in his speech, with his typical nobility, sincere admiration as for his predecessor: 
“Let history tell what achievements Emperor Menilek II made for his people and his country, 
for it will be impossible for Us now to enumerate them all here. No matter how intelligent and 
brave, no one on earth can escape death and Emperor Menilek II had to pass from this world 
on December 13, 1913, after having worked as much as he could for the growth of Ethiopia 
and the progress of his people.”72 The truth is that despite many controversial opinions on 
Menilek’s policy toward “periphery”, or his colonizing policy, it was him who gave Ethiopia 
an international credit and respect, though uneven as compared to European countries.  
 
With the death of Menilek in 1913, the throne was open to Lej Iyyasu, whose time in power 
brought various challenges to the Orthodox Church and the foreign powers. His short-term 
reign was characterized by contradiction and inconsistency73 when he undertook several 
campaigns against southern Ethiopia resulting in enslavement of dozens of thousands 
individuals, or when he expressed his support to Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, the 
Somali leader successfuly fighting against the British in the British Somaliland. After the 
beginning of World War I, Iyyasu extended his relations with Germany and Turkey - in order 
not to be strictly dependent on France, Britain and Italy - which was a process that had begun 
already during the Menilek’s rule.74 The Allies sent a note to the Ethiopian government in 
1916, protesting against Iyyasu’s policy. On September 27, Iyyasu was deposed and 
Menilek’s daughter Zawditu was designated heir to the throne. Iyyasu fled to the Afar region 
where he became a fugitive for the following five years.75 
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The three European powers maintained their policy towards Ethiopia insisting on continuity 
of the Ethiopian independence. In a dispatch sent to Addis Ababa on August 4, 1917,76 by a 
French representative, France promises to send 30,000 guns and 6 million cartridges. The 
three powers pledged not to cease any part along the Ethiopian frontier to Germany, Austria 
or Turkey after the war.77 The Agreement can be seen as a direct response to the previous 
period of the reign of Lej Iyyasu, whose contacts with Germany and Turkey were for the 
Three Powers and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church unacceptable. Contacts with Germany 
occurred in various ways, resulting in military programs of different types, and with strategic 
aims, as suggested by Scholler.78  
 
World War I did not mean a change in Italian policy toward the Horn of Africa. The Treaty of 
London of April 26, 1915, and its Article 13 granted Italy territorial gains in Libya, Eritrea 
and Somaliland if England and France enlarge their colonies by absorption of the German 
territories.79 After the World War, the Allied Powers were not motivated to allow Italy to 
enlarge its colonial domains. Partly, it was because their own interests and uwillingness to 
share the potential prize with a rival. The other, and more serious reason originated in Italy’s 
ambiguous attitude during the war, especially its failure to declare war on Germany until 
August 28, 1916, had done much to weaken its position. Italy thus failed to obtain from 
France and Britain their Red Sea colonies. Both powers also did not allow it to abandon the 
guaranteed independence of Ethiopia.80  
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Italy hoped for gaining huge benefits after the end of World War I in exchange for entering 
the war. The most important part for Italy was Article 13 of the Treaty of London signed on 
April 26, 1915. Italy would receive extensions of its territory in Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland 
if England and France should enlarge their colonial empires by absorption of the German 
colonies. Italian interests in Ethiopia after the battle of Adwa and the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 
were renewed in 1913 and 1914, when the Director-General of Political Affairs in the 
Ministry of Colonies, Giacomo Agnesa, met the British Ambasador Sir James Rennell Rodd 
within several talks. On the background of the Tripartite Treaty, Italy sought to determine 
more precisely its interests in East Africa.  
 
The main Italian concern in this early phase was to achieve the possession of Kismayu in 
Southern Somalia. After entering World War I, the discussion of further colonial settlement 
increased as the minimum and maximum programs were put in by the Colonial Ministry 
demanding the abrogation of the Tripartite Treaty. Besides the demands on control of the Red 
Sea and extension of Italy’s colonial territory, Rome often repeated that Italy “was certainly 
not pushed into this war by imperialist goals, but only by the task of completing her national 
unity.”81  
 
As the post-war discussion was nearing its end, Italy was aware of its disadvantaged position, 
as documented by Minister Colosimo’s condemnation: “What is taking place in Ethiopia is 
unique. A representative of an associated Power and a representative of an allied Power which 
signed a special accord for Ethiopia with us are inciting Ethiopian public opinion against 
Italy, making a peaceful discussion of the Italian programme at the Peace Conference 
impossible….What idea can the Ethiopian Government have of the solidarity of the Allied 
and Associated Powers when they see France and America behaving in Ethiopia as enemies 
of Italy…”82 
 
The Italian embitterment after the Versailles Conference can be best illustrated on the 
example of a telegraph sent by Colosimo to Orlando, whose words coincide with statements 
of Fascist leaders from the 1920’s claiming the Italian right for colonial expansion, which had 
been forbidden by the Peace Conference. After the third meeting of the Committee on Article 
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13 on May 2, 1919, Colosimo wrote the following: “It appears that there is nothing more to 
hope for, except the rectification of the borders in Northern Africa; the cession of a part of 
British Somaliland, which it would be a great mistake to accept, for without Djibouti it would 
bring us burdens and not benefits; and the definition of Kismayu. No mandates were assigned 
to us. To sum up, the colonial question, of the highest importance to Italy, is about to resolve 
itself in betrayal.”83 From many other statements in the pre-Fascist and then the Fascist era, it 
is clear that despite those declarations claiming almost absence of any colonial ambitions at 
entering the war, the results of the post-war processes became a bitter end since in the era of 
colonialism, what else could have a country like Italy demand as a reward? 
 
If the main scope of this work is to examine the uneven position of Ethiopia within 
international affairs, one of the aspects, largely extravagating the narrow Italian-Ethiopian 
case, was the embargo on arms sales to Ethiopia from 1916 to 1930 that put Ethiopians into 
an uneven role among the sovereign states since Ethiopia had no military industry of its own 
and could have been handicapped within possible military affairs in the Horn. Italy, after its 
defeat at Adwa, and with its uncertain position among the Allies during World War I, felt that 
Ethiopia would be a better neighbor without a huge military arsenal.84  
 
On September 12, 1916, the Tripartite Powers explained their action in a joint note regarding 
Lej Iyyasu’s misleading behavior towards the Allies on the side of Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Turkey. The French, striving for having sufficiently established a colony in 
Djibouti continuously maneuvered to provide guns and ammunition to Ethiopia, though it was 
Italy and Britain who successfully blocked the arms deliveries.85 Since France was willing to 
increase its economic incomes from the trade with Ethiopa with an effort to break the 
embargo, it was the Paris government who initiated the question of Ethiopia’s possible 
membership in the League of Nations. As a signatory power, Ethiopia could obtain as many 
arms as needed. The British position was motivated in the economic sphere as well, when the 
British sought to build the Lake Tana Dam for the Gezira region irrigation, but with the 
embargo on arms sales to Ethiopia it looked complicated to realize these plans. After a series 
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of discussion, being aware of broader economic aspects, Italians finally conceded that it 
would be worthy to support Ethiopia’s admission to the League.86 
 
In order to observe the Italian-Ethiopian relations in the 1930’s, we should take a deeper look 
at Ethiopian politics after the reign of Menilek II. While Menilek’s rule was characterized by 
strong centralization and power in the hands of the capital and Menilek himself, it was (except 
for the last years before his death) a clear and respective partner for the Europeans. The period 
from 1913 to 1930 was a little uncertain as compared to the previous one. The situation 
changed after Ras Tafari was crowned Emperor Haile Selassie in 1930. For answering the 
question why Ethiopia attracted Italians, we have to consider multiple aspects. 
 
First and foremost, we should ask why Ethiopia had never been colonized by any other 
European power. We may divide the reasons into four major groups: geographical, religious, 
political and racial. First, the geographical setting in which Ethiopia built its kingdom, was 
never easy to access for foreign visitors, thus it created an image of isolated country.87 
Tibebu88 shows the influence of its isolation image as one of the major aspects in Western 
Ethiopianist studies. Tibebu correctly criticizes this view as ignoring some crucial historical 
events – the British expedition reaching Maqdala, the Mahdist campaign setting Gondar on 
fire, or the Italian troops defeated at Adwa. The latter was explained by hostility of Ethiopia’s 
terrain. The isolation image has disappeared mostly due to the Italian investment policies and 
building roads that connected the so-far hardly accessible places with the center.  
 
Second, Ethiopia was the only African country that converted to Christianity,89 but religious 
mythology was not pointed out of Ethiopia. It also played a major role in a political discourse 
inside the country. Traditionally, the Amhara people viewed themselves as inhabiting a 
Christian area surrounded by “hostile” Muslims. European allies showed their supportive role 
at least once when the Portuguese army helped to stop invading Ahmad Gragn’s troops in 
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1541-1543. The idea of Ethiopia as a Christian outpost was strong in Europe. On the other 
hand, the reason why the British did not occupy Ethiopia after their mission in 1868 stays 
unclear. The solution might be seen in the creation of an image. Ethiopia’s connection with 
the distant past based on the story of Queen Sheba and King Solomon served to project the 
power of the modern state into the past that has its biblical roots. Thus, a logical alliance with 
European Christianity made Ethiopia safe as compared to other ancient African kingdoms 
which were colonized at the turn of the 19th century.  
 
Third, race as a factor in the history of Ethiopia played a role in the pre-Fascist period as well 
as during Mussolini’s campaign – both in a diverse mode. In the inner Ethiopian policy, race 
was a major aspect of political mythology as well as religion. The ruling Amhara elites 
invented an image of their superiority over other – especially Cushitic90 languages speaking 
people – inhabiting mainly the Ethiopian “periphery”. This opposition has its correlates in the 
modern history when some Eritrean and Oromo intellectuals challenged these readings of 
history.91 Unfortunately for them, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union supported the Amhara 
version in order to extend their own influence.92 The Amhara version was logically closer to 
the anthropological thought of the 19th and early 20th century Europe with the Hamitic 
hypothesis93 and racial prejudice. On the other hand, scholars are divided into two groups 
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when talking about the so-called Ethiopian colonialism.94 This view is popular mainly in 
Oromo and Somali intellectual circles.95 Some European authors usually stress Menilek’s role 
in saving Ethiopia from being colonized by European powers.96 The discussion on Ethiopian 
colonialism and its extent remains unresolved. 
 
There has been only a limited focus on the era between WWI and the Wal Wal Incident (ca 
1914-1934) dealing with mutual Italian-Ethiopian relations. It has already been stated that 
scholars usually focused on the period of 1935-1941, which overshadowed the post-WWI era 
that in many ways anticipated the tragedy of 1935. The effort of European diplomacy to 
strengthen its economic influence in the Horn of Africa characterized the period.97 On the 
other hand, territorial expansion was focused on Somalia, while Ethiopia survived its 
independence and nothing seemed to violate its borders. Since Adwa, Ethiopia’s position was 
bolstered by the international situation at the turn of the 19th century when Russia, the United 
States, France and Belgium recognized Ethiopia’s sovereignty and refused to accept its 
designation as a “tribal” African jurisdiction.98 The reason to do so may be seen in the 
economic sphere as well.  
 
Ras Tafari was welcome warmly during his visit in Rome in 1924 and he met Mussolini by 
whom he was impressed.99 His awareness of possible Italian danger was greater and he 
rejected the Italian offer of a ninety-nine-year lease for a free port in Assab in return for 
creation of economic concessions.  
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On August 2, 1928, the Italian-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration 
between the Kingdom of Italy and the Empire of Ethiopia was signed in Addis Ababa.100 
From the general point of view, the most important was Article 2, which was a follow-up to 
the previous Treaties, indicating that Italy and Ethiopia “bind themselves reciprocally not to 
undertake, under any pretext, any action which might prejudice or injure the independence of 
the other, and to safeguard the interests of their respective countries”. In addition, Road 
Agreement and Lease for a Free Zone in Assab was formalized. By Italians, this was partly 
conceived as a great victory especially after several disappointments beginning with the 
Treaty of Versailles. Italy articulated that this moment was the beginning of peaceful 
penetration of Italy into Africa and the Middle East. Podestà101 thinks that it is possible that 
Mussolini had peaceful intentions and really sought to develop economic relations with 
Ethiopia. Further actions and events showed us that effective application of the treaty failed 
and they were not useful for development of mutual economic and peaceful relations. 
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A Brief Account on Colonies in Eritrea and Somalia – background for further expansion 
 
Italian colonial ambitions in Ethiopia were strengthened by the fact that Italy had already 
established domains in Somalia and Eritrea. Moreover, Eritrea was seen as “traditional” 
Italian colony and as an entering gate to Africa. Good accounts on Italy’s colonial times in 
Eritrea can be found in Negash, Pateman, Pankhurst and Trevaskis,102 while Somalia’s 
colonial subjugation is sufficiently discussed in Hess and Lewis.103 From the contemporary 
perspective, it is obvious that the colonial administrative in Eritrea had established a much 
more sophisticated system due to several reasons. First, Somalia was not very suitable for 
effective agricultural activity104 while Eritrean plateaus were used as a source of settlement 
and raw materials. No colonial power saw Somalia as a source of wealth, except for Italy. 
Second, Eritrea was the first Italian colony in Africa since 1890 and many Italians settled in 
areas with mild climate.105  
 
The first Italian trade station was established at Adale, where the Somali leaders had signed a 
treaty of protection with V. Filonardi and Co., in 1891. Local authorities were represented by 
an Arabian agent and a small group of Somali soldiers.106 There we can place the origin of the 
colony Italians used for another fifty years. Together with Eritrea Italian Somaliland 
presented a base for invasion in 1935. Unlike Italians, the British had to struggle the local 
Somali Muslim leaders in British Somaliland, who were united within Muslim brotherhoods. 
The most famous of them was Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, called by the British “Mad 
Mullah”. His ideology was influenced by a meeting with Sayyid Muhammad Salih in Mecca. 
After Hassan’s return to Somalia, he began to preach the message of the Salihiya Order and 
he attracted a large number of followers to the port of Berbera. He believed that Christian 
involvment in Africa sought to destroy the Muslim sphere which resulted in his challenge to 
remove the English from Somaliland. Moreover, Ethiopian engagement in the campaign 
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based on capturing of the booty of the Dervishes as the Somali leaders were commonly called, 
only set the Ogadenese feelings against the Ethiopians on fire causing several counter-attacks 
at Jijjiga.107  
 
For Britain, Somaliland did not mean a “pearl” in the colonial “crown”, the aim of the British 
was to control their economic interests or, as stated by I. M. Lewis,108 “Britain’s interest was 
strictly limited to seeing that no hostile power held the shore opposite Aden and to ensuring 
that the Aden garrison’s meat supplies from the Somali coast were unhampered”. On the 
contrary, for Italians, Somalia was a major aim, except for Eritrea, since the Italian colonial 
empire was much smaller than that of the British or the French, and Italy was thus seeking its 
place in the sun. Somalia was an important area not only because of the strategic meaning on 
the Benadir coast, but also because of its position as a “gate” to Ethiopia. Similar to the 
British Somaliland, hostility towards the colonizers was such that, as reported by the 
Governor of Somalia, Tommaso Carletti (1907-1910), “a European could not venture outside 
any of the coastal towns without an escort of armed soldiers”.109  
 
There has been a discussion over the motives of Italians for settling the area and over the 
relations between them and the people in Eritrea. While Negash110 argues that Eritrean 
resistance thwarted the scarce settlement of poor Italian farmers, Pateman111 maintains the 
position that the resistance was limited mainly to the areas suitable for European colonization. 
In addition, Trevaskis112 states that “Italy had looked on Eritrea as a clearing-house from 
which Italian manufactured goods were distributed to Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Arabia in 
exchange for the raw materials needed by Italian industry”, and concludes that “throughout 
the Italian régime the Eritrean remained content, docile, and obedient to his rulers”.113 Thus, 
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in the later phase, there was only a limited resistance against Italy. The author114 argues that in 
the inhospitable areas where mainly the Muslim pastoralists grazed their herds, there was 
almost no resistance against Italy due to the fact that these grazing areas, inhabited mainly by 
the Afar and Beni Amer, were not suitable for agricultural activity and therefore it was not 
appropriate for Italian farmers to settle here. The conflict was limited mainly on the Tigrean 
part. 
 
The idea that Italians preferred Eritrea in the early phase of colonial planning is supported 
also by McCann115 whose account on agricultural history may correspond to the previous 
theories. McCann states that as early as 1890, Italian “policy makers had in mind a 
‘colonizzazione agricola’ for the highlands of Eritrea and Ethiopia, which would provide 
exportable foodstuffs and support a further ‘demographic colonization’ of Italy’s surplus 
population in Ethiopia’s highlands”.116 Even the former basis of Società Geografica Italiana 
was used for agricultural experiments. Though Pankhurst117 considered the Italian experiment 
in Eritrea as a “complete failure”, the idea of Italian settlement in the cold highlands of Eritrea 
played a key role in their colonial planning at the end of the 19th century.118  
 
Thus, we may conclude that the early phase of colonization of Eritrea (and in a lower extent 
Somalia) was characterized mainly by economic and agricultural motives; political and 
ideological causes came many years after. Compared to Italian emigration to other parts of the 
world, including Argentina, the USA or France, African colonies played only a marginalized 
role. The main emigration waves to Eritrea, and to a lesser extent Libya and Somalia, counted 
maximally dozens of thousands of Italian peasants, while emigration to the USA and 
Argentina in the 1920’s, caused mainly by worsening economic situation, needed to be 
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counted in hundreds of thousands individuals.119 Larebo120 also discussed a changing attitude 
towards Eritrea as a colony in Italian political thought. He states that the Italians were proud 
of not taking their colonization of Eritrea as an exploitative act. This approach was only 
emphasized after the Adwa defeat. Italy rather turned to developing of the country – perhaps 
wary of a political backlash – and thus they spent most of the “colonial” finances on defence, 
administration and agriculture.121 
 
If Somalia had an inferior position in the Italian settlement policy, its meaning in further 
Italian expansion is indubitable. Since the 1880’s, the line of the Ethiopian and Somalian 
border was at least uncertain. The borders were vaguely defined in a series of treaties between 
1884 and 1886, in which the tribes on the northern Somali coast were made the object of the 
British Protectorate. The boundary between Ethiopia and the Italian territory was the matter of 
the 1908 Treaty. The specific problems of Ethiopian-Somalian borders will be discussed in 
chapter IV. Finally, we may assume that if Eritrea was an agricultural and economic basis for 
Italian colonization, Somalia became a playground for further territorial expansion, or at least 
a weak point from where the Italians could provoke Ethiopia and cause a conflict.122  
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Ethiopia’s Admission to the League of Nations in broader context 
 
Ethiopia’s efforts to become a member of the League of Nations had both its followers and 
opposers. Ras Tafari’s efforts to modernize the country and to make Ethiopia a member of the 
League was slowed down by a group of conservatives in the government who blocked the 
necessary reforms and “thereby ignorantly invited European intervention”.123 These men were 
led by the Empress and Fitawrari Habte Giorgis, both of them being strongly opposed to any 
negotiations with European countries. As proposed by Marcus,124 these people wanted to 
make a fortress around Ethiopia without any external diplomatic influence. The clash of these 
two approaches then may be seen as one of the significant aspects of Ethiopia’s internal 
politics. In 1919, a committee was elected by thousands of soldiers at the Imperial Race 
Course. They demanded Habte Giorgis’s dismissal because he opposed to the progressive 
measures the government wanted to make. The committee expressed its disgust with 
Ethiopia’s backwardness and lack of progressivity. Being aware of the complicated situation, 
Zawditu then tried to mediate a debate between Ras Tafari and Habte Giorgis by re-opening 
the discussion about Ethiopia’s entry to the League of Nations.125 
 
The Ethiopian admission to the League was preceded by a series of negotiations among the 
European powers, each maintaining their position. On November 17, 1919, Italian officials 
submitted a memorandum inviting “Great Britain to consider the backward state of 
development of Ethiopia to adopt a policy of efficacious collaboration for the progress of 
Ethiopia”.126  Italians promised to back the British concession for a dam on Lake Tana at the 
Ethiopian court in return for reciprocal support for the railway connecting Eritrea with Italian 
Somaliland.  
 
It may be seen as one of the paradoxes accompanying the modern history of Ethiopia that 
Britain was the only major power openly opposed to Ethiopian membership in the League of 
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Nations. As for European scientific literature, Ethiopia was commonly described as an 
“uncivilized” or “barbarous” country. Britain accented lack of “westernization” or political 
cohesion of the African Christian kingdom.127 Unlike Britain, the role of Italy in Ethiopia’s 
admission to the League of Nations is covered with a veil of uncertainty. Some scholars 
accented Italy’s key position and supportive role;128 others were a bit reserved as for 
Mussolini’s intellectuals dealing with the theory of Fascism and its supportive role in the 
Ethiopian case.129 Moreover, in my opinion, the Adwa complex was present in the Italian 
political thinking since 1896 and was strengthened by the 1922 Mussolini’s accession to 
power.130  
 
At the beginning of 1922, the situation reached its impasse as a member of the British 
legation at Addis Ababa, dr. Sharp wrote an article for Westminster Gazzette describing the 
extent of slavery in Ethiopia. In his view, slavery in Ethiopia was totally uncontrollable and 
slaves were even employed in the British legation (see also chapter V). A number of officials 
in the British Foreign Office stated that slavery could be wiped out only if the three powers 
policed their respective areas, which meant the partition of Ethiopia. This was the case that 
many British were afraid of because it was Britain who could lose most in the potential 
partition based on the 1906 Treaty.131  
  
On August 7, 1922, Ethiopia sent a delegation to Geneva with a letter from Ras Tafari 
Mekonen. The delegates132 signed an accord and returned to Addis Ababa where the Emperor 
thought it would protect Ethiopia from any Italian attack.133 The major aspect of the 
international and mainly Italian distrust towards Ethiopia, slavery, had been – according to the 
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Emperor – misunderstood. In his autobiography, Haile Selassie I134 gives an explanation of 
the origin of such a misunderstanding, it is thus worthy to take a deeper look in his view:  
“The reason is that in Ethiopia, from the 15th to the 18th century,135 the power of 
Muslims and pagans had prevailed against her, […], while many of her provinces 
rebelled against the reign of the Emperor, establishing their own nobility and 
looting the country. But later on the kings before Us, and in particular Emperor 
Menilek, conquered these provinces in battle and restored them as of old to the 
unity of Ethiopia; and so for all those who had come by way of capture in war, it 
had been the custom that they should live in slavery to their captor – in 
accordance with ancient usage. Nevertheless, those who had come as prisoners of 
war were scarcely distinguishable in appearance from other Ethiopians, and 
therefore it is very difficult identify them as slaves. Thus the slavery of some was 
in name only, but in their mode of living they were not much different from their 
captors.“  
 
The Emperor moreover concluded that those who had been taken in service for a wage were 
mistakenly perceived by Italians as slaves. Therefore, slavery was used in the Italian Fascist 
propaganda as one of the key aspects.136  
 
Haile Selassie’s view is largely opposed not only by the Oromo intellectuals,137 but also by a 
part of European scholars dealing with slave trade in the Indian Ocean or Northeastern 
Africa.138 Donham139 asserts that “slavery and ivory were not ‘produced’ at all but were the 
booty products of Abyssinian predation”, while Sowell140 adds that “Ethiopian women were 
sold for higher prices than Negro women”. In the Ethiopian political and idelogical discourse, 
the case of slavery has a lot in common with the Oromo/Amharic or the Amharic/non-
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Amharic historical opposition in general. As for the Oromo people, they were somehow made 
a “category” placed between the ruling Amhara and the slaves, called Shanqilla.141 In 
addition, Ewald142 shows how Ethiopia was connected to the Nile Valley System and the Red 
Sea Trade during the 19th century.  
 
The flow of slaves from the Ethiopian Blue Nile increased even before Menilek’s reign, as 
reported by European travelers of that time. On the other hand, it would be correct to say that 
slave trade in the Red Sea area was a domain for Arab slave traders. There was a different 
situation in southern and southwestern Ethiopia where bandits and merchants, regardless of 
religion (not necessarily Muslims), captured their victims and used them mostly for 
agricultural work.143 It is not the aim of this study to give a deep focus on slavery in Ethiopia, 
but only to present different opinions on its existence because slavery was used as one of the 
crucial propaganda tools. For counterbalance, Haile Selassie’s assertions on the history of 
slavery in Ethiopia do not correspond with the usual scholar conclusions considering 
Ethiopian slavery much older than it might seem.144  
 
Slavery was one of the aspects that were used by Italians to advocate their ambiguity to 
Ethiopian membership in the League of Nations. According to diplomatic sources, it seems 
evident that European powers, France and Britain, were aware of Italian opposition long 
before Ethiopia entered the League.145 Mussolini himself was aware of the fact that stressing 
Ethiopian slavery is worth it since it was mainly the British press146 who at the beginning of 
the 1920’s emphasized Ethiopian slavery in order to show the backwardness of the African 
country and to prepare a better position of Britain for further influence. Slavery was thus a 
tool for provoking more tensions legitimately, as Mussolini stated that the fact “that there is 
slavery in Ethiopia, that is the buying and selling of human beings, is admitted by the negus 
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himslef. That this trade takes atrocious forms is documented in a thousand reports, mostly 
carried out by the English, the latest being published in 1932”.147 
 
Italian pressure on expelling Ethiopia from the League increased in the first half of the 1930’s 
emphasizing racist prejudice and European supremacy. Dino Grandi, regardless of his 
diplomatic status, stressed Italy’s willingness to expel Ethiopia from the League, as his 
conversation with Robert Vansittart shows: “Do not tell me that it is difficult for the Great 
European Powers: England, France and Italy to find thousand and more ‘juridical’ reasons to 
expel from Geneva those slavers and savages of Negro race who live in a permanent state of 
banditery and anarchy.”148  
 
On the other hand, as I will show later in this thesis, it was mainly Britain through its press 
who stressed slavery as a major problem putting Ethiopia outside the League. The discussion 
over Ethiopian slavery cannot be overestimated since it has to be clearly differentiated 
whether we talk about slavery in Ethiopia or slavery out of Ethiopia, leading to Arab states or 
the Ottoman Empire. As Tibebu149 argues, there was no genuine slavery in Ethiopia, since 
Ethiopia always belonged to slave-owning societies. Tibebu states that the relationship 
between a master and his “slave” was remarkably different from the example of American 
slaves in the 18th or the 19th century since in American slaves were not allowed to wear drums 
because it was feared that they could communicate through sounds. In Ethiopia, boys 
(“slaves”) were wearing a gun of their masters, and masters trusted them. Tibebu quotes from 
Baum’s account on Addis Ababa slavery in 1927 where a “slave boy was trotting at the right 
side of his master’s mule, gun in bright satin case over his shoulder”.150 
 
While there was a rich complexity of slavery in Ethiopia differing from slavery known in 
Arab countries or America, European powers were not willing to differ between those and 
used the existence of slavery for their purposes. One thing that, in my opinion, differed 
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Ethiopia from many other examples was that household slavery could be replaced by 
household servitude and thus ex-household slaves became household servants.151 Slavery in 
Ethiopia was at the beginning of the 1920’s a hot theme not only in the diplomatic circles but 
also especially in daily press, it meant a threat to Ethiopia’s admission to the League as one 
could suppose. Perham152 states that the British anti-admission attitude towards Ethiopia was 
felt with great strength with its anti-slavgery tradition. In 1926, an international Slavery 
Convention was drawn up and Ethiopia was a signatory but it never ratified this adherence.153 
The fact that slavery kept the British in discomposure can be seen when the Anti-Slavery 
Society sent a mission to Addis Ababa in 1932 to discuss the progressivity of abolition of 
slavery, the Emperor expressed “little more than his general assurance that he would abolish 
slavery altogether within a period of fifteen or at most twenty years”.154  
 
Finally, on August 1, 1923, Ras Tafari applied for membership in the Legue of Nations on 
behalf of Ethiopia and incorporated his country into the world system, though the position of 
Ethiopia in the League was challenged until the invasion. Besides slavery, another 
controversial question was the embargo on arms sales. Since many publications focused on 
the period of 1935-1936, the embargo on arms sales to Ethiopia put this African state in 
confusion and disadvantage. The embargo was put into legal force on September 12, 1916, 
and it was explained by Lej Iyyasu’s actions in favor of Islam and the Central Powers during 
World War I.  
 
Iyyasu was seen not only in Addis Ababa as a potential threat to Ethiopia’s independence and 
integrity. The European powers did not proceed with the same intensity. While the French 
continuously maneuvered to provide weapons to Ethiopians, Italians and the British blocked 
deliveries.155 During his visit to Europe, Ras Tafari tried to moderate the embargo on arms 
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sales which resulted in the Weapons Control Edict of April 9, 1924, which aimed to limit and 
control arms import into Ethiopia through increased government oversight and more 
responsible merchandizing.156  
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Treaties and mistrust 
 
In 1925, Great Britain and Italy signed an agreement which clarified their interests in the 
Horn of Africa. Because France was not included, it seemed as a violation of the 1906 accord. 
Ethiopia perceived the document with distress and anxiety, and as a dangerous expression of 
European diplomatic imperialism that might be viewed as a prelude to further military 
actions. Italian economic interests in western Ethiopia were recognized by Great Britain157 
and since this time we may count with an increased Italian emphasis on economic supremacy 
in Ethiopia leading to military preparations in the 1930’s. Mussolini wrote a letter to the 
British governmentstating that his country would never construct any dam on the White or the 
Blue Nile which would affect the flow of these rivers and that Italy would always respect 
British interests in the Sudan and Egypt.158 Ethiopia’s reaction was predictable as “on June 
15, 1926, Tafari addressed identical notes to Britain and Italy, protesting their apparent 
intention to infringe on Ethiopia’s independence and best interests...Four days later…Tafari 
took his case to the League of Nations.”159  
 
Beck,160 in his study regarding the Ethiopian appeal to the League of Nations, concludes that 
the British government soon realized that the agreement with Italy resulted in reduction of 
chances to secure Ethiopian approval of the Lake Tana scheme. On the other hand, it was 
France that welcomed the involvement of the League since the French were unhappy of being 
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presented with a fait accompli. Beck then presents the engagement of the League as an 
Ethiopian hollow victory in the Lake Tana dispute, “since the inherent instability of the 
international situation meant that such a success was unlikely to be repeated”.161 
 
As stated by Hickey,162 Tafari’s appeal was rather symbolic because Ethiopia, though being a 
member of the League of Nations, did not have any means for changing or influencing the 
accords of the European colonial powers. The only thing that changed was the fact that the 
tripartite agreement was replaced by a bilateral one; the European interest increased and 
seemed more dangerous for Ethiopia. The British-Italian-Ethiopian “correspondence” was 
largely viewed by the European press163 giving a word to Ras Tafari’s appeals. For a more 
complex overview of the then public opinion on Ethiopia in Europe, let us take a look at the 
following chapter.  
 
On August 2, 1928, Italy and Ethiopia signed the Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration whose 
Article 1 says that there will be constant peace and friendship between both countries, while 
Article 2 refuses any action leading towards threatening the other’s independence.164 Giuliano 
Cora and Ras Tafari also formalized a Road Agreement and Lease for a Free Zone in Asab.165 
Before the invasion in 1935, when Italy presented its report at Geneva regarding Ethiopia’s 
violations of international treaties, the 1928 Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration was one of 
the treaties he criticized. One of the agreements was that:  
“It is not possible to develop any agricultural activity in Ethiopia, also because the 
Ethiopian government, by violating particular obligations prescribed by treaty in 
comparison with Italy, did not hesitate to forbid acquisition of realities and 
property by foreigners. By this they pushed down not only numerous societies 
subjected to colonial law in Ethiopia, but also every Italian citizen able to initiate 
work in country to inferior conditions and made thus further Italian participation 
in development of the country impossible”.166 
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While Popolo d’Italia writes about Duce’s remarkable ability to lead Italy towards its place in 
the sun,167 The Times are more sceptical and warn from the Italian effort for a superpower 
position in the world, for which this Treaty is the last evidence.168  
 
Since the Treaty of Friendship, it Italy seemed to have gained a certain confidence in mutual 
negotiation and became aware of its supreme position over Ethiopia. From this point, it is 
reported by non-Italian sources that arrogance and bluff were becoming characteristic for 
Italians in Ethiopia.169 The Italian propaganda sought to use every possible means to point at 
Ethiopian incapability and chaos of the state. Baron Franchetti’s expedition leading through 
the Danakil (Afar) lands was warned by the Ethiopian government of possible danger. Baron 
Franchetti decided to make his trip despite this warning. By traveling through the Afar desert, 
he reached the edge of the Ethiopian highlands where he was attacked by a group of Afar and 
Oromo warriors. It was reported that after the clash had occurred, there were fifteen dead on 
the side of the attackers while Franchetti lost only two men. The unequal relationship can be 
documented on Ras Tafari’s decision not to blame Italians for causing the conflict though 
they had been warned before. When the American ambassador in Addis Ababa asked his 
Italian colleague about this incident, it seemed as if he “appeared to take considerable pride in 
the report that Franchetti had killed fifteen of the attackers and lost only two of his own 
men”.170 As added by Southard, Franchetti’s expedition had one major goal, to explore the 
desert in order to find possibilities for further economic development after the Treaty of 
Friendship. It gave Italians a good position, and almost monopoly for economic cooperation 
with Ethiopia. Events from the second half of the 1920’s also gave Italians confidence 
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example of Baron Franchetti’s expedition to the Danakil (Afar) land.; DEP 1977: 167. 
 
170 Addison E. Southard to the Secretary of State, May 7, 1929.; DEP 1977: 168. 
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necessary for their peripheral actions and policy directed to dismantle or at least weaken Ras 
Tafari/Haile Selassie’s centralizing policy.171  
                                                
171 Larebo 2006: 47-48. 
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V Imagining Ethiopia  
 
Linguistically, Fascism has its origin in the word fascio (pl. fasci), which may mean bundle 
or, in its political context, union or league, which seems as a more exact translation. Fasci di 
combattimento thus represented combat unions resulting in formation of a political program 
encompassing the abolition of monarchy, confiscation of church property, nationalization of 
arms industry, an eight-hour working day with a minimum wage, worker participation in 
industry, votes for women or abolition of the nonelected Senate. As Gregor states,172 before 
World War II “some analysts had gone so far as to insist that ‘fascism’ was the product of 
‘orgasm anxiety’, a sexual dysfunction that found release only in ‘mystic intoxication’, 
homicidal hostility, and the complete suppression of rational thought”. In 1919, after the 
dissillusionment by World War I, radical nationalists were gaining benefits due to the 
worsened economic situation and deteriorating social tensions.  
 
Race  
 
The Italian term razza, used by both nationalists and early Fascists, did not refer to race in a 
narrow sense, but rather to “people” or “nation” signifying generally larger moral and 
spiritual concepts of culture, society, or civiltà. Mussolini’s opposition to the ideology of 
internationalism was probably best explained in his Omnia opera: “I mean to say that Fascism 
must take up the problem of race; Facsists must concern themselves with the welfare of the 
race, which is what makes history. We believe in the concept of the ‘nation’, which is for us 
an indelible, insuperable fact. We are therefore antithetical to all internationalisms.”173  
 
As for racial policy and ideology, Mussolini’s position remained constant in his opposition to 
biological racism. In 1910 he attacked the racial doctrines of Arthur de Gobineau, Vacher de 
Lapouge, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Ludwig Woltmann that had already become 
popular in Germany and in 1912 had denigrated racial interpretations of history.174 In 1931 
Mussolini, in his talk with Emil Ludwig, argued that “there are no pure races left; not even 
                                                
172 Gregor 2005: 1. 
 
173 Quoted by Bernardini, G. (1977): The Origins and Development of Racial Anti-Semitismin Fascist Italy. The 
Journal of Modern History 49 (3): 431-453.; Bernardini 1977: 433. 
 
174 Bernardini 1977: 438. 
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Jews have kept their blood unmingled...Race! It is a feeling, not a reality; ninety five per cent, 
at least, is a feeling. Nothing will ever make me believe that biologically pure races can be 
shown to exist today…No such doctrine will ever find wide acceptance here in 
Italy…National pride has no need of the delirium of race.”175 
 
Italian racial attitudes had nothing to do (at least in the early phase) with anti-Semitism, which 
is documented in regard to Ethiopia by an effort of dr. Faitlovich to establish a Jewish school 
in Addis Ababa. According to his presumption, the school was important as a tool of 
education for the local Ethiopian Falasha community. Interestingly, when dr. Faitlovich 
negotiated with the British over funding of the school, the British refused his proposals. After 
this refusal, Faitlovich turned to Italians who promised him to grant a patronage to it. The 
school itself existed until 1937, though the construction was already interrupted by the Italian 
invasion and seizure of the capital.176 In spite of the military act, Italians were willing to 
support Jewish activities in Ethiopia before 1936. Since Italian anti-Semitism177 is far beyond 
the scope of this work, let us focus on how race was perceived by the pre-war Italy.  
 
In his Omnia Opera Mussolini gives us an example of how he perceives the problem of race 
in connection to Ethiopia, as he admits that certain aspects emphasized by the press were of 
secondary importance to him and to Italy. The reason why the Italian-Ethiopian conflict was 
nearing and became unstoppable was not race:  
“We Fascists acknowledge the existence of races, their differences and their 
hierarchy, but we do not propose to present ourselves to the world as the 
embodiment of the White race set against other races, we do not intend to make 
ourselves the preachers of segregation and of racial hatreds when we see that our 
fiercest critics are not Negroes of Harlem – who could profitably use their time to 
                                                
175 Bernardini 1977: 439. 
 
176 Grinfeld, I. (1980): Jews in Addis Ababa: beginnings of the jewish community until the Italian occupation. 
In: Goldenberg, G. (ed.): Ethiopian Studies. Proceedings of the sixth international conference, Tel-Aviv, 14-17 
April 1980 (pp.  251-259). Rotterdam-Boston: A.A.Balkema.; Grinfeld 1980: 256-257. 
 
177 It is true that racism and anti-Semitism in Italy before 1935 was not a theme of such an importance as in 
Hitler’s Germany. In Italy, there were no concentration camps for Jews. First, because the Jewish community in 
Italy was small (in 1938 it is reported that only 47 thousand Jews lived in Italy), second, because the Jewish 
community was important. Jews were a group of businessmen, playing an importnat role in commerce, banking, 
etc. Jews even played a crucial role in financing some local fascist groups at the beginning of existence of the 
movement, as was the example of Ferrara in the period of 1920-1922. Anti-Semitism only became a theme after 
Germany had gained control over the central part of Italy in 1943; see more in Eatwell, R. (2003): Fascism. A 
History. London: Pimlico. 
 
 54 
take care of their colleagues who are daily and Christianly lynched in the United 
States – but are mostly genuine Whites in Europe and America.”178 
 
Racism as a colonial aspect cannot be easily defined and described since there is no clear 
connection between the French, the British, the German, the Italian, the Portuguese or the 
Spanish colonial thoughts.179 From the present-day point of view, acts of the Portuguese in 
Angola, or Germans in South-West Africa can be easily called racist ones since the law which 
existed there considered the “white” superior to the “native”. The existence of “concentration 
camps” in those countries as well as in South Africa during the war in 1899-1902 can support 
the opinion that colonialism went hand in hand with racism, or at least brutality. An example 
of Italy in the 1920’s and the 1930’s shows remarkably similar aspects as that of Germany in 
the pre-World War I period. Germany, as the last great colonial power, tried to make up for 
lost time by increased brutality and extraordinary violence that preceeded the Nazi period.180 
Italy in the 1920’s and especially in the second half of the 1930’s can be perceived as a 
country willing to gain quickly what it was not able to gain before. The increased brutality, 
the use of poison gas181 and racial prejudice leading to establishment of racial laws in 1938 go 
together with colonial, Fascist thoughts desiring for their place in the sun. Of course, the 
racial thoughts became important in Ethiopia after the conquest, but we can see previous 
attempts for dividing populations on the basis of their “qualities” in the Italian colonies, 
Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. On an example of other Italian colonies, mainly Eritrea and 
Libya, Mia Fuller analyzed how racial prejudice and the myth of superiority were used by 
Italian architecture and urbanism of the 1920’s and the 1930’s.182 
                                                
178 Omia Opera di Benito Mussolini, in Griffin 1995: 75. 
 
179 A brief, but readible and informative account on comparative history of the early period of colonialism is 
given by Saccone, S.; Broccoli, L.; Maurizi, G. (1979): Aspetti politici ed economici nell’esplorazione italiana 
dell’Africa (1867-1900). Bologna: Pàtron Editore, though the main part is focused on Italian interests in Africa. 
Valuable work can be seen in Gann, L. H.; Guignan, P. (eds.) (1969): Colonialism in Africa 1870 – 1960. 
Volume One. The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870 – 1914. London: Cambridge University Press, 
though it may be considered old-fashioned and already antiquated. 
 
180 Probably the best accounts on colonial history and the Scramble of Africa are presented in Pakenham 2003, 
and Vandervort, B. (2004): Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa 1830-1914. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
181 On the use of poison gas during the Italian-Ethiopian conflict (1935-1936), several works have been written 
in the last years. Among the most promising and complex works we may include Del Boca 2007; Rochat, G. 
(2005): The Italian Air Force in the Ethiopian War (1935-1936). In: Ben-Ghiat, R.; Fuller, M. (eds.): Italian 
Colonialism (pp. 37-46). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 37-46.; Rochat, G. (2007): L’impiego dei gas nella 
guerra d’Etiopia1935-1936. In: Del Boca, A.: I gas di Mussolini. Il fascismo e la guerra d’Etiopia (pp. 69-118). 
Roma: Editori Riuniti.; Sbacchi 1997. 
 
182 Fuller, M. (1988): Building Power: Italy’s Colonial Architecture and Urbanism, 1923-1940. Cultural 
Anthropology 3 (4): 455-487. 
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Moreover, it seems that racial aspects of the conflict and the whole period were more 
discussed by West European countries or, and even more, by black immigrants in America 
and Europe. What I have not found in primary sources is the awareness of European 
politicians of severe consequences the Italian campaign could have. Having the world divided 
between France and Britain (besides other countries), it was only a matter of time when the 
colonized countries would search for their own independence. From one point of view, it may 
seem as if the Italian campaign could be an aspect causing, or better to say, accelerating 
processes of nationalism and anti-colonialism in many countries of Africa and Asia seen 
through racial eyes. As the war was getting nearer, it became clear that from the world public, 
especially from that of the colonized countries, the campaign would have serious effects on 
the shape of colonialism. A few months before the conflict, European press discussed racial 
and colonial aspects of the potential Italian threat as promoted by the British parliament: 
“Impacts of the war between Italy and Abyssinia would be extraordinarily malign 
for the League of Nations. Small and weak countries would see how their 
protection, on which they are dependent, is threatened. The pacts which had been 
negotiated with such an effort in the interest of European safety would be 
considered not more than a piece of paper. England does not believe in the 
necessity of clashes with the colorful people. England did not work for making a 
conflict, but rather for making a bridge between Europe and Africa, or Europe and 
Asia. England does not stand hostilely against the Italian need of expansion. If the 
Italian government has any complaints about the Ethiopian government, it has to 
be presented in an appropriate manner. The war would indispensabily lead to 
serious weakening or maybe even destruction of the powers of peace and finally 
to a huge reaction among big color races of the world.”183  
 
One cannot think that Italians, stressing the weakness, slavery and barbarity of Ethiopia, 
would underestimate Ethiopia’s power to struggle. Since Adwa, there had been certain 
consciousness of Ethiopia’s power in the public meaning, which gained respect not only in 
Italy, but also in other European countries involved in economic and political discourse of the 
Horn. When Minister Emilio De Bono arrived in 1932 in Italy, where he came from Eritrea, 
he stressed that it would be dangerous to let Ethiopia develop in its own way without foreign 
impact. In his words we can find also an accent towards military solution that would bring 
                                                
183 Venkov, August 2, 1935, an article titled “War would do harm to white race” (Válka by uškodila bíle rase): 
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Afrikou a mezi Evropou a Asií. Anglie nestojí nepřátelsky vůči italské potřebě rozmachu. Má-li italská vláda 
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oslabení a možná I ke zničení sil míru a konečně k velkému rozruchu mezi velkými barevnými rasami světa.” 
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Ethiopia under the Italian rule. Mussolini did not fully accept his suggestion.184 His speech 
contributes to the fact that some kind of military preparations had existed already before 
1933/1934, which is usually taken as the year of a final decision.185 On March 22, 1932, De 
Bono wrote to Mussolini that:  
“Abyssinia is an unknown, not yet clear, but can became […]. If Sellassie 
continues in organization of regular forces – as he is doing – may have a need to 
think about our deeds […]. Ethiopia, though it is a member of the League of 
Nations and lays developed civilization on people, is in fact nothing but a semi-
barbarous state. What is thus better for them to understand, or perhaps only 
comprehend, is the use of force. Our military intervention with force, if 
successful, would stabilize our situation for years. But it is not useful to think of 
it. This would require long work of preparations and hundreds of millions of 
expenses, which would be better to be spent elsewhere.”186 
 
There has been a long dispute over the status of African people, and it has been especially the 
British Colonial Office which has sought to redefine the terms “native”, “civilized” and 
“race”. Since Ethiopia became a member of the League of Nations, Ethiopians had to be 
regarded as duly civilized and treated in the same way as British (or other European) subjects 
whose states had belonged to the League earlier.187  During the 1920’s, for instance, there 
were a number of complaints by Ethiopians living in Tanganyika, the British mandate 
territory. Ethiopians wanted not to be perceived as “natives”, but as citizens of a member 
state. As concluded by Callahan, the Colonial Office then warned of the possibility of 
international litigation and noted that in a British mandated territory “an Ethiopian subject, 
whatever degree of civilization he might have attained, would be entitled to the same 
privileges of a French national in respect of such matters as the right to possess arms or to 
purchase an automobile”.188 In this quotation, we can see a good example of clash between 
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the legal order and the prevailing racial preconception. In the following chapter, we will 
discuss the problem of prejudices and preconception more in detail since it is usually 
connected with the making of myths and images. 
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Creating myths and images  
 
The roots of “imperial greatness” need to be seen in the early period of Fascism when 
Mussolini defined a myth of a nation, necessary for further expansion. Only a nation can be 
strong enough to make historical deeds. Mussolini in his Omnia Opera defines the myth of a 
nation in the following words: 
“We have created our myth. The myth is a faith, a passion. It is not necessary for 
it to be a reality. It is a reality in the sense that it is a stimulus, hope, is faith, is 
courage. Our myth is the nation, our myth is the greatness of the nation! And to 
this myth, this greatness, which we want to translate into a total reality, we 
subordinate everything else. For us the nation is not just a territory, but something 
spiritual. There are states which have had immense territories and which have left 
no trace in human history. It is not just a question of size, because there have been 
minute, microscopic states in the history which have bequeathed memorable, 
immortal specimens of art and philosophy. The greatness of the nation is the 
totality of all these qualities, of all these conditions. A nation is great when it 
translates into reality the force of its spirit. Rome becomes great when, starting 
out as a small rural democracy, it gradually spreads out across the whole of Italy 
in accordance with its spirit until it encounters the warriors of Carthage and must 
fight them. It is the first war in history, one of the first. Then, gradually, it bears 
its standards to the ends of earth, but at every turn the Roman Empire is the 
creation of the spirit, since the weapons were aimed, not just by the arms of the 
Roman legionaries, but by their spirit. Now, therefore, we desire the greatness of 
the nation, both material and spiritual.”189 
 
The following expansionism led though the myth of the greatness of a nation. In his speech to 
the parliament on January 3, 1925,190 Mussolini again stressed the necessity of love to the 
“Fatherland” as a basis for further development. The emphasis on “moral purity” of the new 
era and “decadence” of the old times was another component of creating a myth of Italy as a 
great nation having the right for a great empire. The main ideologist of the Italian Fascism, 
Giovanni Gentile, expressed his vision of a nation as follows: 
“Let us add new monuments to the old ones if we feel like this. Let us erect them 
on our squares to steel our characters, to honour the living more than the dead in 
the consecration of recent memories, which at the bottom are more glorious than 
any which Italian history has to offer, and, paying tribute to generous memories, 
to raise our consciousness of being the free citizens of a great nation. For where 
‘nation’ is understood in this way, even liberty is less a right than a duty: a prize 
which is only achieved through the self-denial of the citizen prepared to give 
everything to his Fatherland without asking for anything in return.”191 
                                                
189 Quoted by Griffin 1995: 44. 
 
190 Speech to the Parliament, January 3, 1925, in Omia Opera. In Griffin 1995: 50. 
 
191 Lecture at Firenze March 8, 1925. In Griffin 1995: 54. 
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Though we may doubt that there were plans to conquer an Ethiopian territory in the 1920’s, 
the call for raising the new civilization with “blood and tears” refers to what I have already 
discussed on the preceding pages. Plans for further expansion to Ethiopia had developed 
during the 1920’s though we may suggest that concrete plans were depicted two or three years 
before the invasion. Mussolini had long argued192 that the necessary development of Italy 
could not occur without a free access to raw materials that Ethiopia provided. The industrial 
and economic development supported or even strengthened by the Facsist call for “national 
greatness” has to be seen behind the initial tendency of Italy to attack Ethiopia.  
 
To find other examples of the Fascist doctrine which would prove an expansionist character 
of the movement, it has to be reminded that the roots of Italian superiority over Ethiopia, 
increasing after the 1928 Treaty of Friendship, can be even found in the teaching of Enrico 
Corradini and Alfredo Rocco,193 who understood history as a move with a tempo supplied by 
the dynamics of production. More productive nations extend their influence over the less 
productive ones, to stimulate a cycle of economic growth and maturation in them.194 While 
most of the 1920’s were characterized by economic growth and economic expansion, the turn 
of the decade brought a visible change. Italians turned from theory to practice and in the early 
1930’s, they sought to stabilize their power in Libya, and then, also with the help of 
international links, began to concretize their plans for further expansion to Ethiopia. I agree 
with Nicola Labanca195 that the “first years of the 1930’s coincided with a radical 
reformulation of the spaces of action and of the character of the regime, by now on its way to 
totalization. This transformation found a reflection and at the same time a powerful 
accelerator in the terrain of colonial politics, which, from that moment on, started to head 
toward the Ethiopian adventure.”196  
                                                
192 See Gregor’s (2005) analysis of the development of the Facsist social and political thought. 
 
193 Alfredo Rocco is sometimes seen as an important ideologist of the regime as well as Giovanni Gentile, or 
even more important. He is responsible for some influential economic doctrines. In 1925 Mussolini announced a 
plan to make Italy self-sufficient in food production as part of the initial moves toward an autarchic war 
economy. This policy ebcouraged domestic production but raised price levels, as well as wage demands. 
Mussolini also announced stabilization of the exchange rate. This policy harmed the Italian economy in general. 
See more in Eatwell 2003: 77-78. 
 
194 Gregor 2005: 48. 
 
195 Labanca, N. (2003): Studies and Research on Fascist Colonialism, 1922-1935: Reflections on the State of the 
Art. In: Palumbo, P. (ed.): A Place in the Sun. Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the 
Present (pp. 37-61). Los Angeles: University of California Press.; Labanca 2003: 37-61. 
 
196 Labanca 2003: 50. 
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Of course, the colonial policy toward Ethiopia should be perceived as part of a set of 
international events that occurred in the first half of the 1930’s. With the growing power of 
Germany, Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the inefficiency of the League of Nations, 
distancing from Britain, the strengthened emphasis on Ethiopia within Mussolini’s policy is 
nothing but a clear and logical step to facilitating his position for further actions. Labanca 
argues that there were three major components or levels that formed Italy’s Fascist colonial 
policy toward Ethiopia. First, the international level, which has already been outlined; second, 
the internal level, which means mainly political and ecnomoic pro-colonial circles that 
pressed on Mussolini, who became head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1932. The army 
and diplomatic background cannot be underestimated as well. Third, there were also certain 
economic aspects, especially when, after a decade of its existence, the regime was not able to 
justify the absence of an empire. Problems with unemployment, growth of the population, and 
industrial stagnation in general had to be solved by an expansion that could bring a free access 
to land and prosperity.197 
 
Carlo Zaghi198 gives an interesting and, in my opinion, correct description and analysis of the 
myth of the Italian greatness. Zaghi states that from the ethic and political point of view, there 
were a lot of myths that Mussolini created toward colonial ambitions. A myth of the Italian 
state as an absolute entity,199 a myth of the Roman right, the cult of Romanità, a myth of life 
as a “dovere, elevazione, conquista”, a myth of force as the only means of success, a myth of 
superiority of the white race, and myth of inferiority of the black race, as well as a myth of 
Italy as a victim of egoism of the great powers,200 these are only a small number of those that 
can be seen as major in creating a Fascist myth of the great country which has to “civilize” a 
country of poor black people. On May 2, 1925, an anonymous article published in the journal 
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“I fasci italiani all’estero” celebrates the military power of the Facsist Italy which is the only 
true way to fulfill the Duce’s will. It clearly shows a true face of the Fascist mysticism: 
“It is in this way that Fascism has triumphed, through the efforts of its Militia […] 
The cup of sacrifice is held out to the “best” and we must drink from it. Then we 
can say with Christ when he drank from the sponge soaked in vinegar and gall: 
“Consummatum est.” His sacrifice is the salvation of others. What does the 
individual matter? It is the Race that counts; it is its renewal that is necessary for 
the good of the Country and the world. The Duce has spoken […] His command is 
our law, which is already in us. The struggle continues and it is bitter. All over the 
world Italy is looked to as a beacon of light which guides humanity to salvation 
[…]. We are princes and triarii of the new legions of civilization.”201 
 
Another level of myths is colonial, where Zaghi202 argues that Mussolini was a man from the 
19th century. Mussolini was raised in the atmosphere of colonial struggle and the scramble for 
Africa, which probably left a feeling of “natural” superiority of the colonizing people over the 
colonized. For a colonial thought it was “natural” to perceive African people as inferior. 
Moreover, since not many African languages had their own script, the word “barbarous” 
became synonymous to everything African. The only aspect that was different as compared to 
other European colonial powers was its military background, since Italy, after the lost battle 
of Adwa, did not have its necessary self-confidence, while Ethiopia was celebrated as a 
country that defended its independence over the mighty “white” power. That is why the 
Italian army was preparing for a long time before the invasion with no scruples and no respect 
to the international agreements prohibiting the use of gas weapons. As documented by 
Rochat,203 plans to use gas weapons had been discussed by Mussolini and Emilio De Bono 
since 1932, long before any concrete plans to invade Ethiopia came existence. Rochat 
concludes that for Mussolini it seems that the war was more a “national” question rather than 
a “colonial” one.204 
 
If I should add my commentary to Zaghi’s explanation of the Italian colonial motives and 
myths, I would conclude that the preparations for the war and imperialism in the Italian 
colonial thought which was characterized by a “hysterical type of Fascism” with its brutality, 
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racism and nationalism,205 was to a certain extent a matter of lack of self-confidence since 
Italy still did not mean a “sufficient” colonial empire that would bring it a place in the sun. 
The colonies in Eritrea and Somalia did not seemenough and the richness of Ethiopia played 
an important role in the Italian colonial mind. The only problem was how to gain the territory 
quickly without financial and human losses.  
 
As we have seen, the problem of race did not play such a major role in the Fascist colonial 
thought compared to the problem of nation and the greatness of the nation. Already in the 
1920’s, there was a considerable increase of anti-minoritiy feeling in the state policy. First, it 
was directed against Croatian and Slavic linguistic groups, and Italianization206 became an 
official policy. Second, in the Italian colonies in East Africa, Eritrea and Somalia, a certain 
amount of Fascist propaganda reached educational methods and administrative. As 
documented by Trevaskis,207 the standard of Eritrean schools was low and education was 
heavily influenced by the Fascist prppaganda. In a confidential direction to the Italian 
headmaster, Andrea Festa wrote that by “the end of his fourth year, an Eritrean student should 
be able to speak our language moderately well; he should know the four arithmetical 
operations within normal limits; he should be a convinced propagandist of the principles of 
hygiene; and of history he should know only names of those who have made Italy great”.208    
 
The fact that Italians played an active role in some Ethiopian provinces in order to weaken the 
doubtful stability of the state supports my assumptions that plans of the invasion – not in 
military terms – had existed already long before 1933/1934, which is by some authors209 
considered a year when decisive plans for the invasion were created. In military terms I may 
agree, but every military operation needs a long-lasting period of economic, political, and 
strategic preparations, and these lasted at least from the second half of the 1920’s. The peak of 
these preparations may be seen in the 1928 Treaty of Friendship between Italy and Ethiopia. 
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Italian plans for economic supremacy coincided with secret actions done towards disuniting 
of the country, as an example of the Tigre province shows.  
 
Haile Selassie tried to reach a constructive compromise to strengthen his position in Tigre and 
to weaken Italy’s diplomatic subversive attempts. A constructive compromise meant an old 
Ethiopian political tradition, intermarriages between the houses of Shoa and Tigre. On May 5, 
1932, the Emperor’s elder son Mariadazmach Asfa-Wassan married Ras Seyum’s daughter 
Wallata-Israel. However, the first attempts to stabilize the relations had already been done 
before, in 1930 at Tafari’s coronation. On April 14, Tafari ordered the two rival chiefs of 
Tigre to report to Addis Ababa about the coronation. Their arrival with all the important 
provincial chiefs was a “most obvious sign of Haile Selassie’s supremacy.”210  
 
The lack of stability inside Ethiopia was one of the aspects that Italians tried to use in order to 
strengthen their influence and their position. While Fascists in Italy were consolidating their 
power during the 1920’s and, since the second half of the decade, started to make some steps 
forward in order to renew the glance of the Empire, Ethiopia was not able to overcome its 
ethnic, historical, political, and economic diversity. Official Italian documents published just 
before the invasion, presented at Geneva and “explaining” the reasons why their country 
seeks to keep order and stability in East Africa, present the “internal disorder as a major 
aspect”.211  What is more interesting for historians is the description of Ethiopia as a state 
which violates international agreements and accords. The material includes a description of 
events from the last phase of Menilek’s reign through several attempts of “coup d’etat” to the 
reign of Empress Zewditu and Ras Tafari/Haile Selassie. What is more interesting, the Italian 
propaganda, being directed against the Emperor and Empress Zewditu, regarded Menilek II 
and his successor Lej Iyyasu as the last legitimate ruler, while Ras Tafari plunged Ethiopia 
into uncertainty, being driven only by his will to strengthen his power.212  
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After a series of incidents depicted, there are some concluding remarks that served as a 
justification of Italian policy being led by willingness to defend right and order. Though it 
was Italy who was searching for internal territorial differentiation and division of Ethiopia 
especially in Tigre,213 the main amount of complaints is given to the instability in peripheral 
regions caused by Ras Tafari’s policy of changing local officials: 
“The Ethiopian state, with a structure mostly medieval, with an administrative 
completely primitive and vicious because of particular mentality of leaders in the 
center and the periphery, with a simple juridical organization […], and with a 
traditional regime special for foreigners that cannot ever work sufficiently; with a 
patriarchal financial institution that cannot differ between the budget of the State 
and that of the Negus; with an uneducated and uninstructed population that 
maintained its barbarous customs and the most backward mentality; with 
economy based on slave-labor; with almost an absolute – except for the railroad 
Djibouti-Addis Ababa – lack of communication and roads; with a state of disorder 
in which peripheral provinces stay, particularly those of South-East, South and 
West, represents an anachronism in comparison with the civilization and progress 
of both independent countries as Egypt or South Africa, or those controlled by 
European powers.”214 
 
Italians assessed that the internal situation in Ethiopia tended to be in the state of total 
disorder and desintegration. It was especially a long series of rage and incidents that occurred 
on the Italian-Ethiopian border that Italians sought to inform about.  
 
Historians have no unified opinion on the development of the Fascist colonial approach. 
While Mussolini expressed his colonial interests in his earlier speeches, it seemed for a long 
time that things would never come true. Further actions, especially during the 1920’s are 
chracterised by an emphasis on internal Italian problems. Some historians, as Brice Harris, jr., 
explain the new emphasis on colonialism and national greatness at the turn of the 1920’s as 
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Mussolini’s inability to resolve domestic problems and as a result of the worldwide economic 
depression as well as Italy’s overpopulation in relation to its natural resources.215  
 
Other views of the Fascist policy stress the fact that it was always connected with colonialism. 
As Carlo Zaghi states, for Mussolini “colonial expansion has always been one of the great 
components of internal and external fascist policy: undoubtedly the most vital and sensible; 
and the most demagogic too”.216 Zaghi assumes that the colonial question became 
fundamental in Mussolini’s policy especially after 1926, probably after the internal 
consolidation, and uses Mussolini’s statement from 1928 that “Italy should either expand or 
explode”.217 
 
The spirit of the Fascist colonial ambitions has a lot to do with the myth of an Empire 
coinciding with the ancient Roman greatness, which worked as an ideal state for Mussolini.218 
One of the points thanks to which we can consider the Italian-Ethiopian relations in the 
1920’s and the 1930’s is creating a myth of a great Italian nation amd creating an image of 
Ethiopia as a poor, uncivilized country that “needs” to be conquered, colonized, and civilized 
by a highly developed, “noble” nation that needs to secure its policy and supremacy in East 
Africa. In July 1935, Mussolini explained the vital needs for an Empire, which he called an 
“irrefutable fact”:  
“The essential arguments, absolutely irrefutable and enough to put an end to any 
attempt to censure us, are twofold: the vital needs of the Italian people and its 
military security in Eastern Africa.[…] The second of these is the decisive one. 
[…] It is blindingly obvious that the strategic situation of our colonies, precarious 
enough in normal times, would become untenable in exceptional times, if ever 
Italy was to become a player on the chessboard of Europe. The solution of the 
problem must be a totalitarian one. […] Posed in military terms, the Italo-
Abyssinian problem is one of striking simplicity, of an absolute logic; posed in 
military terms, the problem only admits – with Geneva, without Geneva, against 
Geneva – one solution. All the other agruments are important, but not decisive: it 
is in this last fact that the policy of Fascist Italy finds its supreme historical and 
human justification.”219  
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In concordance with the previous statements we should emphasize that also Italian 
historiography and ethnography used a fixed cliché for the description of Ethiopia’s ethnic, 
religious, and political conditions. Being always described as a chaotic, barbarous, or even 
scandalous country by the European press, in ethnography and history, especially Italian 
scholars have used prejudiced models for the description of the local realities. Ettore Falcone 
in his historic book Menelik II. L’Etiopia e le relazioni con l’Italia shows an example of a 
stereotype view of Ethiopia: 
 “An Abyssinian is endowed with a superficial intelligence, is ambitious and 
proud of his land, apparently courteous and ceremonial, in every moment he can 
be good, generous, hospitable; ordinarily, he is intrigant and caviling. His 
particular features are unsincereness and idleness. He tends to obtain means of 
intrigues; he prefers to live in poverty rather than to work. He is greedy for 
women, he called: ‘Bury me with a hand with flowers because I can continue to 
ask!’”220 
 
Recently, Italian historians have been dealing with questions of racial motives of the Italian 
colonialism as well as its legacies, since in 1996 there was a centennial anniversary of the 
battle of Adwa, which still can provoke as a major defeat of a European colonial army of the 
19th century. Racial aspects of the Italian colonialism have been discussed mainly by 
Goglia221 and Mattioli.222 Deeper analyses of Italian racial policy within Africa Orientale 
Italiana have been presented in German by Schneider,223 and in English by Robertson.224 
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Colonial images, memories and legacies have been discussed especially by Del Boca,225 
Triulzi,226 Labanca,227 and Isnenghi.228 
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The myth of Adwa and its reminiscence in the Fascist Italy 
 
One of the reasons for the invasion of the Fascist Italy in Ethiopia was the revenge for the lost 
battle of Adwa, which for Mussolini’s official propaganda presented as a disastrous moment, 
or a mistake in Italy’s history that had to be rectified in order to prove the greatness of the 
Empire. According to Mussolini’s biographers,229 Duce was as a schoolboy excited by the 
ruined Italian colonial ambitions at Adwa. What he was very much disconcerted of was the 
Italian withdrawal from the East African sphere, though all other European colonial powers 
continued in their conquest of Africa. Despite the massive Fascist propaganda concerning the 
revenge, most Italians probably felt a certain fear connected with reminiscence of the defeat 
that had brought a few thousands of dead and wounded rather than the necessity for a 
revenge.230  
 
The fact that Adwa “lived” in the Italian colonial mind is demonstrated by a frenetic invasion 
to Ethiopia in October 1935, when Adwa was one of the first places bombarded. After the 
quick battle and occupation on October 6, the Italian officers Toselli, Arimondi, and 
Dabormida, who were killed in the battle of Adwa 1896, were “avenged”.231 Mussolini’s 
impatience as it is often presented in scholarly works in regard to the invasion could have its 
root in his effort to revenge the 1896 events. The perception of Adwa has always been two-
sided. On one hand, Europe witnessed a so far unimaginable defeat of a colonial army. On the 
other hand, for black consciousness, Adwa was a self-defining point from which the pride of 
the colonized people began to rise. For Ethiopia itself, the Adwa victory further elevated the 
concept of Ethiopianism.232 While Emperor Menilek rejected the idea of being regarded as 
“the Negroes”, for Afro-American communities Ethiopia after Adwa became a symbol of 
black independence. The most prominent leader of the awaken Afro-American movement at 
the beginning of the 20th century, Marcus Garvey argued that Afro-Americans must abandon 
their feelings of inferiority, build a distinctive culture, and ultimately work to liberate, 
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develop, and redeem their homeland in Africa.233 In West Africa, Ethiopianism became 
fundamentally racial, though there was a certain difference between the concept of 
Ethiopianism in West Africa and, for instance, in South Africa, most probably because in 
West Africa people did not have an experience with “white settlement”.234  
 
The myth of Adwa and its presence in the Italian colonial mind in the 1920’s coincide with 
the already discussed Italian imagology. From the point of view of the 1920’s it seems as if 
the battle of Adwa was only a pretext to further action, even though a pretext that accelerated 
or at least contributed to the mosaic which formed part of the ideological rhetoric against 
Ethiopia. Zaghi discussed Mussolini’s “mythological invention” and it was Andall and 
Duncan235 who expressed their analysis of Italian expansionism. According to them, the 
Italian regime “affirmed its presence through a range of ritualized activities that connected it 
to the past and projected it into future”. The return to the past and the existence of Roman 
iconography on coins, posters, stamps and other things was one of the key concepts of 
creating myths by Mussolini and that is also why Mack Smith could title his book 
“Mussolini’s Roman Empire”.236 For Italy, the return to Ethiopia and directing military forces 
to Adwa was one of the ideological points of military preparations.237 
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Czechoslovak and European Press and the image of Ethiopia 
 
In this sub-chapter I will try to present the image of Ethiopia as it has been developed by 
newspapers published in Czechoslovakia and some other European countries, mainly Italy, 
France, Britain, and Germany whose newspapers were published in Prague. For the purpose 
of this thesis it seems crucial to use newspaper articles since newspapers all around the world 
can probably describe the public opinion in the best way and they can tell us a lot about the 
spirit of each era. As I have already written, the image of Ethiopia in Europe was developing 
throughout the time, at least since the battle of Adwa.  
 
The basic idea of the following chapter is that the image of Ethiopia was not created by 
Fascist Italians in the 1920’s but only followed a long-lasting opinion that had been 
developing in Europe since at least the 16th century. It can be also seen as a conflict between 
the idealized self-image and demonized counter-image, as a conflict between myths and 
images of the high and the low. The fact that I will discuss mainly the image of Ethiopia 
presented in European media is of great importance for the purpose of this work since media, 
especially with the beginning of the 20th century, became the means of propaganda and the 
most important tool for extending influence and information. As discussed by Mikkonen,238 
throughout the 20th and the 21st centuries, media and the press have had a considerable impact 
on people’s images and worldviews. Newspapers, diplomatic documents, correspondences of 
Europeans are thus the main tool for analyzing the process of imagining Ethiopia before the 
1935 invasion. 
 
First, we have to start with a brief overview of the process of creating the concept of “the 
otherness” in regard to Ethiopia. Modern Ethiopia is based on ancient Meroitic and Axumite 
kingdoms and as the Solomonic dynasty derived its origin from the king Solomon and Israel, 
it is clear that there was a long-lasting tradition of contacts with the Near East and the 
Mediterreanen. The first European came to Ethiopia in the 15th century and since then we can 
see how Ethiopia was depicted. Beginning with Italian and Portuguese missionaries such as 
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Alessandro Zorzi,239 Manoel de Almeida or the Ethiopian Priest Bahrey,240 through the Czech 
Franciscan missionary Václav Remedius Prutký241 to the late 18th and the 19th century 
travelers as James Bruce, Henry Salt, Walter Plowden and many others, Ethiopia tended to be 
depicted in a multi-dimensional way: on one hand, as a country with a long history and high 
Semitic culture which adopted Christianity in the early period; on the other hand, as a country 
of barbarous, uncivilized people with savage manners and vicious beliefs. These images 
coincide with general European thinking for which a nomad/pastoralist was the lower one, 
while a settler was the higher one. In the late 19th century, after the battle of Adwa where 
Ethiopians defeated the invading Italian army,242 Ethiopia gained an image of a “pure” 
African kingdom that maintained its independence despite the “white” European power and 
the Ethiopia-oriented millenarian ethos became a popular feature within the Afro-American 
community,243 while for Europe, Ethiopia remained a somewhat backward country and a 
puzzle, since there was no space between “the colonizer” and “the colonized” in sub-Saharan 
Africa in the European colonial thinking. 
 
Andall and Duncan show that “Africa was seen by the nineteenth century Europe as a land of 
unfettered sexual opportunity and this notion enjoyed unchallenged popularity in Italy until 
the late 1930’s when legislation on inter-racial sexual liaisons lightened”.244  
Lombardi-Diop245 named her promising study concerning the 19th century Italian explorers in 
Africa “Gifts, Sex, and Guns”, which appropriately correlates to the previous statements.  
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In order to understand better how the image of Ethiopia was developing in the first third of 
the 20th century, it is necessary to see the Italian Fascist view of Ethiopia in the context of a 
historical process that begun more or less in the 15th century with the first missionaries 
coming to Ethiopia. The image of Ethiopia as a country of the black, Christians, barbars, 
backward pastoralists and vicious beliefs simply prevailed until the 20th century when 
Ethiopia became the most prominent representative of Africa. The previous images and the 
new-born myths were used by Mussolini’s government and those regarding Ethiopian 
antiquity and nobleness eliminated in order to legitimize the necessity of civilizing the last 
African independent country. The fact that it resulted in a perverse and brutal war which 
violated several international agreements is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
For the Czechoslovak press in the 1920’s and the 1930’s, Ethiopia was not an unknown 
country since several authors of honorable education, such as dr. Alois Musil, had brought 
news from Ethiopia as well as news concerning Ethiopian relations with the major European 
countries from time to time. In Venkov in the 1920’s, Alois Musil246 wrote a series of articles 
in which he tried to inform readers about local conditions and troubles that Ethiopia was 
facing as a member of the League of Nations. As a contrary to the majority of other 
newspaper articles written in Czechoslovakia in this period, Musil focuses mainly on the 
British economic and political ambitions in Ethiopia and writes with no scruples about the 
“predatory” policy of the British trading companies in Ethiopia.  
 
Musil tries to explain the British-Ethiopian relations in a complex set of aspects, one of which 
is the creation of an image. He argues that it was especially the British press who continually 
wrote about “Abyssinia as a backward country that needs another country to come and create 
a protectorate or a mandate”. Musil almost cynically explains the British motives and reserved 
position toward the Ethiopian accession to the League of Nations. The British attitude can be 
best described as follows: “Englishmen excelled in a clear view, persistence and frequent 
unscrupulousness. What they did not reach in one way, they tried to reach in another way. 
They started to speak and write about slavery and began to assert that the Christian Abyssinia 
is the last supporter of slave traders who are destroying villages of pagan blacks and capturing 
women and girls.” Musil, in defence of Ethiopia, claims that in the time of Ethiopia’s 
accession to the League of Nations, there was already no slavery and that the slaves in 
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Ethiopia are descendants of the 19th century slaves. The aim of this study is not to explore 
whether there was slavery in Ethiopia in the first half of the 20th century or not, but what is 
more interesting is that it was not only Italy, as one might suppose, who used a massive 
propaganda in newspapers to create a public opinion leading to appropriate results.  
 
Musil continued in his work for all the 1920’s and in his article in the same journal247 four 
years later he gave readers a good overview of Ethiopia’s international relations. Musil sees 
the position of Ethiopia as a country that was betrayed by its Christian partners. He says that it 
seems as if other Christian powers would do anything to strengthen the power of their African 
Christian ally, but the opposite is true. In fact, he blames the European powers of hypocrisy, 
since, on one hand, they boast that they would defend the interests of Christians all around the 
world, but on the other hand, a brief look at the map of East Africa shows that behind these 
promises there is a strong imperialistic effort. A very interesting look at internal Ethiopian 
policy is brought by dr. In his article, he consideres Ras Tafari a leader who does not intend to 
incense local leaders against him and thus he gives them a free hand to oppress peasants and 
traders by new taxes and duties. Moreover, Musil states that Zewditu248 reigns and Tafari 
takes care only of his own profit.249 
 
In regard to Musil’s accounts on imagining Ethiopia by the British press, it is true that the first 
major “campaign” against the “state of disorder” in Ethiopia was spread by Westminster 
Gazette in 1922. In an article “The Scandal of Abyssinia”, Ethiopia was portrayed in the 
following manner:  
“Abyssinia is the only remaining free and independent native State in Africa. It is 
also the last home of open slavery. In its Capital, Addis Ababa, there are more 
slaves than free men. The British Legation itself is full of slaves, owned by the 
Legation servants, who would not take service if they were not allowed to bring 
their chattels with them. The Legation compound is British soil, yet not only do 
slaves who enter it not become instantly free, but if they have escaped from their 
owners can and do enter it without hindrance to recapture. That is an odd-enough 
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fact; but still odder one is that a great many of these slaves are British subjects 
captured by slave-raids into British territory.”250 
 
In the article a discussion over the character of the Ethiopian slave state then follows. 
Abyssinia was, accordning to Westminster Gazette, independent only because the neighboring 
powers did not have a line of policy which they could follow in order to partition the territory. 
As the newspapers began to be interested in the order and law of Ethiopia, it became popular 
to inform about the negative sides of Ethiopia’s conditions: 
“…there is nothing in Abyssinia that can be described as ‘order’ and as for the 
‘law’ it is quite useless to appeal to it unless the complaint is rich enough to 
purchase the justice he seeks, and even then it may still be useless if the defendant 
happens to have a powerful protector”.251 
 
Images of distant people and distant places are almost in every case based on stereotypes and 
myths. The developing pattern of images of Ethiopia coincides with the same pattern of 
images of Africa that has been developing since the 15th century until nowadays. Analyzing 
the media and their relevance in regard to Africa (in this case Ethiopia), we see somewhat 
general agreement within the major European newspapers. One of the key concepts of the 
study of the media influence is their role in creating fragmented and ambiguous images as 
well as sensation-seeking “nature”, since sensations bring more readers. On the other hand, 
objectivity means presenting antagonistic views. When media present only one view, one can 
hardly consider them objective.252 Stereotyping the enemy is one of the oldest methods of 
propaganda. Stressing the differences between the “normal” and the “abnormal”, the “good” 
and the “bad”, the “right” and the “wrong”, the “acceptable” and the “unpleasant”, the 
“modern” and the “traditional”, propagandists tended to legitimize their approach usually 
leading to a war.  
 
In the case of the British we can hardly imagine military intentions. These were replaced by 
economic motives of the British effort to gain control over water resources on the Nile. Africa 
has always been a question of such interpretations, oppositions, stereotypes and prejudices. 
While Africa had “tribes”, Europe was represented by “nations”. The word “tribe” bears a 
negative connotation meaning “backward”, “stateless”, “ignorant”, while “nation” is allowed 
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to make historical deeds, a nation makes progress, a nation is noble. One of the major aspects 
of the propaganda is a tendency to eliminate the “good” and replce it by the “bad”, the 
“positive” by the “negative”. We can see a similar scheme in the Westminster Gazette series 
of articles in regard to Ethiopia, where authors did not seek to inform the public objectively. 
A typical example of making differences between the “nobleness” of the ancient times and 
“primitiveness” of the present can be seen in the following words: 
“Trade conditions in Abyssinia are, to put it mildly, uncertain. There is no 
stability, not at present any foundations upon which a stable commercial system 
could be built up. Abyssinia is almost as large as France and Germany combined; 
it is the home of an ancient “Christian” civilization; and it is one of the richest 
countries in the world – richer, we believe, than any other country in Africa of 
similar size. Yet it is decaying. Vast areas are going out of cultivation, partly 
owing to brigandage and partly to slave-raiding. One of the writers recently 
passed through an outlying district, which, when he first visited ten years ago, was 
a remarkably prosperous and populous country. The soil was so fertile that the 
hills were terraced for cultivation. Today it is possible to march through this 
district for days without meeting a single human being, the terraces are still there, 
but the people who should be sowing and reaping are either dead or slaves in the 
capital. The whole country-side is abandoned to the jackals and the hyenas.”253 
 
While official Ethiopian and some European documents tended to oppose these statements 
widely extended first by the British, then by the Italian press and officials, the contemporary 
Ethiopian intellectuals usually of non-Amhara origin agree with the general conditions in 
Ethiopia as being described by the European press. If one can make some generalizing 
statements going slightly beyond the scope of this work, one can state that the image of 
Ethiopia (or better to say Abyssinia) as an undeveloped country, that with the help of 
European machine guns conquered the country of Oromo and other people, is increasing.  
 
It generally coincides with the three basic ethno-nationalist perspectives on Ethiopian history, 
which can be divided as follows: 1) nation-building perspective; 2) national oppression 
perspective; 3) colonization perspective. While the nation-building perspective regards to the 
process of empire-building during the second half of the 19th century, the “national 
oppression” came into political vocabulary of the Ethiopian elites within the 1960’s evolution 
of Ethiopian Student Movement, inspired by Marxism-Leninism. The colonial perspective is 
then connected to the Eritrean issue and the question of Italian legacy as well as Ethiopian 
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state from 1952 to 1991.254 In other words, rewriting the history of Ethiopia has a lot ot do 
with Levine’s255 suggestion of the “Amhara thesis”, the “Oromo anti-thesis” and the 
“Ethiopian synthesis” which has had to be reached by the 1994 constitution but now does not 
seem to fulfill. Ethiopia under the rules of Menilek II and Ras Tafari/Haile Selassie is usually 
depicted by the Oromo political leaders256 as the only African country that participated in 
conquering and occupying other African territories. The fact is that colonialism does not 
differentiate the color of skin, religion or continent.257  
 
Oromo intellectuals have seemed to adopt the vocabulary of those European activists who 
sought to emphasize Ethiopia’s inability to resolve its own domestic problems and thus 
stressed the necessity of a foreign rule. The rule of Abysinians over the native population of 
the Ethiopian south is also suggestively described by the British writer Evelyn Waugh in his 
notes on Ethiopian war, where he states that “peoples in the south and west treated with 
wanton brutality unequaled even in the Belgian Congo…” while at a different place he 
continues with the statement that “the Abyssinian officials, with retinues which varied in size 
from royal guard to a standing army, lived upon the work and taxes of the original 
inhabitants; their function was not to protect but to hold in subjection; fighting was the only 
occupation they recognized”.258 In many works the general view on the Amhara-Oromo 
relation can be summarized as follows: “Oromo were not considered human beings by 
Abyssinians, but property to be owned and sold. Oromo peasants were given to the colonial 
settlers and local landlords to be ‘eaten’.”259  
 
Since the main scope of this work is to analyze the period of the 1920’s and the early 1930’s, 
it is obvious that the Ras Tafari/Haile Selassie era has to be put under deeper investigation. 
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What is common to both European press and the government opposition in Ethiopia is its 
depiction of Haile Selassie as a ruler who violates international agreements and who exploited 
the non-Amhara territories.260 To be honest, the European colonial thinking was in this sense 
single-track as we can read in different contemporary sources that “Africa is Africa”261 which 
says about the contemporary anthropological and colonial discourse even more than huge 
amounts of diplomatic and historical books. Ignorance was one of the features that 
“distinguished” Africans from Europeans and in this manner Haile Selassie was a ruler who 
“ignored” treaties, concessions, and agreements.262 On the other hand, it was not only the case 
of Europeans who distrusted the Regent/Emperor. His efforts to build roads, develop cotton 
industry, install telephones and telegraphs and thus to modernize the country had an 
opposition in a part of the nobility, though more or less passive, as shown by the example of 
Fitawrari Habta Giorgis. During the 1920’s, this Commander-in-Chief changed his opinion 
and became a slight supporter of Tafari’s plans, which is by some sources263 explained as a 
result of Ras Tafaris’s diplomacy and the tact with which he dealt with Fitawrari Habta 
Giorgis. 
 
Ras Tafari’s charisma became a matter of many studies and works of a number of travelers, 
diplomats, scientists, etc. While some depicted him as a man who is interested only in his own 
property, others emphasized his progressivity and nobleness. Reverend Ashley Brown, the 
Chaplain of Aden wrote his impression of Ethiopia and the Regent: 
“But at this difficult time a very great man indeed controls the destinies of this 
Ancient Empire, in the person of the Prince Regent. Like many of the members of 
the ancient Abyssinian families, he is no darker than many a Spaniard, with clean- 
cut features. Indeed in his person he preserves the tradition of the personal beauty 
in the House of David. He has great charm, great dignity and superb self-control. 
He is a very simple man. His private wealth is enormous, and he has interests in 
most of the business enterprises in the Empire. […] He dresses in the simple white 
cotton clothes of his people, with a coarse black wool burnous or cape in rainy 
weather. He wears no jewels, a surprise to me, as I have often seen Indian princes 
literally ablaze with precious stones. He is a strong man and a very clever man. It 
has needed both great strength and ability to rule his State of powerful nobles and 
turbulent people through stormy days.“264    
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Reverend’s impressions show a distinctive way of imagining the Regent and Ethiopia since he 
stresses the ancient character of the state and nobility of the ruling class, which is an opposite 
of the Italian propaganda shown mainly on pages of daily press where we can see somewhat 
general tendency to eliminate any notes regarding the ancientry of Ethiopia. Reverend’s 
accounts on Ethiopia can be derived from his Christian affiliation since he at several points 
expresses his admire to the state that was “Christian when our ancestors still worshipped their 
Teutonic deities”. For Brown, Ras Tafari was a “great statesman and patriot […] who burns to 
lift his people out of the morass of ignorance and superstition in which their isolation for so 
many centuries has kept them”.265 
 
Almost in the same manner Ras Tafari was viewed by American Ambassy, as may be well 
documented by correspondence of American Consul Addison E. Southard, who gives some 
interesting accounts on the background of Ethiopian high political levels: 
 “The Prince Regent is modernistic and progressive in his tendencies. The 
Empress is unusually conservative and reactionary. The various provincial rulers 
and higher government officials belong either to the ‘party of the Empress’ or to 
the ‘party of the Prince’. This means, in effect, that they oppose, and intrigue 
against each other in the various Councils and frequently deadlock on matters 
sometimes of the most vital importance and frequently insignificant. The 
members of the party of the Empress are more or less against the introduction of 
foreign influence and modern progress into Ethiopia. Their basic reason is that 
such introduction would open the way to political and territorial aggression by 
certain European powers. They point to what they consider attempts of this sort in 
recent decades by Britain, France and Italy.”266  
 
From a retrospective point of view, Southard’s notes on opposition between the Empress’s 
and the Regent’s clique in regard to European influence seem to be in favor of Empress 
Zewditu since it meant mainly from the economic point of view that the Europeans wanted to 
gain control over Ethiopia.   
 
As has been stated (and it is with no doubt), the first major campaign (rather than propaganda) 
against Ethiopia in the 20th century was led by the British press. In the following paragraphs I 
will offer two articles which show how the British public opinion regarding Ethiopia was 
shaped and on which information it was based in the 1920’s. First, in Westminster Gazzette267, 
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there was series of articles, and nothing can illustrate the situation better than the following 
part: 
“Gangs of slaves, marching in misery, the men chained together in rows, and the 
women and children dragging themselves alongside the main body, can be seen 
by any traveller in Southern Abyssinia today. Some of these slaves are captured 
on the Abyssinian territory, others in British East Africa, others in the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan. […] The European powers have contracted not to supply 
Abyssinia amongst other African countries, with munitions, nor with materials for 
their manifacture, but America, unluckily, has not signed the contract; and so it is 
to America that the Abyssinian Government has lately turned. Payment was made 
in advance, three months ago, and the cartridges and automatic rifles, exported 
from the United States, are now lying at the port of Djibouti […] with its terminus 
of the Abyssinian railway. […] The purpose of these articles is to describe the 
position as it appears, not merely to the writers but to every European who has 
spent even a short time in Abyssinia. If on any aspect of the question we have 
failed to convey a sufficiently precise view of the facts, we shall be glad to do our 
best to remedy the defect. Meanwhile, we hope that the American public will 
realize what is being done in their name, and that the British public will face the 
intrinsically impossible situation created by the presence of British slaves in the 
British Legation at Addis Ababa.” 
 
The second article was written in Manchester Guardian268 a year and half after the previous 
one but it followed the same structure and form. Let us quote the following passage: 
“The familiar features in the story may be catalogued as follows. First, Abyssinia 
is a rather scandalous country. The Abyssinians, at the very times when they have 
been falling under the shadow of Western economic expansion, have been 
importing Western lethal weapons in order to conduct systematic slave-raids 
against weaker and more uncivilised peoples in the interior - chiefly within the 
frontiers assigned to the Empire of Ethiopia occasionally in territories belonging 
to the Kenya Colony and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Abyssinia’s successful 
application for admission to the League was possibly stimulated by the fear that 
this scandal might become the subject of international action, and Abyssinia was 
admitted on the distinct understanding that the Abyssinian Government would 
loyally co-operate with the League in the suppression of the slave trade. The 
central Government of Abyssinia, however, is by no means in effective control of 
the whole extent of its juridical dominants. The scandal remains and may at any 
time afford a pretext for interested intervention, if it does not necessitate 
interventions of a disinterested character. A second feature is that the known 
resources of Abyssinia are rich, while her unknown resources (…) are likely to be 
overestimated by those who desire to exploit them. A third feature is that 
Abyssinia has two European neighbours – Great Britain (…), and Italy in Eritrea 
and Italian Somaliland – who possess interests in her territory derived from 
contiguity like the interests of France and Spain in Morocco. Great Britain wants 
to store the surplus waters of Lake Tana in order to make them available for 
extending irrigation in Egypt and the Sudan. Italy wants to link her two East 
African Colonies by constructing a railway north and south to the west of the 
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railway zone which was assigned to France in 1906 …Certainly France has no 
true grievance and no moral status for interfering, since she not only signed the 
1906 agreement but has profited by it already. Nor is she a good friend to 
Abyssinia, for Djibouti and the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway are reported to be 
the main channel through which Abyssinia has been receiving for many years 
consignments of arms which may ultimately prove her undoing. The party with 
genuine grievance is Abyssinia herself. Will she ventilate this grievance at 
Geneva?” 
 
One of the most common features of all newspaper articles (in regard to Ethiopia) at least in 
the former Czechoslovakia in the 1920’s and the 1930’s was its interest in ethnic, religious or 
geographic conditions of Ethiopia, which corresponds to the already mentioned aspects of 
“slavery”, “barbarity” and “primitiveness”. Many articles begin with words “Abyssinia is a 
country of black Christians”, which became a cliché, though we may now suggest that 
Muslims form one half of Ethiopian population. One such example of an “ethnographic” 
cliché can be abstracted from Polední List:269  
“The Abyssinian population is rich in colour of skin, ranging from lemon yellow 
to the dark ebony. There we even find whole villages of albinos, of whose origin 
there exist various rumours. The most important of many Abyssinian tribes is the 
reigning tribe of Amhara, who own about one eighth of the land.“ 
 
The main amount of newspaper articles came in 1934 and 1935 as the tensions were nearing. 
The press continued to describe Ethiopian military potentials using expressions corresponding 
to the contemporary political and anthropological dictionary:270 
“The Abyssinians are good and brave soldiers and in their natural fortress and 
their climate they present a power which cannot be underestimated by modern 
states. The stable army of Abyssinia has 100 000 men in arms equipped by guns 
and machine guns and instructed by European advisors. Artillery has cannons of 
various origin. In the most recent times Abyssinia has even numerous cavalrymen 
and a small number of airplanes. Besides the professional army there is also a 
trained reserve of 200 000 men at Emperor’s disposal. Finally, Abyssinia can also 
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call up all men from 15 to 65 years of age, which means 2 million soldiers for 
whom, however, enough modern weapons would be hardly available. Abyssinia 
thus has quite a strong defense and would surely be able to offer persistent 
resistance against a big invading army.“ 
 
Military preparations on both sides were largely discussed on pages of daily press,271 as 
Mussolini expresed his resolve to stress Italy’s position in the world by massive enlargement 
of military equipment, weapons and guns. The European public was impressed by Italy’s “fast 
division” composed of artillery, cavalry, motorized unit as well as unit of moto-cyclists. 
 
Czechoslovak daily newspapers in most cases showed a certain neutrality to Italy’s 
preparations for war, though in some examples we can see a hidden support of Ethiopia as e.g 
Československé slovo272 in February 1935 informs about Mussolini’s order to send more 
soldiers to the Horn as he was feeling displeasured after Ethiopia (ironically) “showed total 
disregard of Italian armament”. Others, such as Polední list rather follow the pro-Italian line 
when emphasizing the fact that Italy gained almost nothing after World War I and that since 
Mussolini’s access to power he took care of his colonies constructing new roads, buildings, 
ports, hospitals, airports, etc.273 Národní politika published a short interview with dr. Borský 
(February 1935) where he states that Mussolini’s intentions were to make peace among tribes 
which do not follow orders of the Abyssinian Emperor.274  
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At least a year before the Italian invasion events regarding Ethiopia were monitored in detail 
by newsapers and journals all around the world, including the former Czechoslovakia. 
Montagsblatt275 asks in September 1934 whether Italy really strives for protectorate over 
Abyssinia. The author answers that it is rather a matter of time if it comes through diplomacy 
or military action.   
 
Some newspapers, such as Lidové noviny276 pay attention to discomfiture of the League of 
Nations after the Wal Wal incident and suppose that there will be no quick solution of the 
crisis. Národní politika277 goes further and criticizes especially the British ambivalent attitude 
towards the crisis, when a journalist writes that “on every map, the site of Wal Wal is 
sketched in the Abyssinian part, about 100 km in the interior. It is curious that the English 
newspapers are dry (i.e. silent) as for these cases. Perhaps because they stand on the causes of 
the 1925 accord when Italy and England mutually guaranteed their spheres of influence over 
Abyssinia.“278   
 
Shortly after Wal Wal, Alois Musil279 doubts that England could stand the Italian invasion 
and occupation of Ethiopia. Italian newspapers state that the reason for the military action was 
Abyssinian violation of agreements signed with Italy. According to them Ethiopia gives 
remarkable economic advantages to Japanese merchants, traders and emigrants while in 
Italians they see dangerous neighbors. Half a year before, Le Temps pays attention to the same 
aspects of the conflict by bringing a large article ephasizing the role of the Japanese.280  
 
In January 1935 the main topic of European newspapers was the position of France and 
Britain in the Ethiopian question. Polední List,281 quoting French newspapers, writes about a 
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certain probability that France would give a free hand to Italy; Československé slovo282 
discusses the reticence of Paris political circles concerning the Abyssinian crisis and the 
ambivalence of France regarding the Austrian independence. Newspapers bring information 
about the willingness of France to agree with the policy of “appeasement”. Večerní 
Československé Slovo283 is surprised by the Italian readiness for new demarcation of the 
borders between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia.  
 
Lidové noviny284 brings  information about a visit of the Ethiopian Ambassador in Paris, Takle 
Mawariat who disproved the news that there was an anti-French revolt in Ethiopia caused by 
the fact that France ceded part of its territory to Italy. The ambassador stated that in a period 
of serious drought, nomad tribes fought each other for an access to water wells and that the 
battle within which a French colonial official and Somali natives died was one of those battles 
of the desert. The ambassador stressed that the power of the Addis Ababa government over 
these tribes was minimal. As quoted by United Press,285 800 fighters of the Aisamaras tribe 
captured a French colonial official Albert Bernard and killed another 16 colonial soldiers and 
88 Issa tribesmen. They were pursued by a group of 200 colonial soldiers with an order to 
surpress the revolt. Newspapers doubted about the success of the French army since the 
tribesmen were said to be already on the Abyssinian territory where they could move without 
being threatened neither by the French nor by Addis Ababa.  
 
While Czechoslovak newspapers mostly show certain incredulity towards the Italian 
intentions, the French Petit Parisien286 understands that Mussolini, outraged by the hostile 
displays, which were touching the Italian prestige, wanted by a quick and energic gesture to 
remind that Italy is prepared and decided to even invade in order to defend its rights. The 
newspaper writes that it is surely allowed to hope in a peaceful solution of the crisis. The 
Times287 conclude that the Italian move cannot be condemned as illegitimate. Daily 
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Telegraph288 thinks that it would be tragic if the situation ends in a war.  Prager Tagblatt289 
quotes from an interview with Haile Selassie published in the United Press concerning the 
Wal Wal crisis and its possible solution: “Ich bemühe mich mit meiner ganzen Kraft, das vor 
kurzen in Genf abgeschlossene Übereinkommen so schnell wie möglich durchzuführen. Ich 
habe sofort den Befehl erteilt, alle meine Soldaten aus Wal Wal zurückzurufen und habe nur 
eine Beobachtungsabteilung von 300 Mann in Gerlogubi zurückbehalten.“ 
 
While British and French journals were more optimistic and hope for a peaceful solution, 
Czechoslovak newspapers brought news about the military preparations in Italy and discussed 
its threat since the end of 1934. In February 1935 when the public was concerned with the 
League’s approach, Lidové noviny290 warns of Mussolini who announced to his soldiers that 
they would go to Egypt and Somalia to defend Italian interests, which can be seen as a direct 
proof of the creeping war.  
 
Leftist journals and newspapers criticize not only Italian aggression and unability to make 
compromises but also Euroean powers, which with their policy of appeasement give Italy a 
free hand in Ethiopia. Sozialdemokrat291 stresses the anti-war demonstrations against 
Mussolini in Italy, Rudé právo,292 the most important leftish daily, ironizes the negotiations 
between Mussolini and Laval, and Mussolini and Beneš already in the title of the article: 
“Laval agrees with Mussolini, Mussolini agrees with Beneš. And the result of this agreement? 
War.” Also French daily journals are alarmed by the Laval – Mussolini negotiation which 
they think would give a free hand to Mussolini for his action in Abyssinia.293 
 
In May 1935 European newspapers already discussed the term of the war. It seems as if 
nobody believed in a peaceful solution of the conflict, as e.g. Večerní Československé Slovo294 
                                                
288 Daily Telegraph, February 12, 1935. 
 
289 Prager Tagblatt, February 15, 1935. 
290 Lidové noviny, February 17, 1935. 
 
291 Sozialdemokrat, March 15, 1935. 
 
292 “Laval souhlasí s Mussolinim, Mussolini souhlasí s Benešem. A výsledek tohoto souhlasu? Válka.“ Rudé 
právo, May 14, 1935. 
 
293 Quoted by Rudé právo, May 14, 1935. 
 
294 “Válka o Habeš do 20. května?“ S podtitulkem “Žně mezinárodního válečného průmyslu-Italové narazí na 
nejtěžší odpor“. Večerní Československé Slovo, May 11, 1935. 
Odstraněno: ¶
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asks in the title of an article “War in Abyssinia until May 20?“  and answers by its subtitle 
“Harvests of international military industry – Italy will meet with the hardest resistance“. 
Giornale d’Italia295 speaks about massive mobilization in Ethiopia and adds that Italy cannot 
countenance to let its borderland be persistently threatened. Právo Lidu296 quotes Alessandro 
Lessona who said in Rome that according to the situation, the government could not hesitate. 
The question of relations between both states must be solved clearly once and for all  in the 
interest of safety of Eritrea and Somalia as well as in regard to dignity of Italian policy.“ 
Lidové noviny297 speculates that Italy has already one million of soldiers in arms.  
 
As I have found in newspapers and journals of 1935, it seems that since May, and more 
probably since July, the European public had no illusion about the Italian-Ethiopian conflict. 
It was only a matter of time as we have already seen in some examples of May volumes. In 
July 1935, Popolo d’italia298 claims that the only solution in regard to the Italian-Ethiopian 
dispute can be a “total solution”. Economic expansion without military action would end 
similarly as the Treaty of Ucciali. The communist, and thus anti-Facsist daily Rudé právo299 
argues that all people from France are against Laval’s policy of supporting Mussolini in his 
aggressivity against the innocent Ethiopia.   
 
Lidové Listy300 quotes from News Chronicle when they inform about Abyissinian 
Ambassador dr. Martin’s visit in London where he tried to obtain a 2 million GBP loan. 
According to his own words, “the money was suppossed to be used for the economic 
development, but the war, which is brewing, has the first right. Abyssinia was loaded with 
special war tax to which everybody has to contribute. It is supossed to bring 5 million GBP. 
First of all, we need a large amount of cartridges for our Mauser rifles since the war will last 
                                                
295 Giornale d’Italia, May 9, 1935. 
 
296 Právo Lidu, May 8, 1935. 
 
297 Lidové noviny, May 8, 1935. 
 
298 Popolo d’Italia, July 31, 1935. 
 
299 Rudé právo, July 10, 1935. 
 
300 Lidové Listy, July 26, 1935. 
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long. We have about 200 thousand of Mauser rifles. Our artillery has some new cannons, 
others come from 1896 when we took the victory away from the Italians at Adwa.”301 
 
An international wave of solidarity with Ethiopia appeared also on pages of daily newspapers 
and journals quoting one another about protests against the Italian aggression and European 
passivity. Národní politika302 quotes from Le Temps and Echo de Paris and brings a large 
discussion over nationalist tendencies in African countries caused by the Italian-Ethiopian 
dispute:  
“All natives not only in the French Somaliland, but also in British colonies in East 
Africa, and even Southern Arabs talk only about the following war of the 
Abyssinians with the foreigners. The natives estimate the chances of the 
Abyssinians and the hopes ‘with the help of Allah’ in this war and dream of a 
support which all colored Africans have to provide to their colored brethrens in 
Abyssinia, as soon as they are caught in danger, or in other words: The Italian-
Abyssinian conflict has contributed in a few months to awakening of African 
nationalism that had fallen asleep since Lord Kitchener’s capture of Khartoum 
much more than the long-lasting, to foreigners hostile pan-African and pan-
Islamic propaganda. This critical situation definitely requires our absloute 
attention. We must not allow our great colonization work of the whole century 
that was sealed by our blood and our money to be threatened by the development 
of an action, which, geographically has to be limited only for a given territory.”303  
 
The importance of “racial discourse“ and growing chauvinism of Italy is underlined by the 
same article in discussion over Italian relations to Turkey and Japan. The Japanese press 
understands, according to Národní politika, the Italian-Ethiopian dispute as a conflict of the 
white race against “colored“ people. These racial aspects are suppossed to find support in 
France and Britain. Národní politika does not fully agree by stating that it was the French 
                                                
301 “Původně jsme potřebovai tyto peníze na hospodářský rozvoj Habeše, ale válka, která nám teď hrozí, má na 
ně první nárok. Habeši byla uložena zvláštní válečná daň, k níž musí přispět každý obyvatel Habeše. Má vynést 
asi 5 milionů liber. Především potřebujeme velké množství nábojů pro naše Mauserovy ručnice, neboť válka 
bude snad trvat dlouho. Mauserových pušek máme asi 200tisíc. Naše dělostřelectvo má některá nová děla, jiná 
pocházejí z roku 1896, kdy jsme je odňali Italům ve vítězné bitvě u Adowy.“; Lidové Listy, July 26, 1935. 
 
302 Národní politika, July 25, 1935. 
 
303 “Všichni domorodci nejen ve francouzském Somálsku, nýbrž také v anglických osadách ve východní Africe, 
ba dokonce i jižní Arabové, nemluví o ničem jiném, než o nastávající válce Habešanů s cizinci. Domorodci 
odhadují, jaké mohou míti Habešané „s Alláhovou pomocí“ naděje v této válce a sní o podpoře, kterou všichni 
barevní Afričané mají poskytnouti svým barevným bratřím v Habeši, jakmile se ocitnou v nebezpečí, čili jinými 
slovy: Italsko-habešský konflikt přispěl v několika málo měsících mnohem více k probuzení afrického 
nacionalismu, který upadl v tvrdý spánek po dobytí Chartúmu lordem Kitchenerem, než mnohaletá, cizincům 
nepřátelská panafrická a panislámská propaganda. Vznikla situace rozhodně velmi kritická, která již dnes 
vyžaduje, abychom jí věnovali všechnu svou pozornost. Nesmí býti připuštěno, aby velké kolonisační dílo 
celého století, které bylo zpečetěno naší krví a našimi penězi, bylo ohroženo rozvojem akce, která, geograficky 
vzato, musí zůstat omezena na určité území.“; Národní politika, July 25, 1935. 
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Ambassador to Rome, H. E. Chambrun, who tried to persuade Mussolini about the racial 
apsects of the forthcoming conflict, but Mussolini did not reply.304 Later in August, Sir 
Samuel Hoare tried to convince Mussolini of the necessity to stop the war or to solve the 
problem in a different way rather than the military one.305  
 
August and September 1935 were with no doubt the months of unstoppable preparations for 
the war, especially on the Italian side, and reflections of the Italian-Ethiopian “quarrels“ can 
be well documented again on pages of daily newspapers. International News Service 
interviewed Mussolini, whose following sentence was quickly picked up by newspapers from 
all around the world:  
“The Abyssinian dispute could be solved also in an other than military way, if 
leaders who now manage the fate of Abyssinia, give up their illusions of possible 
resistance, and do not believe in hypothetic help from other countries and realize 
that it is in a real interest of Abyssinia to accept an Italian protectorate. I do not 
believe that in Geneva a real and radical solution of the Abyssinian crisis could be 
found. The Italian nation is spiritually integrated and ready to make sacrifices.”306 
 
The Times307 in regard to the previous statements inform about Haile Selassie’s persistent 
willingness to solve the problem peacefully without using weapons. His “neverending hope“ 
and trust in the League of Nations is documented by an article about his military “operations“ 
contrasting to Mussolini’s conviction of Ethiopia as a dangerous country.308 The Times speak 
about the Emperor’s decision not to send for 60 thousand Wollamo and Konta men in arms to 
Addis Ababa because he wished to respect the will of the League of Nations.309 The Ethiopian 
will to solve the dispute on the ground of the League and its absolute belief in the principles 
of the League are documented also in the words of Takle Mawariat who told the journalists in 
                                                
304 Národní politika, July 25, 1935. 
 
305 Národní politika, August 25, 1935. 
 
306 “Habešská otázka mohla by býti rozřešena ještě jinou než válečnou cestou, kdyby předáci, kteří řídí nyní 
osudy Habeše, vzdali se iluse o možném odporu, nevěřili v hypotetickou pomoc se strany jiných zemí a 
uvědomili si, že ve skutečném zájmu Habeše jest, aby přijala italský protektorát. Nevěřím, že v Ženevě mohlo by 
býti dosaženo skutečného a radikálního řešení habešského problému. Italský národ je duševně ucelen a ochoten 
přinésti všechny oběti“. Quoted by Československé Slovo, August 15, 1935, the interview given on August 5. 
 
307 The Times, August 5, 1935. 
 
308 See e.g. Československé Slovo, August 15, 1935.  
 
309 The Times, August 5, 1935. 
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Paris on August 4, 1935, that for Ethiopia it was enough being a member of the League of 
Nations.310  
 
Positive reactions to Ethiopia’s position among the great powers of Europe not only had a 
great impact in Africa or Asia, but also the European public perceived the conflict as a clash 
between unequal entities. We can read that “the proud independent country of Abyssinia“ 
would never accept a protectorate or any other solution leading to suppression of its 
sovereignty. A pilot, Roy Tuckett, offered Ethiopia his help in the war, when he sent a 
telegramm to the Emperor. A British conservative member of the Parliament, Vivian Adams, 
told journalists that “England cannot abandon the hardest precautions like turning off the coal 
supplies or closing the Suez Canal in the case that Italy would stand on its position regarding 
Ethiopia.”311 
 
Rudé právo312 speaks about support of white and black communists in Washington who 
protested against the Italian regime and its foreign policy. In general, we can state that the so-
called leftish newspapers (Rudé právo is a good example of those) tended more to see the 
conflict in racial (white and black), political (Fascism vs. the free world) and even gender 
terms. Since women were important for their role in family life and economy of the country, 
their importance was stressed as shown in an example of an article concerning the foundation 
of a women committee for the defense of Ethiopia. Women involved in this committee gave 
their jewels as a symbol of their love to the homeland.313  
 
No other daily in the former Czechoslovakia informed about these aspects of Ethiopian 
patriotism. While other newspapers usually inform about negotiations between governments 
of the involved countries, Communist daily did not miss the opportunity to point at the fact 
that the “peoples of“ (whatever country) wish to stop the war and to express their support of 
Ethiopia. In general, right-wing journals were more conservative and cautious, though it can 
be said without any dispute that the common feature of most of European (and probably even 
                                                
310 Lidové noviny, August 5, 1935. 
 
311 Národní politika, August 2, 1935. 
 
312 Rudé právo, August 3, 1935. 
 
313 Rudé právo, August 3, 1935. 
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American) was their (at least) moral support of Ethiopia in the unequal fight against the 
growing Italian aggression.  
 
One interesting explanation why Ethiopia was attacked and threatened by Italy was expressed 
by Marcus Garvey whom we have met earlier in this work. He saw the reason in the fact that 
Haile Selassie ignored any relationship with the black people and throttled their aspirations. 
On the other hand, his critical comment is said to be the result of an attempt to regain the 
attention, lost authority and prestige.314 
 
This multidimensionality of imagining Ethiopia contributed to Mussolini’s persuasion that 
other European powers simply would not oppose to his expansion to Ethiopia315 and creating 
an image of Ethiopia became one of the means of conquest. One of the main points of the 
invasion was surely economy, the necessity to gain access to land suitable for agriculture. In 
my opinion, there are two reasons explaining the invasion in a symbolic way, or at least 
reasons that stay beyond the whole event. First was, as examined by Del Boca316, the “Adwa 
complex”. While for Italians Adwa meant a point in the history that needs to be revenged, for 
a part of the Ethiopian population it was time when Menilek’s “savage army killed millions of 
Oromo”.317 Second, the strategy was to create an image of a cruel enemy that presents a direct 
threat to interests of the “peaceful nation of Italy”. The enemy is always against our values 
and our values have to be defended by all means. Since the ancient times, there has been a 
long tradition of imagining enemies as those who are against our enemies and it is thus not so 
improbable that Mussolini in his rhetoric used something from the ancient Roman propaganda 
against the rising Christian community. The values of enmity, values of our enemies need to 
be put in contrast to our values of the good, the better. European rhetoric seems to follow this 
theory of rationalizing and legitimizing approach against the enemy by using strategic 
propaganda based on values of enmity.  
 
                                                
314 Sbacchi 1997: 6. 
 
315 Sbacchi 1989: 7. 
 
316 Del Boca 1969: 3-16. 
 
317 Melba 1988: 66. 
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Ethiopia seen by Czechoslovaks in the 1920’s and the 1930‘s 
 
Ethiopia did not belong to countries that the Czechoslovak population would be very much 
informed about between the wars, although we may suppose that due to Ethiopia’s position as 
the only truly independent African country, people were more aware of its conditions. A 
number of Czechoslovak travelers visited Ethiopia, which was also among the first African 
areas “discovered” by Czech missionaries in the 18th century.318 In the 1920’s and the 1930’s, 
the main focus of the Czechoslovak people interested in Ethiopia lay in agricultural 
colonization posibilities. Travelers brought to Czechoslovakia information about the 
difficulties with agriculture in Ethiopia, but also understood the growing importance of 
Ethiopia and Africa in general319 for Czechoslovak emigrants, businessmen, traders, and 
everyone who wanted to propagate the reputation of Czechoslovakia.  
 
One of the most important businessmen of Czechoslovakia in regard to Ethiopia was the 
already mentioned Ervín Mandelík, who sought to gain concessions for his planned cotton 
and banana farms in Ethiopia.320 From the correspondence between the Czechoslovak Foreign 
Department, an effort to gain better economic and trade conditions for Czechoslovak 
businissmen in Ethiopia is clear. Czechoslovakia wished to open new tade routes to Ethiopia 
as well as send there engineers, merchants, craftsmen and advisors.321 A letter of extreme 
importance was written by Ervín Mandelík to the Ethiopian Emperor, where the 
Czechoslovak businessman gives his accounts and advice to Haile Selassie.322 Mandelík 
describes Ethiopia as a country rich in natural resources, which means that all the necessary 
                                                
318 The most important person was a Franciscan, Václav Remedius Prutký, who visited Ethiopia in 1751-1753. 
His diary was translated into English by Arrowsmith-Brown in 1991. 
 
319 This was the case of a presentation given by a traveler Vilém Němec organized by the Department for 
emigration and colonization affairs on February 25, 1930. Vilém Němec outlined problems of accessibility of 
fertile land for foreign emigrants and described agricultural land in Ethiopia as generally poor, though with a 
certain potential that would be increased by sufficient technologies.; NA - ČÚZ 104, Č.j. 777, Přednáška 
cestovatele Viléma Němce pořádáná Ústavem pro em. a kol. styky při M. A. P. v České technice 25II.30. Referát 
Aloise Krejčího.; Three years later (October 25, 1933) Engineer Ludvík Kalvoda had a presentation on “the 
Contemporary Ethiopia“ organized by the Oriental Institute in Prague, where he talked about an import 
company, which he had established in Addis Ababa. 
 
320 In 1929, Mandelík discussed his possibilities with Austrian dr. Weizinger, a former European languages 
teacher of Ras Tafari. In February 1929, Mandelík went for to Ethiopia four months to discuss his plans with 
Ethiopian partners. NA – ČÚZ 104, Č. j. 1379, Habeš. Akcia pána vel’kostatkára Mandelíka. 
 
321 NA – ČÚZ 104, Č. j. 1450. 21. V. 1929. 
 
322 NA – ČÚZ 104, Č. j. 1450. Date unknown, there is only a copy of the original version, which is missing. 
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development needs to originate in the agricultural sphere. It is worthy to quote from the letter 
as we can get a better idea of the then perception of “non-colonial mind“: 
“It is a big fault that Europeans settled in Your country, with only minor 
exceptions, they are not specialists in what they are doing here: thus a merchant is 
not originally a merchant, a mechanic is not trained in his occupation and 
moreover a peasant is everything possible but not a peasant. Many of these people 
came to You by adventure in order to make some profit and do not have either 
professional or moral qualifications to be propagators of culturein Your country. 
That is why the government has to help itself by employing qualified European 
instructors and later by its own people, who will gain qualification and practice in 
Europe. They will then introduce perfect economy in different parts of Your 
country, in which broader classes of Your nation may gain knowledge in rational 
economy.”323 
 
Then an erudite advice how to develop Ethiopian economy, agriculture and production 
follows. After a detailed analysis of agricultural methods, Mandelík concludes his letter with 
a brief account on the political scene, as he sees Czechoslovakia being a promising partner for 
Ethiopia, which was more and more disappointed by the behavior of several European 
colonial powers: 
“During my stay in Abyssinia I was interested also in political aspects of Your 
country. I understand that His Excellency protects himself against foreigners with 
colonizing intentions, but just these reasons that speak against some other nations, 
could lead to cooperation with our compatriots. Our state with its geographical 
position and mentality of its inhabitants cannot ever have conquering plans. On 
the other hand, we look for a suitable market for our industrial goods and for our 
diligent and intelligent peasantry, a country in which they could work and find 
their new home. Because of these reasons, my countrymen would be useful for 
Your state, particularly if only the best ones would be chosen after an agreement 
with our government.”324 
 
                                                
323 “Velkou vadou jest, že Evropané usedlí ve Vaší zemi, až na malé výjimky nejsou odborníky v tom, čím se u 
Vás zabývají: tak obchodník není povoláním obchodníkem, strojník není vyučeným strojníkem a hlavně rolník je 
vším možným jen ne rolníkem. Mnoho z těch lidí přišlo k Vám dobrodružným způsobem, by z Vás jen těžili, a 
nemají ani odborné ani morální kvalifikace, by se stali u Vás šiřiteli kultury. Proto si vláda sama musí pomoci 
tím, že pomocí kvalifikovaných evropských instruktorů a později i vlastních lidí, kteří potřebné praxe v Evropě 
nabudou, zavede vzorná hospodářství v různých částech Vašeho státu, ve kterých se širší vrstvy Vašeho národa 
budou moci racionálnímu hospodářství přiučiti.“ 
 
324 “Za mého pobytu v Habeši zajímaly mne též politické otázky Vaší země. Chápu, že Vaše Výsost se chrání 
před cizinci s intencemi kolonisačními, ale právě důvody, které mluví proti některým národům, mohly by vésti 
k spolupráci s mými krajany. Náš stát svojí zeměpisnou polohou a mentalitou svého obyvatelstva nemůže nikdy 
míti dobyvačných plánů, hledá však pro své průmyslové výrobky vhodné odbytiště a pro své pilné a inteligentní 
rolnictvo a řemeslnictvo zemi, v které by pracovati mohli a našli svůj druhý domov. Z těchto důvodů by moji 
krajané co kolonisté a instruktoři se pro Váš stát obzvláště hodili, zvláště kdyby v dohodě s naší vládou byly 
k tomu vybráni lidé co nejlepší.“; Ibid. 
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Not all Czecholsovak emigrants went to Ethiopia with best intentions, as an example of the 
aforementioned Ludvík Kalvoda shows.325 Besides him, there were more than a dozen of 
Czechoslovak businessmen (see also Appendixes). Vojtěch Kalvoda in the mid-1930´s wrote 
his remarks on the creeping war: 
“The Italian-Abyssinia war is inevitable. It will be a revenge for Adwa, where 
Menilek’s army beat the Italian troops hollow. As it is clear from this sentence, 
you can see what I judge from the result. It is evident that today, Italy is well 
prepared, it has brought huge amounts of military material and finally, technical 
troops into its colonies in East Africa. […] On the contrary, Abyssinia […] is in a 
very poor situation. They have, all in all, 15 observational planes […]. They do 
not have cannons except for some empty parade ones from which they shoot 
every noon so that Europeans can set their watch […] and finally some machine 
guns, I do not know exactly how many they have, but the last delivery was 300 
units from Czechoslovakia.”326  
 
Kalvoda’s letter gives us one of the interesting proves of the contemporary European thinking 
already expressed in many previous documents and analyses in this work. In his view, the 
difference between an Italian and Ethiopian soldier lay in the fact that an Ethiopian “simply 
gets a gun and goes to the border”. With no scruples, Kalvoda concludes his comment on the 
potential result of the war: “Today, England still officially boasts about the name of humanity 
towards the black race, but I think that unofficially they negotiate which part of western 
Abyssinia which they will get.”327 Czechoslovak newspapers from time to time presented 
information about a tiny community of Czechoslovak citizens living in Ethiopia. An article,328 
written in an ironic manner shows some difficulties that these people had to face. The author 
criticizes the way in which mail goes from Czechoslovakia to Ethiopia: from Prague, through 
Trieste, Port Said, El Kuscir, Djida, Massawa, Aden and finally to Djibouti.  
 
                                                
325 In a letter to the editorial board of the journal Krajan, Anna Peterková depicts Kalvoda as a man whose 
character can be described in words of  “stealing, lying, and servility”. Kalvoda extended the message that he 
was the only Czechoslovak invited to the coronation of Haile Selassie in 1930.; The letter written on July 5, 
1934, in Addis Ababa.; Number unknown. 
 
326 “Válka habešsko-italská jest neodvratná. Bude to odplata za Aduu, kde vojska Menelika na hlavu porazila 
armádu italskou. Jak z věty vidno, vidíte už, co soudím o výsledku. Jisté je, že Itálie dnes je dobře připravena, 
navezla spoustu válečného materiálu a konečně, technických trup do svých kolonií ve východní Africe. […] 
Naproti tomu Habeš […] je na tom velmi uboze. Má zde všeho všudy 15 pozorovacích letadel […]. Děla žádná 
vyjma několika prázdných parádních, ze kterých se střílí denně ve 12 hodin v poledne, aby si Evropané nařídili 
správně hodinky […] a konečně strojní pušky, kolik těch mají, nevím přesně, ale poslední dodávka byla 300 
kusů z ČSR.”; NA – ČÚZ 104, č. j. 2243, July 29, 1935. 
 
327 NA – ČÚZ 104, č. j. 2243, July 29, 1935. 
 
328 NA – ČÚZ 104, Pestré cesty čsl. Pošty do říše Krále Králů. Title of the newspaper unknown. 
 93 
Though this work is limited by the beginning of the Italian-Ethiopian war, I would like to add 
some brief comments on Czechoslovak citizens living in Ethiopia during the war, which may 
be useful for my aim to give an analysis of multi-dimensional images of Ethiopia. The war 
came to Ethiopia on October 3, 1935, and lasted until the following May, when Africa 
Orientale Italiana was established. Marcus adds to the result of the war that “modernity 
defeated Ethiopia – it was that simple”.329 After Haile Selassie left Addis Ababa at the 
beginning of May 1936 for an exile in London, Ethiopia lost its symbol of majesty and honor 
and many Ethiopian people felt it as a betrayal, while Italians took the opportunity to prove 
that they are the saviors of a barbarous race and “the apostles of light and civilization”.330 
Since the end of 1935, Czechoslovaks perceived changes in Ethiopia with a certain 
discomposure, though in the first months of the war, it is reported that in Addis Ababa there 
was hardly something that could resemble a military conflict.331 Czechoslovakia had always 
been one of the countries exporting weapons and guns to Ethiopia,332 and this was also 
reflected in the correspondence between Czechoslovaks in Ethiopia and Prague. A deep 
analysis of the Czechoslovak trade and export of weapons to Ethiopia is given by Chmiel in 
his Ph.D. dissertation,333 and it would be far beyond the scope of this work to bring the same 
analysis. What is – on the other hand – a direct aim of the thesis, is its interest in 
Czechoslovak reflections of the war in Ethiopia.  
 
In a letter from November 11, 1935, Kalvoda wrote about an increasing wave of solidarity 
coming to Ethiopia from all over the world, including offers for guns and other military 
equipment. One of the countries offering the best price was Czechoslovakia, but soon after 
that, on November 14, Lithuania offered an even cheaper load of weapons.334 Kalvoda 
assesses the situation in Ethiopia and states that Ethiopia at that moment was absolutely out of 
financial sources. All money from the League was spent for military material. What is more 
                                                
329 Marcus 1998: 175. 
 
330 Del Boca 1969: 204. 
 
331 This note was written by a Czech citizen (M. Šrámek) in Addis Ababa at the beginning of November 1935, 
who sent a letter to the editorial board of Krajan.; NA – ČÚZ 104, č. j. 3311, November 6, 1935. 
 
332 A good reputation of the former Czechoslovakia is to be seen in many parts of Ethiopia up to the present, 
since the name “Czechos“ symbolizes the type of a machine gun imported from Czechoslovakia during the war 
and occupation (personal communication with Pavel Mikeš). 
 
333 Chmiel, J. (1991): Československo-etiopské vztahy v letech 1935-1939. Praha: Kandidátská práce ČSAV.  
 
334 NA – ČÚZ 104, č. j. 3458, November 16, 1935. 
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useful for our purposes is his comment on the public opinion in Ethiopia in regard to Haile 
Selassie: 
“The political situation still remains unchanged. It is rumored that the position of 
Haile Selassie begins to be unstable. The Emperor is not popular among the 
people, they consider him an usurper of the throne, who does not even come from 
Menilek’s ancestry. He is still suspect of collaborating with Europeans, while 
Ethiopians have a mortal aversion to the white race. It is known that he has money 
saved in Europe “in case” and this is perceived with displeasure by chiefs and 
provincial governors, who complain about taxes they have to pay to the Emperor 
and, instead of giving money to his national bank, he sent them abroad.”335 
 
Kalvoda also makes comments on general public mood when he says that Lej Iyyasu (former 
Emperor) is more and more popular and his support grows as the situation gets worse: „Lej 
Iyyasu is an enemy of the white race and that is why he is so popular.”336 In another report 
from Ethiopia, Šrámek adds that the Ethiopian public is still open and friendly towards 
Europeans and according to him, the Emperor himself proclaimed that those Europeans who 
stayed in Ethiopia are from friendly countries, and thus people have to treat them properly.337  
 
Petr Kopecký (born in 1893) was one of those who not only spent some time in Ethiopia but 
also one of those who transformed their images into a written word. Kopecký write three 
books about Ethiopia, though only one of them – Across Ethiopia (Napříč Etiopií) – was 
finally published. The other two remained as manuscripts. Kopecký thought of agricultural 
colonization and promoted some trade between commercial subjects and Ethiopia. 
Nevertheless, Czechoslovak Ministry of Social Work regarded him an adventurer who 
seemed as a “psychologically unstable.”338 
 
                                                
335 “Situace politická zatím nezměněna. Šušká se ale, že pozice Haile Selassie počíná kolísat. Císař není u lidu 
oblíben, považují ho za uzurpátora trůnu, který nepochází ani přímo z větve Menelika. Jest stále podezříván, že 
se zády lidu paktuje se s Evropany, tedy s tou na smrt nenáviděnou bílou rasou, ví se, že má v Evropě schovány 
peníze „pro případ“, a to je zase nelibě neseno mezi šéfy a guvernéry provincií, kteří si stěžují, že musí odvádět 
poplatky císaři, který, místo aby je dal do vlastní státní banky, je posílá za hranice.“; NA – ČÚZ 104, č. j. 3458, 
November 16, 1935. 
 
336 Ibid. 
 
337 NA – ČÚZ 104, č. j. 3311, November 6, 1935. 
 
338 NA – ČÚZ 104, Opis, number not known, October 12, 1931. 
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Table 1: Czechoslovaks in Ethiopia in the early 1930’s 
1) Addis Ababa 
Ludvík Kalvoda (with his wife and two 
daughters) 
Expert in production of beef bowels 
František Štepančík  Employee of Mr. Kalvoda 
Karel Peterka (with his wife) Owner of a butcher’s shop 
František Mezník Employee of Mr. Peterka  
Mr. Heliger (with his wife and son) Mechanic in a power plant 
Vojtěch Kalvoda (with his wife and two 
children) 
Employed in the National Bank 
Ernest Kametz (with his wife and child) Architect at the Ministry of Public Works 
W. Kametz Architect at the Ministry of Public Works 
 
2) Dire Dawa 
František Vacek Clerk in the National Bank 
Alois Vacek Exporter of live game 
Antonín Šrámek (with his wife and three 
children) 
Owner of the shop “Tchecoslovac Halle” 
Krob family Owners of the shop “Krob Bros.” 
 
3) Other places 
Antonín Franc (with his wife and two 
children) 
Head of a coffee plantation in the Arrussi 
province 
Mr. Vokáček Hunter, without regular accommodation 
Unknown family Located in Harar 
 
Source: NA – ČÚZ, karton 32, Č.j. 3311/35. November 21, 1932. 
 
 
For the following years filled by a brutal war, Adolf Parlesák was the man who promoted the 
name of Czechoslovakia to Ethiopian elites. Parlesák spent many years in Ethiopia at the 
court of Haile Selassie though he began as an adventurer traveling through the country. His 
famous memoires – Abyssinian Odyssey (Habešská odysea) – remains one of the most 
important witnesses of the war.339 His engagement in the conflict is already out of the scope 
of this work.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
339 Parlesák, A. [1948] (1989): Habešská odysea. Praha: Panorama. 
 96 
Table 2: Ethiopian import and export in 1918 and 1923 
IIIa. Import 
Commodity Kg (1918) Kg (1923) 
Aboudjedid 2,365,205 2,513,019 
Other cotton materials 1,150,810 868,180 
Kerosene 38,260 511,670 
Soap 69,720 187,480 
Beer 13,960 41,650 
Iron-plate materials 13,770 172,710 
Glassware 14,360 72,610 
Bags and sacks 206,465 226,250 
 
 
IIIb. Export 
Commodity Kg (1918) Kg (1923) 
Coffee “Abyssin” 9,060 1,748,700 
Coffee “Harari” 3,194,070 3,779,090 
Coffee “Ecorces” 48,610 69,990 
Beeswax 185,200 220,369 
Beef skin 8,216,340 5,527,390 
Goat skin 505,150 732,750 
 
Source: Národní Listy, April 14, 1927.  
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Remarks, questions and explanations 
 
If I am supposed to reconstruct the image of Ethiopia depicted by daily press from the early 
1920’s until the end of the war, we have seen that as the international political situation was 
getting worse for Ethiopia, the public opinion presented in press continually turned to the last 
African independent state. Beginning in the early 1920’s, Ethiopia represented an unknown 
land and even a puzzle since it became a member of the League in 1923, though people in 
Europe were almost daily informed about serious challenges and problems that modern world 
was facing when accepting Ethiopia in the League. The major problem was seen in slavery, 
which was the only aspect that could be taken as legitimate, since even scientific literature 
showed examples of prevailing slavery in certain parts of Ethiopia.340  
 
Other features of Ethiopia stressed by press in the 1920’s, especially its “barbarity”, 
“backwardness” or “primitiveness”, were used: (1) anthropologically – to determine the 
difference between the white race and the “natives”; (2) politically – to use the color of skin 
as a means of support of other Euroean powers, France and Britain. (1) Since Adwa, there 
were many theories regarding the usefulness of anthropological knowledge in the colonial 
thought. The ancient native people of Ethiopia were regarded as living in “the most inferior 
state of civilization”.341 As has been shown by Sòrgoni,342 academics of already the early 
period were aware of the political importance of the anthropological discipline, “whose role 
was to be a guide toward the ‘better’ governance of the colonized”. Sòrgoni then quotes an 
example of Lamberto Loria who stated that an “ethnographic knowledge was the main tool 
for a ‘firm’ colonial policy, so much so that if in the past ‘our governors’ had known the 
ethnography of their subjects, they would have surely shown ‘a stricter rule…less 
generosity’”.343 In these manners the colonial thought towards the natives was led, since it 
was too complicated for the public to think about heterogenity of “the other” and too simple 
to define them as “primitive”. As Adam Kuper adds, “the most fundamental issue confronting 
                                                
340 For the best view, see Donham, D. L.; James, W. (eds.) (2002): The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia. 
Oxford: James Currey. 
 
341 Conti Rossini, C. (1937): Etiopia e Genti di Etiopia. Firenze: R. Bemporad e F.-Editori. 
 
342 Sòrgoni, B. (2003): Italian Anthropology and the Africans: The Early Colonial Period. In: Palumbo, P. (ed.): 
A Place in the Sun. Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present (pp. 62-80). Los 
Angeles: University of California Press.; Sòrgoni 2003: 64. 
 
343 Sòrgoni 2003: 64. 
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anthropologists in every society has always been the definition of the basic units of human 
life. Should people be grouped according to race, descent, language, custom, religion, or 
political allegiance? What are the primordial social groups – tribe, clan, caste, ethnic group, or 
nation? To complicate matters, there may be multiple affiliations.”344  
 
For the European (and especially Italian) colonial thought in the 1920’s and the 1930’s, as 
reflected in daily press, Ethiopia was hardly something more than a country of slavers and 
slaves, barbars and uncivilized people. The reason was not only anthropological. We can 
better say that the reason did not lie in anthropology, because since Giuseppe Sergi’s 
classification of races in 1897, the Hamites and Mediterraneans were of the same origin, both 
being indigenous to the Horn of Africa.345 Thus in the light of this theory, Ethiopians, or 
Amhara people were being regarded higher than “the Negro”. While “the Negro” was viewed 
as a lower race and closer to “savage”, Ethiopians enjoyed a certain dignity derived from the 
awaken black consciousness in the Afro-American world at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Ethiopia was now, in words of William E. B. DuBois, “that strange and ancient center of the 
world civilization whose inhabitants in the ancient world were considered to be the most 
pious and the oldest of men. From this center the black originators of African culture, and to a 
large degree of world culture, wandered not simply down the Nile, but also westward.”346 
Ethiopia was thus seen as the “real mother” of all Africans and this feeling had been 
strengthened after the Adwa victory in 1896, from which Ethiopia came as the only 
independent country in Africa (we can doubt whether Liberia was really independent).  
 
For European powers seeking for other economic or even territorial expansion, Ethiopia 
represented a chance how to boost their confidence and influence in the Horn. (2) Politically, 
there was a necessity to find a way of changing the public opinion on Ethiopia. The best way 
lead through daily press, which could legitimize economic tensions originating in the British 
unwillingness to accept Ethiopia’s admission to the League of Nations. There can be a reason 
why British newspapers in the early 1920’s brought news about Ethiopian savagery, barbarity 
                                                
344 Kuper, A. (2005): “Today We Have Naming of Parts”: The Work of Anthropologists in Southern Africa. In: 
L’Estoile, B.; Neiburg, F.; Sigaud, L. (eds.): Empires, Nations, and Natives. Anthropology and State-Making 
(pp. 277-299). Durham and London: Duke University Press.; Kuper 2005: 279-280. 
 
345 Sòrgoni 2003: 64. 
 
346 DuBois, W. E. B. (2001): The Negro. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.; DuBois 2001: 48. 
 
 99 
and existence of slavery.347 As the international situation in the 1920’s and mainly in the first 
half of the 1930’s worsened and Italy became more interested in territorial expansion, the 
Italian Fascist propaganda using Popolo d’Italia and some other daily press as the main 
“speaking trumpet” picked up the baton. The Italian press by stressing the “innocence” of 
Italy and “aggressivity” of Ethiopia sought also to use the concept of race as a means to 
persuade not only the public opinion of the necessity to attack the country, but also a means to 
designate the conflict as a clash between two “races”. The fact that it was a real state policy of 
Italy, or let us say, the political opinion of that time, can be well documented on the example 
of the Italian diplomatic correspondence.348  
 
If we compare Italian newspapers regarding Ethiopia, we can deduce some interesting points. 
As the war was nearing, the structure of articles was focused more on the justified Italian 
action against “le volgarità dell‘Impero Nero”349 or against British interests that were seen as 
egoistic and unscrupulous though it was Britian who had always shown a certain disinterest in 
the mutual Italian-Ethiopian disputes.350 While Ethiopia was “violating” international 
agreements, Italy maintained its liberty to act since Haile Selassie’s willingness to solve the 
problem on the ground of the League was regarded as a comedy.351 
 
One of the crucial aspects of the Italian propaganda before and during the occupation of 
Ethiopia was the accent on its “civilizing” role. No words can sum this up better than those of 
Haile Selassie: “Italy has recently established a propaganda campaign to make it appear that 
her occupation of a part of Ethiopian territory, her attack upon Ethiopia, and her desire to 
seize the people are simply in order to civilize them properly; and this is what ought to be 
done to a pagan population.”352 The Italian propaganda toward Ethiopia (or Africa in general) 
had three main aspects: race and culture, the magnitude of Italy and the inferiority of Africa, 
                                                
347 See Venkov, July 27, 1924, and Manchester Guardian, July 27, 1926. 
 
348 Grandi al Mussolini. Londra 3 maggio 1935, R. 1451/465(1).; DDI 1953: 132. 
 
349 See e.g. Il Popolo d’Italia, September 6, 1935. 
 
350 See e.g. La Tribuna, September 3, 1935. 
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352 Haile Selassie I 1976: 213. 
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and the necessity to civilize Africans. All spheres of art, journalism and daily life were 
affected by explicit or implicit propaganda.353 
 
While Italy presented its racial prejudiced rhetoric based on superiority of the “white” race, 
Afro-American scholars stressed since the beginning of the 20th century Ethiopia’s ancient 
majesty and its role as the center of the ancient world.354 The roots of the imperial propaganda 
are of much older origin as Said355 examined on the example of Verdi’s opera Aida. The 
highpoint of the Italian propaganda came – with no doubt – during the Fascist regime.  
 
Italy’s weak point was the lack of support in Europe. In Britain, Dino Grandi was well 
informed about the public indignation toward Italy’s activities leading to war preparations.356 
To find the way out of the deteriorating image of Italy in Britain, Italians funded gracious 
journalists. Bosworth357 writes of Grandi’s carte blanche which he used to pay for pleasant 
explanations of Italy’s imperial endeavour in Ethiopia. One such journalist was E. Polson 
Newman, who had written articles praising Italy’s activities since the 1920’s. Between August 
and October 1935, Newman received a generous offer to spend a few months in East Africa in 
order to praise the Fascist cause and condemn the Ethiopian “barbarism”. However, the 
impact of his work was rather insignificant. Both Grandi and Mussolini were aware of it as 
Grandi spoke about hypocrisy of British political puritanism.358 Unlike Britain, France 
represented Mussolini’s chance or at least slight hope.  
 
                                                
353 Mignemi 1984. 
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Hakim Warqenah, known as Dr. Charles Warqenah Martin, was appointed Ethiopian Minister 
to the Court of St. James’s in 1935. Richard Pankhurst359 is the only account on Warknah’s 
so-far unpublished documents and correspondence including letters to and from Sylvia 
Pankhurst. His value in relation to the Italian-Ethiopian crisis may be compared to that of  
dr. Malaku Bafan in the U.S. and of Makonnen in France. Warqenah’s correspondence 
included reactions on the Italian propaganda as well as the pro-Ethiopian propaganda. What is 
more essential, his education gave him respect to Britain, thus his opinions might have been 
of greater importance. Concerning the reactions to the Italian propagandist and prejudiced 
approach, he wrote: “It is too disgusting for words to see how people who call themselves 
Christian and civilized gentlemen can demean themselves to tell such lies. - One can’t help 
but look down on Italians.”360 His own propagandist initiatives were written with regard to the 
Arab World in his report from September 29, 1935: “I am having some information regarding 
Italian atrocities printed with illustrations from a book called Italy’s Fight for a Desert.”361 
His aim was to win their favor, as also Mussolini did with his speeches concerning the Italian 
respect of Islam.362 
                                                
359 Pankhurst, R. (2002): Hakim Wärknäh, Propagandist for Ethiopia at the Time of the Italian Fascist Invasion. 
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VI The Wal Wal Incident and its Consequences 
 
Article 4 of the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 asserts that France, Great Britain, and Italy “shall 
make every effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia.”363 Since 1906, the three European 
powers tried to act in the mutual concordance, though rivalry traditionally existed especially 
between France and Great Britain. The agreement between the three countries signed on 
December 13, 1906, specified the economic interests of the three.364 After Mussolini had 
gained power in Italy (1922), the Fascist regime in Rome turned its eyes to the revival of the 
colonial empire. Colonial expansion was implicit in Fascism, as stated by Lowe and Marzari: 
“In a movement permeated by crude social Darwinism and intoxicated by the discovery of the 
efficacy of violence, the notion took root early that the conquest of ‘inferior’ peoples was as 
legitimate as it was desirable and profitable.”365   
 
The roots of the Fascist colonial ambitions were defined in Impero, 1923: “...the solution for 
an imperial nation such as Italy is and must be one alone, an extra-European Empire over 
people unable to govern themselves, over lands whose produce will give a nation such as ours 
not so much wealth as the raw materials which now rule out our commercial autonomy. The 
Empire will weld all Italians into a ‘single class’.”366 The imperial expansionism was 
presented as the only solution to poverty and the post-war instability though concrete plans 
for conquering Ethiopia were not discussed until 1933/1934.367 
 
Be as it may, Italy’s decision for invasion to Ethiopia was a part of diplomatic and political 
discourse for a long time. Italy’s disappointment after the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and 
Mussolini’s accession to power (1922) may seem as other roots of the expansionist policy.  
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In his speech to the second quinquennial assembly of the Fascist Party on March 18, 1934, 
Mussolini said the following: “The historical objectives of Italy have two names: Asia and 
Africa. The south and the east are the compass points toward which the interest and will of 
Italians are directed... Of all the great western powers of Europe, the closest to Africa and to 
Asia is Italy... There is no question of territorial conquests – this must be understood by all, 
both far and near – but of a natural expansion which ought to lead to collaboration between 
Italy and the peoples of Africa and the nations of the near and middle east… Italy in the first 
place is able to introduce Africa more fully into the circle of the civilized world.”368 His 
speech was in sharp contrast with the deeds, since the state of Italy after the Great Depression 
sought to control all heavy industrial activity and Mussolini gave several times evidence of an 
interest in embarking colonial expansion in East Africa.369  
 
One such evidence Mussolini gave was published in his La Dottrina del Fascismo370 (1932).  
He was convinced that “Fascism does not, generally speaking, believe in the possibility or 
utility of perpetual peace. It therefore discards pacifism. War alone keys up all human 
energies to their maximum tension and sets the seal of nobility on those peoples who have the 
courage to face it… Fascism carries this antipacifist attitude into the life of the individual.”371 
Considering the beginning of real plans for the invasion, we have to count in the opinion of 
Emilio De Bono who considers 1933 the year “in which we began to think in concrete terms 
of the measures to be taken in the case of conflict with Ethiopia”.372 From his words it seems 
that since 1933 Mussolini did not hesitate to enlarge the military budget. 
 
The fact that Italy was preparing its military campaign against Ethiopia had been clear to the 
Emperor already in 1934, when he, in a speech to the Parliament (June 11, 1934), accused 
Italy of “building up its military preparedness and Italian Government top officials openly 
talk that their major plan is to occupy Our country”. What is more important, or we may say, 
more interesting, is the Emperor’s appeal to his nation and state to defend the country against 
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the aggression. Though a little pathetic, while he did not know whether Italy would finally 
invade Ethiopia or not, it is worthy to quote from his speech that was to mobilize and unite 
the country: “Fighting men of Ethiopia! Do not lament or lose hope when you see a respected 
and beloved leader fall in the battlefield, for the cause of Our freedom. Instead, you must 
realize that anyone who dies for his country is indeed fortunate. Death comes to all whether in 
time of peace or war and takes those it chooses. It is better to die with freedom than without 
it. […] Soldiers! Businessmen! Farmers! Young and old, men and women! Unite! Together 
for the defence of your country! As it has always been in our tradition, women too must rise 
to defend their country by encouraging the soldiers and nursing the wounded. No matter how 
hard Italy tries to disunite us, Christians and Moslems, everyone will stand united.”373 
 
The border between the Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia had never been formerly delimited – 
although several treaties were signed between both countries – and this fact was seen as the 
major factor of mutual quarrels and increasing tensions. The convention between Ethiopia and 
Italy, signed in Addis Ababa (May 16, 1908) delineated vaguely the Italian and Ethiopian 
possessions of Somalia. It also sets general conditions on control over the Somali tribes on 
both sides of the Juba River,374 though no concrete approach had been made towards it. 
Article 4 speaks about a point situated north of Wabe Shebelle, but the vagueness of the 
Convention is sketched in Article 5: “The two Governments undertake to delimit on the spot 
and the actual line of the frontier as soon as possible …”.375  
 
The unwillingness to make compromises accompanied the whole conversation on the frontier, 
as was the case of a joint commission established in 1911 that soon went to failure after both 
countries resigned to make a compromising conclusion. In the following years Italians 
counted with an area much wider and much more beyond the territory delimited by the 1908 
Treaty. It was a deliberate deed, since Italians had known about the areas rich in water around 
Wal Wal and Wardair, although these were described even in Italian documents as Ethiopian 
localities.376 
                                                
373 To Parliament on Italy’s Aggression, July 11, 1934. Selected Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Haile  
Selassie I. 1918 to 1967. Published by the Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information. Addis Ababa: 
Publications and Foreign Languages Press Department, pp. 301-302. 
 
374 AB 1979: 835. 
 
375 AB 1979: 836. 
 
376 Baer 1967: 46; Del Boca 1969: 19-20; Hess 1966: 172-174; Zewde 2001: 153; Sbacchi 1997: 328. 
Komentář [H1]: Tahle pomlčka 
by měla být dlouhá! 
 105 
The Ogaden region is a semiarid inhospitable land with scarce water resources, inhabited by 
nomadic Somali tribes wandering across the Ethiopian-Somali border.377 Though Ogaden was 
incorporated to Ethiopia in 1895, after serious losses of the Ethiopian army, the Addis Ababa 
government lost any interest in these remote areas.378 While Ethiopians had no significant 
interest in the semi-desert border district, Italians were strongly interested and valued the 
watering points of Wal Wal, Wardair, Afdub and Ado for their remarkable supplies of 
water.379 It is estimated that approximately 360 wells were built in Wal Wal. Cesare de 
Vecchi – the then governor of the Italian Somaliland – decided in 1926 to incorporate these 
areas to the Italian colonial empire. His aim was to claim Wal Wal as an Italian dependency. 
In 1930, a garrison was built in Wal Wal and a command position installed at Wardair.380  
 
De Vecchi’s successor, Guido Corni, continued in 1928-1931 in the policy of infiltration into 
the Ethiopian Ogaden by persuading prominent religious leaders across the border to support 
the Italian cause. Some Somali bandit groups were recruited to ignite the tensions in 
Ogaden.381 While Italians established several points in the Ethiopian Ogaden in the early 
1930’s, Ethiopians were not able to intervene. It was only a matter of time when the tension 
would break out in a serious incident. The main clash occurred at the end of 1934 and became 
known as Wal Wal incident. As for Ogaden and Somalia, resentment against Italy was one of 
the main causes of the awakening of the Somali national consciousness.382  
 
As Eshete383 outlines the trend of expansion of the Ethiopian power into Ogaden, it is clear 
that the incorporation of Ogaden followed the defeat of Emir Abdullahi of Harar in the battle 
of Chelenqo on January 6, 1887. Why did this region play such an important role in Menilek’s 
time and after? Primarily, there were economic reasons because trade routes through Ogaden 
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connected Harar with Zeila and Berbera. Moreover, there was also a significant livestock 
potential. Secondly, for Menilek, the possession of Ogaden would strengthen his position in 
negotiating with the neighboring powers. As for Italian claims, the Anglo-Italian Protocol of 
1894 recognized Ogaden as part of the Italian sphere of influence. The British in return were 
to have the Haud region, a rich grazing land in Ogaden.384 Since both sides claimed their 
territorial right over Ogaden and since the border delimitation remained vague and unclear, 
Italians were allowed to occupy the Wal Wal area without being threatened by any 
international sanctions. 
 
As Italians were in occupation of Wal Wal, Haile Selassie sought to regain control over the 
territory. While his early attempts failed, in 1934 he commenced the active harassment of the 
Italian position in Ogaden. One of the key steps was to be the engagement of Omar Samantar. 
Ethiopians made him an offer to lead a group of Ethiopians and Somalis who would then 
occupy Gerlogubi and the Wal Wal/Wardair area. At the beginning of 1934, after a series of 
negotiations, Ethiopians broke off because of the unacceptable demands of Omar Samantar 
who wanted a higher price.385 In March of the same year, the Italian consul at Harar reported 
that Omar Samantar had decided to accept the Ethiopian offer and was on the way to Addis 
Ababa. At the beginning of April, Italian officials reported that two armed bands of a 
thousand men each were active in the border region and at Jijjiga under the leadership of 
Omar Samantar and the sultan of Makail. According to the Italian diplomatic correspondence, 
Italians monitored their activities in the following months accusing them of hostile 
behavior.386  
 
Bahru Zewde387 in his A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855 – 1991 states that Mussolini’s 
plans to conquer Ethiopia gained a more concrete shape after unsuccessful territorial claims in 
Europe, mainly over Austria. After the lost dispute over the Brenner Pass with Adolf Hitler, 
the Italian desire of re-establishing the Empire became more evident and “logical”. Rough 
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plans on the seizure of Ethiopia had lain on Mussolini’s table since 1925.388 This statement is 
supported by the fact that since Ethiopia’s admission to the League of Nations, Italians 
contested the Ethiopian membership.389 Paul Henze390 argues that the real plan for invasion to 
Ethiopia was being prepared already since 1932. The truth is that Mussolini wanted a quick 
war without any huge losses that could bolster the Italian pride and honor. With regard to this 
fact, the Fascist propaganda began to berate Ethiopia as a primitive country full of slavery and 
barbarism.  
 
Italians proceeded in a very rational way by trying to make Ethiopia precipitate a crisis. A 
possible Ethiopian aggression would be used as pretence for an oppressive reaction. In my 
opinion, the Italian colonial policy had far broader spectrum of aspects that predetermined the 
invasion. That is why the invasion cannot be simplified or restricted to the military conquest 
itself. It is worthwhile to sense the Italian colonial ambitions in several points. First, as a 
revenge for the Adwa defeat; second, as a consecutive chain of political events in Europe 
connected especially with the role of Germany and culminating in 1939; last but not least, the 
invasion plans and the creation of Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI) were eased by the political, 
ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Ethiopia. There was a strong opposition toward the 
ruling Amhara elites, especially among the Oromo. Italians attempted to make some of their 
opposition leaders their allies. At the same time, Mussolini wanted to win favor of the Muslim 
minorityby his proclamations about his support of Islam.391 
 
Italians took advantage of the vaguely delineated Ethiopian borders with the Italian 
Somaliland and provoked the so-called Wal Wal incident. They benefited from the rather lax 
Ethiopian administrative control of this area. The Italian aversion led to a clash that left a lot 
of dead on both sides, but it was Italy who, according to the prearranged scenario, demanded 
apologies and reparations.392 At the beginning of 1935, Italy began to enlarge its troops on the 
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Ethiopian border. Loads of ammunition and weapons were being delivered from Italy to 
Mogadisho and Massawa. Beside Italians, a lot of native people from Eritrea, Italian 
Somaliland and Libya were called into arms. Italian secret service conducted intensive 
activities along the borders and endeavored to provoke conflicts and quarrels between Italians 
and Ethiopians as well as among Ethiopians. 
 
The British, as partly involved in the clash, were aware of the real origin of the conflict. In his 
letter to Sir E. Drummond, Sir J. Simon with no doubt acknowledges Ethiopia’s right to the 
Wal Wal territory. On the other hand, the British policy was not willing to take any direct 
action: “…Italian right to the territory they have occupied is, to say the least, doubtful; and it 
is by no means certain that in some form or other the dispute as to the boundary between 
Ethiopia and Italy may not come before the League of Nations, where His Majesty’s 
Government must have a free hand, it is particularly desirable that you should not use any 
language implying any admission on our part that any Italian permission to visit the area is 
legally required”.393 Ethiopia’s only possibility was to rely on the League of Nations. Perhaps 
unaware of a broader context of the international politics, Haile Selassie turned to the League 
with a request to investigate the incident. His proposals were refused by Mussolini, who 
persisted on Italy’s demands, “without investigation and without adjudication in the proper 
manner”.394 
 
The solution of the conflict, as well as the previous British involvement in it, was rather crude 
or embarrassing and corresponded to the general British policy that can be characterized as 
cautious. Already on November 29, the British Minister in Addis Ababa, Sir S. Barton 
received a note from Sir J. Simon, advising him that “no advice can be given to the Emperor 
until decision can be taken here as to general policy to be adopted in these matters and this 
decision can only be taken when full details are available”.395 The answer of S. Barton, on 
December 2, indicates the British dubiousness about their engagement at Wal Wal: “In the 
course of today it has become clear that having regard to provocative attitude of Italian 
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authorities, presence at Wal Wal of Anglo-Ethiopian Commission creates a grave risk of 
provoking a regrettable international incident.”396  
 
Italians exerted to solve the border situation in the military way, as indicated by 
communication between the Italian, Ethiopian and British representatives in Addis Ababa.397 
While there was no proper effort for a diplomatic solution on the Italian side, the result of the 
clash was a matter of the propagandist struggle.398 It is documented by a letter written by Lt. 
Collingwood who asserts that “Italians had every intention of a fight and were awaiting the 
arrival of their armoured cars and aeroplanes, whereas Ethiopians appeared to be awaiting 
some form of arbitration between their respective Governments”.399 Unfortunately for 
Ethiopia, the arbitration of the conflict did not reach a direct result until September 3, 1935 (a 
month before the invasion). Its conclusion was predictable as five Italian arbitrators took part 
in it. The result was a victory for Mussolini, while Haile Selassie knew that there was nothing 
that could prevent Ethiopia fom the Italian attack. The arbitrators reached the following 
“unanimous verdict: neither Ethiopia nor Italy can be held responsible for the attack which 
occurred at Wal Wal”.400 
 
Mussolini’s persuasion was made up that the Ethiopian question had to be solved by force of 
arms within the next two years from the conflict. This explains his diplomatic good will at the 
end of December which has nothing to do with real plans of the Fascist official strategy. 
Mussolini’s decision to use force for the final destruction of Ethiopia was drafted in a secret 
memorandum circulated on December 30, 1934. It seems clear that the Wal Wal incident 
worked as a starting mechanism for the military preparations: “History, in modern times, 
marches fast, especially when aided by European missions… This political development 
augments the Ethiopian Emperor’s capabilities and warlike efficiency…. time works against 
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us.”401 Several authors consider Mussolini’s views of the invasion and destruction of Ethiopia 
as his uncertainty about the invasion.402 In my point of view, it seems, according to broader 
aspects of the Fascist policy and international circumstances, that Mussolini’s decision for 
war was prepared already during 1933. The only barrier in his plans was his consciousness of 
Italy’s insufficient capability to lead a long war. These conclusions might “legitimize” his 
order to use poison gas later in 1935/1936.403  
 
The Wal Wal incident remained for many years a remarkable, even breaking point in the 
mutual Ethiopian-Italian relations as well as in relations between Ethiopia and Europe in 
general. One and half a year later, in his appeal to the League of Nations in Geneva, Haile 
Selassie emphasized the international context of the whole event and undirectly accused the 
international body of having sacrificed Ethiopia:  
“The Wal Wal incident, in December 1934, came as a thunderbolt to me. The 
Italian provocation was obvious and I did not hesitate to appeal to the League of 
Nations. I invoked the provisions of the treaty of 1928, the principles of the 
Covenant; I urged the procedure of conciliation and arbitration. Unhappily for 
Ethiopia this was the time when a certain Government considered that the 
European situation made it imperative at all costs to obtain the friendship of Italy. 
The price paid was the abandonment of Ethiopian independence to the greed of 
the Italian Government. This secret agreement, contrary to the obligations of the 
Covenant, has exerted a great influence over the course of events. Ethiopia and 
the whole world have suffered and are still suffering today its disastrous 
consequences.”404  
 
The Emperor’s awareness of the principles of international affairs at that time is more than 
evident from his speech, however, time unfortunately played against Ethiopia. 
 
Mussolini reached an important victory at the beginning of 1935. The French Prime Minister 
reassessed his position of his country towards Italian interests in the Horn and gave Italy a 
free hand in Ethiopia.405 It was evident that in order to keep Italy far from Hitler, France and 
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Britain had to sacrifice Ethiopia. These factors eased Mussolini’s way to Addis Ababa. While 
France expressed its support explicitly, Britain played a double role. London had always had 
considerable comprehension for Italy’s interests in East Africa, because its main rival was 
France, thus the British supported the Italian rather than the French efforts. On the other hand, 
London guarded its own interests by many treaties and negotiations on modification of border 
delineation.406  
 
Although Laval publicly denied several times in 1935 that he had given Mussolini a free hand 
in Ethiopia, it was clear that he had given him freedom to seek economic concessions except 
in the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway zone, being the French most important sphere of 
influence in the Horn of Africa. On the contrary, Italians insisted that Laval surely gave 
Mussolini a free hand in Ethiopia both in the political as well as the economic area. As 
published by Askew, secret talks407 between Italy and France show that in a series of letters 
from January 1935 France renounced its political interests under the Treaty of 1906 and 
limited its economic interests to the zone of the railway. On June 18, 1935, the Italian 
government informed Laval of its intention to secure a direct rule over the peripheral zone of 
Ethiopia and a protectorate over the central part.408  
 
Britain’s position toward Italy was in connection with the French approach a little 
complicated and it weakened the British-French latent coalition as the British war-time Prime 
Minister officially declared: “There can be no doubt that Laval agreed early this year to 
accord Mussolini a free hand in Abyssinia. The Italians claim that they paid France a high 
price for that freedom. They surrendered all those Italian claims to Tunis, which had 
accounted a good deal for the recent frigidity of Franco-Italian relations, and they 
degarrisoned their French frontiers…The bargain is being kept with cunning fidelity.”409 The 
major British interest must have been seen in maintaining its imperial domain. 
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On September 4, 1935, the Italian delegate in Geneva, Baron Pompeo Aloisi, declared that 
Italy has “no further confidence in the Abyssinian Government and considered that 
Abyssinia was entirely incapable of understanding and realizing the principles of 
international morality”.410 The Ethiopian delegation insisted on condemnation of the arms 
embargo stating that “one of the two countries (Italy) is in a position to employ, and 
declared that is employing, all its resources in preparing for aggression, while the other, 
weak and pacific, and mindful of its international undertakings, is deprived of the means of 
organizing the defence of its territory and of its very existence, both of which are 
threatened”.411  The same day, the Assembly of the League of Nations discussed the whole 
situation during its meeting.  
 
For the whole situation, the so-called Committee of Five was created in order to resolve it 
peacefully. The plan of the Committee included a suggestion of formation of an 
international mandate, which would in its result weaken Ethiopia’s independence. Ethiopia 
was forced, in an effort to reach a peaceful agreement, to agree with the preparative plan. 
On the contrary, Mussolini questioned the issue and, according to his statements, the 
solution was in an attack. The League of Nations was not prepared for these threats and it 
only inactively monitored the Italian military mobilization. Haile Selassie tried to give 
another concession when he suggested to withdraw his troops fifty kilometres from the 
borders, but also this proposal was not effective. On October 3, 1935, the Italian army 
entered Ethiopia, which was for another five years put into war and resistance against the 
occupation. 
 
What kind of comment or conclusion we might assume? If Italians claimed their right on the 
possession of Wal Wal, why Ethiopia did not protested earlier? Again, we may find answers 
in more levels. First, there was no strict and detailed delimitation of the border which 
remained out of interest of any government for a long time. There was an informal state of 
affairs in regard to border delimitation. Second, for a long period of time, Ethiopia was 
concerned in its relations with Sudan, Italian colony of Eritrea and European powers. Italian 
Somaliland with its nomadic pastoral tribes inhabiting dry areas on the South-east of Addis 
Ababa was seen as a dangerous, hostile piece of the continent. Third, in its military terms, 
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Ethiopia did not have such a force to back up any protest. Moreover, the Italians never 
avowed their possession and never notified it to other government. These factors contributed 
to further complications and thus the result had to be as it was.412 
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Table 3: Estimated number of foreigners (by origin) in Ethiopia 1935  
Origin Number % Origin Number % 
Europe 4,446 30,5 Asia 9,971 68,4 
Greek 3,140 21,5 Arab 4,000 27,4 
French 350 2,4 Indian 3,000 20,6 
Italian 350 2,4 Armenian 2,800 19,2 
German 230 1,6 Jewish 125 0,9 
British 75 0,5 Libanese/Syrian 40 0,3 
Swedish 55 0,4 Japanese 4 0,0 
Austrian 50 0,3 Chinese 2 0,0 
Czechoslovak 50 0,3    
Hungarian 30 0,2 Nort America 103 0,7 
Swiss 30 0,2 American 103 0,7 
Belgian 28 0,2    
Russian 28 0,2 Africa 60 0,4 
Turkish 20 0,1 Egyptian  60 0,4 
Bulgarian 3 0,0    
Dutch 2 0,0    
Estonian 2 0,0    
Polish 2 0,0    
Lithuanian 1 0,0 TOTAL 14,580 100 
 
Source: Norberg, V. H. (1980): Swedes as a Pawn in Haile Selassie’s Foreign Policy 1924-1952. In: Tubiana, J. 
(ed.): Modern Ethiopia. From the Accession of Menelik II to the Present. Proceedings of the Fifth International 
Conference of Ethiopian Studies. Valbenna (p. 332). 
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VII Ethiopia and the world 
 
As the relations of Ethiopia with Italy, and secondarily with France and Great Britain in 
1923-1935 are the main focus of this work, there is no need to describe these in separated 
chapters rather than a whole. On the other hand, Ethiopia’s relations with smaller or non-
involved countries will be examined separately to give a complete picture of Ethiopia’s 
political development in 1923 – 1935. In the following chapters I will discuss relations 
between Ethiopia and Germany, Sweden, Belgium, the United States of America, the World 
of Islam, Asia, Africa, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Canada, Australia and its position in the 
League of Nations. The aforementioned countries played more or less important roles in the 
economic, religious, political, and other aspects.  
 
Ethiopia and Europe 
 
Relations with Germany in the pre-Nazi period were good and friendly. Germany had a long 
tradition of (not only) diplomatic contacts with Ethiopia. Some Germans served in the 
Ethiopian government during Menilek’s era, as was an example of Lieutenant Schubert who 
in 1909 started to work on demarcation of the boundary in the southeastern part of Ethiopia 
where the Ethiopian border meets Kenya and (former) Italian Somaliland. In 1915-1916, 
Germany sought to involve Ethiopia into the strategic plans that coincided with “Mad 
Mullah’s” revolt in British Somaliland. Germans tried to eliminate the influence of France 
and Britain in Ethiopia, and the German press consistently warned against British and 
French ambitions in Ethiopia.413 After World War I, Germany – mainly for economic 
reasons – renewed relations with Ethiopia, and a post of commercial attaché was 
established.414 
 
Haile Selassie’s expedition visited several European countries including Germany, but he415 
eventually could not visit Berlin: “While it was my determined wish to visit Berlin […], 
privately and unofficially, I was sad at my inability to go to Berlin in view of the approach 
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of the time at which I had to return to my country.” Moreover, the German Red Cross, as 
well as the Red Cross of other countries as France, Japan, Turkey, America, Russia, Greece, 
Australia, Sweden and other smaller countries worked in Ethiopia. German president, His 
Excellency Field-Marshall von Hindenburg was among the invited hosts at the ceremony of 
coronation of Haile Selassie. 
 
Advisors from Germany worked in Addis Ababa since the time of Menilek II. Neverthless, 
as Empress Taytu suspected them of being involved in a conspiracy against her, she made 
them give up their work.416 During World War I, Lej Iyyasu was imoressed by the early 
success of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and expressed his willingness to 
cooperate with the Central powers.417 The Allied Powers tried to break off the contacts 
between Ethiopia and the Central Powers and shortly after the outbreak of World War I they 
closed up post offices and telegraph communications and no German, Austro-Hungarian or 
Turkish citizen was allowed to travel to or from Ethiopia. As a gesture of goodwill 
following the fruity cooperation between Ethiopia and Germany, the German and Turkish 
governments decided to restore the monastic property in Jerusalem to Ethiopians. Moreover, 
Leo Frobenius, one of the most famous German Africanists, volunteered to deliver this and 
other messages to Ethiopia as well as to the German legation, but the Italian authorities 
denied him a permit to conduct a research in Eritrea or to travel to Ethiopia at all.418  
 
The fact that mutual contacts were not limited only to military business is also documented 
on the example of a study commission led by Blattengeta Walda Maryam Ayyala, the 
director-general in the Ministry of the Interior and head of the Ministry Department, who 
visited Germany in 1928 to tour educational and small-scale industrial centers as well as to 
recruit instructors and physicians and to discuss matters of common interest. The conditions 
started to change after April 1933 when Adolf Hitler gained power in Germany, but certain 
limits had been seen before. When Ras Tafari made a deal with a German firm for a 
purchase of a Junker plane in 1929, the company insisted on cash payment, which was 
unachievable for Tafari as Ethiopia was short of foreign currency.419  
                                                
416 Haile Selassie I 1976: 30. 
 
417 Marcus 1998. 
 
418 For further information see Tafla 1981: 133. 
 
419 Tafla 1981: 140. 
Komentář [H2]: Sjednoť psaní 
koncovky – máš to několikrát 
v textu, někdy s –or, jindy – er! 
 117 
In 1935, approximately 250 German citizens lived in Ethiopia with only 10 of them outside 
Addis Ababa. Westermann points out the mutual trade in the first half of the 1930’s when 
German trade to Ethiopia totaled 800,000 RM in 1928, 500,000 RM in 1930, 300,000 RM 
in 1931, and 400,000 RM in 1935.420 On the contrary, German trade with Italy was 
increasing up to 278,3 million RM in 1935. On December 24, 1934, Haile Selassie received 
a letter from Adolf Hitler, which has unfortunately not been found. What we know is that 
during a private communication, Haile Selassie requested Chargé Unverfehrt for the supply 
of modern arms and material for the chemical warfare.421 Surprisingly, after a period of 
apathy, it was Hitler’s Germany who quickly replied on Ethiopia’s request. Truly, the 
reason was more practical than suprising. Tensions between Hitler and Mussolini led 
Germany to make a move against Italian interests in the Horn.422 In July 1935, the Ethiopian 
citizen David Hall, whose father was German, visited Berlin and asked for a loan of three 
million reichsmarks to purchase weapons. 
 
Later in 1935, as the conflict was nearing, the position of Germany toward the Italian-
Ethiopian crisis was getting colder and more passive. In the first half of 1935, Mussolini 
made an overture to the German foreign ministry, seeking better relations, worsened after 
the Brenner dispute. Hitler avoided a concrete agreement though he promised neutrality in 
the escalating crisis in Ethiopia. Hitler’s attitude was not surprising after he had withdrawn 
Germany from the League and felt no commitment to defend Ethiopians whom he saw as 
racially inferior.423  
 
The “small” European powers had no will to be involved into the European and Italian-
Ethiopian conflict. On the other hand, Belgium and Sweden played an important role in 
Ethiopia. Their representatives were employed as advisors, teachers or missionaries. Haile 
Selassie’s relations with Sweden and Belgium were on a high level at least since the 
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Emperor’s visit to Brussels and Stockholm in 1924, whose aim was to affirm friendship 
between the engaged governments. Swedish missions had had a great tradition in Ethiopia 
and were responsible for setting up several schools in Addis Ababa. These missionaries 
taught English and were not involved in political activities.424  
 
Swedes were also responsible for medical care as was e.g. dr. Hanner who worked as a 
surgeon in the Bet Sayda Hospital. Dr. Johannes Kolmodin served as an advisor of the 
Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs. After his death he was replaced by General Erik 
Virgin. The intensive and friendly relations were to be crowned by a visit of the Swedish 
Crown Prince in Ethiopia whose plans seemed to be interrupted by the Wal Wal incident. 
Finally, the Prince decided to continue in his journey and arrived in Addis Ababa on 
January 7, 1935.425  
 
A member of the Swedish Export Association, a member of the Royal Party and a Swedish 
diplomat accompanied the Crown Prince and Crown Princess Louise with their children 
Princess Ingrid and Prince Bertil. Sweden, as a respected Ethiopian partner, wished to 
strentghen the economic relations with Ethiopia and vice versa. Before the Prince’s arrival 
there was a limited Swedish economic interest in Ethiopia. Sweden exported matches and 
telephone equipment, while it imported coffee, skins and hides from Ethiopia.426 According 
to several diplomatic sources,427 Sweden wanted to use its very good reputation in Ethiopia 
to be engaged in the development process in Ethiopia. Negotiations with the Ethiopian 
government began on March 22, 1935, culminating on August 1, when the Treaty of Trade 
and Friendship was signed. The Swedish Commercial Attaché in Cairo, O. E. R. Carlander, 
and the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Blatengeta Hiruy, led the negotiations, and it 
was Carlander who sent a letter to Stockholm reporting on his experiences in Ethiopia.  
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Generally, the Swedish economic engagement in Ethiopia must be seen in a wider 
international perspective. After Carlander’s report had begun to circulate in Addis Ababa, it 
was believed that the treaty was something more than a usuall Treaty of Friendship. In its 
Ethiopian-Italian context, there were some persuasions considering Carlander’s visit in 
Ethiopia as a pretext to arms shipment to Ethiopia. Carlander had seen a huge perspective in 
the European economic engagement in Ethiopia because of its rich natural resources. For 
Sweden, it was a chance to make a profit out of its activities in Ethiopia.428 On the other 
hand, it was clear that Italy would not tolerate any further European involvement in 
Ethiopia. Swedish authorities comprehended the situation clearly and concluded the Trade 
Agreement with Italy in the mid-1930’s.   
 
Belgium, unlike Sweden, was a colonial power, but had no borders with Ethiopia and thus 
meant no serious threat to Ethiopia. Ras Tafari was warmly received on his visit to Europe 
in Brussels by His Excellency King Albert, which Haile Selassie describes as an 
“unforgettable welcome”.429 The Belgian army had a good reputation in Ethiopia for its 
heroism during Warld War I, and it was not a coincidence that Belgians were invited to train 
military guards who were supposed to be a small, highly-equipped regular army used for 
preventing internal conflicts. In 1930, when these military advisors arrived in Addis Ababa, 
Ras Gugsa Wule was revolting and the training was interrupted for a few months. After the 
death of Empress Zawditu, Major Polet reported that an infantry battalion of almost 600 
men, one cavalry squadron of 125 horses, and one band of 40 men had been trained.430  
 
On December 12, 1934, another group of Belgian officers arrived in Addis Ababa, led by 
Major Dothée. He set up a new centre at Harar and his aim was to form another two infantry 
battalions with one more cavalry squadron, a camel squadron, and an armored car squadron.    
 
Even after the beginning of the Italian invasion in October 1935, Belgians stayed in Ethiopia 
as military advisors with Colonel Leopold Ruel as the new leader but, in order to avoid an 
incident with Italy, actually recalled its military mission. On the other hand, Belgium raised 
no objection to the setting up of another mission composed mostly of volunteers from 
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Congo.431 During the Italian-Ethiopian war there were not more than a dozen of Belgian 
advisors distributed over Ethiopia with Colonel Ruel and Lieutenant De Fraippont at the 
headquarters at Dessie, Captain Debois and Lieutenant Witmeur in Ogaden, and Captain 
Cambier with Lieutenant Frére in Sidamo Borana.432  
 
As reminded by Mockler,433 Belgians were, more than the Swedish military advisors, being 
viewed as mercenaries because they were paid by the Ethiopian payroll. Del Boca434 
continues that Ethiopians did not fully trust Belgians since they were ferenji (foreigners), 
and Ethiopians did not want with their pride to rely completely on foreign (white) advisors. 
Most Ethiopians paid no attention to the Belgian plans and they soon became “left behind 
the lines with nothing better to do than a few vague duties in the way of police work and 
censorship”. 
 
At the end of December 1935, the Italian army in retaliation against Ethiopians for the 
killings of pilots Toto Minniti and Livio Zannoni attacked the Swedish Red Cross camp at 
Melka Dila. In this disaster, forty-two people were killed, among them dr. Gunnar 
Lundstrom. By this act, Italy violated the Geneva Convention from July 29, 1929, 
concerning respect of the wounded and the sick in the battlefield. It was not the only 
international protocol violated by Italy with poison gas use being the first. As Sbacchi435 
says, Graziani himself gave an account of the attack, including the effectiveness of the gas 
and the destruction of the Swedish Red Cross. Italians then offered the Swedes to return the 
body of dr. Gunnar Lundstrom to Sweden. Moreover, the Italians themselves started to 
search for dr. Hylander lost in the Goba forests. 
 
The former Czechoslovakia formed until 1918 a part of Austria-Hungary, and this is one of 
the reasons why we have to consider both countries together. After World War I, when the 
new countries of Austria and Czechoslovakia were born, both countries established their 
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diplomatic relations – among many others – with Ethiopia. The earliest diplomatic contacts 
between Ethiopia and Austria took place in the mid-19th century with the expansion of 
Austrian economic interests in the Levant and Egypt up to the Red Sea. Both Austria and 
Czechoslovakia were non-colonial powers in the sense of overseas expansions, but on the 
other hand, Austria, as a signatory of the Act of Berlin, which endorsed colonialism as a 
“civilizing mission”, was in a certain sense a colonial power. After the Italian engagement 
in Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century, Austria was a little worried about the Italian 
campaign because Italy’s activities could possibly cause a war between Italy and France and 
Britain, and Italy would expect help from its allies, Germany and Austria.436 
 
After World War I, On August 30, 1926, the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was 
signed in Addis Ababa between the Ethiopian government and representatives of Austria, 
whose aspiration was to continue in the “longstanding trade relations of their two states”.437 
Since 1928, Ethiopia established several diplomatic missions in Europe. In Vienna, Ethiopia 
was represented by honorary consul Rudolf Singer (1871-1946), a wealthy bussinessman, 
whose nomination remains still unclear. Since 1994, when the Italian-Ethiopian relations 
began to worsen and the conflict was nearing, Singer did not seem to support Italy, and he 
retained his position for another six months. After Austria had recognized the Italian Empire 
of Ethiopia, Singer resigned. It was clear that during the conflict, Austria remained on the 
side of Italy.  
 
At the end of 1935, Ethiopia watched with distress how the governments of Austria, 
Hungary and Albania were “regarding as entirely valueless the obligations under which they 
had entered into the League covenant. The relationship which they had with Italy made 
them unwilling to accept anything to stop the work of aggression which Italy had 
undertaken.”438 
 
Czechoslovak contacts with Ethiopia in the 1920’s and the 1930’s cannot be 
overemphasized and it seems that the most important period in that sense still was to come, 
                                                
436 Tafla 1994. 
 
437 Quoted by Tafla 1994: 148. 
 
438 Haile Selassie I 1976: 308. 
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not only after 1935,439 but especially after 1948.440 In the mid-1930’s there was an exchange 
of correspendence between the president of Czechoslovakia and the Ethiopian Emperor, and 
in 1931-1937, the Czechoslovak fiduciary worked at the French Embassy in Addis Ababa as 
being responsible for consluar and passport agenda.441 Some attempts to raise economic 
relations with Ethiopia were done already in the 1920’s though it was not a state policy but a 
personal engagement of several businessmen. A factory owner from Radboří, named Ervín 
Mandelík442 on his travels through Ethiopia in 1927 - where he was invited by his Ethiopian 
partners – also had an opportunity to meet Ras Tafari. Ing. Mandelík examined 
opportunities for the Czech export to Ethiopia, limited at that time almost only to glass 
export. It was reported by him that in 1927, 20 Czechoslovak citizens lived in Ethiopia. The 
Ethiopian partners had, according to Mandelík, a great interest in Czechoslovak agronomists 
and education. Mandelík reported that Ras Tafari wished to send several students to 
Czechoslovakia to become educated in agronomy.443 Ras Tafari also discussed advantages 
of the Czechoslovak-Ethiopian trade agreement and its possible enlargement. Ing. Mandelík 
examined the following analysis of mutual trade perspectives as well as means of transport 
of European goods to Addis Ababa.444  
 
Two years later, the European, and of course, also Czechoslovak press brought news about 
foundation of the colonizing company with the majority of members being from 
Czechoslovakia. The colonizing company was supposed to buy large areas of fertile land 
suitable for cultivation of crops. As quoted from the daily press, “experts declare a certain 
optimism towards this plan. The company would cultivate the large gained areas mainly 
with wheat, cotton and coffee, it would buy raw materials for Czechoslovak industry and 
                                                
439 The best account on the period of 1935-1939 from the point of view of the Czechoslovak-Ethiopian relations, 
see Chmiel, J. (1991): Československo-etiopské vztahy v letech 1935-1939. Praha: Kandidátská práce ČSAV.  
 
440 The most recent and probably the most promising study of the Czechoslovak-Ethiopian relations during the 
Communist period is Zídek, P.-Sieber, K. (2007): Československo a subsaharaská Afrika v letech 1948-1989. 
Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. 
 
441 Zídek-Sieber 2007. 
 
442 A long article “About the possibilities of our trade with Abyssinia” (O možnostech našeho obchodu s Habeší) 
written by Ing. Ervín Mandelík was published in Národní Listy, April 14, 1927. 
 
443 Národní Listy, April 14, 1927. 
 
444 Národní Listy, April 14, 1927. 
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mediate trade relations between Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia.”445 The newspaper discusses 
the possibilities of mutual trade perspectives but warns of the “primitiveness” of the local 
conditions and poverty of Ethiopian people as well as competition of Greek emigrants.446 
On December 19, 1934, the Czechoslovak-Ethiopian trade accord was signed in Paris, but 
was not ratified because of the Italian invasion to Ethiopia.447  
 
Czechoslovakia was diplomatically involved in the Ethiopian-Italian crisis and it was 
especially dr. Edvard Beneš who played an important part in it. In his Memoirs, Edvard 
Beneš gives an interesting and important view of the period from 1919 until World War II, 
or the Munich events in 1938 preceding the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany. He 
finds Mussolini’s campaign against Ethiopia as one of the two major aspects of “how peace 
was continually being lost since 1919”.448 In 1935, as the head of the League Assembly he 
wittnessed the talks at the League of Nations leading to sanctions imposed on Italy at the 
end of the year: 
“It seemed that this increasing crisis would be stopped by the arbitration of the 
Assembly of the League of Nations from October 7 and 10, 1935, on sanctions 
with which it stood opposite the Italian invasion to Abyssinia. The whole act was 
led especially from the British impetus, which faced a persistent sabotage, 
performed in Geneva by Laval, with an unprecedented resolution through the 
mouth of the foreign minister Sir Samuel Hoare. I, personally, provided my full 
support to the League of Nations and as the head of the Assembly I contributed 
without reservation to Sir Samuel Hoare in his action for the use of sanctions 
against the invader. At home, I was resolutely criticized for this by our right wing. 
But this instant resistance was compromited either by Laval’s refusal of sanctions 
and by the fact that he finally found an agreement with the British foreign minister 
Samuel Hoare who first implemented sanctions in Geneva and then unbelievably 
quickly left his earlier fundamental position and gave permission to dividing the 
land of the Abyssinian country before the end of the Abyssinian war between 
Mussolini and the Emperor of Abyssinia.”449 
                                                
445 An article called “Czechoslovaks will colonize Abyssinia?” (Čechoslováci budou kolonisovat Habeš?) 
Národní Politika, December 28, 1929. 
 
446 Národní Politika, December 28, 1929. 
 
447 Zídek-Sieber 2007: 55. 
 
448 Beneš sees the first major challenge to the European peace in Hitler’s attempts to the break-up of Europe, the 
second one in Mussolini’s resistance to European democracies and his expansionist policy, Beneš, E. (2004): 
Paměti. Praha: Naše vojsko; Beneš 2004: 1-45. 
 
449 “Zdálo se, že tuto vzrůstající krisi zastaví Shromáždění Společnosti národů svým rozhodnutím ze  
7. a 10. října 1935 o sankcích, jimiž se postavilo bojovně proti italské výpravě do Habeše. Celá akce byla vedena 
především z podnětu Anglie, která se tehdy přes soustavnou sabotáž, prováděnou v Ženevě Lavalem, postavila 
ústy svého zahraničního ministra sira Samuela Hoara s nebývalou rozhodností za ženevskou instituci. Já osobně 
jsem tehdy poskytl plnou podporu Společnosti národů a jako předseda Shromáždění Společnosti jsem bez reserv 
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Edvard Beneš’s disappointment of the British and French “appeasement” policy leading 
continually to World War II becomes clear and the position of the Italian aggression in 
Ethiopia as the initiating point is indubitable, as he admits that it was the period of the Hoare-
Laval agreement that started the “pestilent European policy of the so-called appeasement. As 
the first one it came to an appeasement in the affairs of Abyssinia, then an appeasement 
regarding the occupation of the right bank of the Rhine, then an appeasement concerning 
China, an appeasement in the case of the Spanish revolution, an appeasement in the affairs of 
Austria until it came to an ‘appeasement’ regarding Czechoslovakia and the agreement 
between the powers in Munich.”450 
 
The relations between Ethiopia and Russia can be regarded as surprisingly long lasting, 
although Russia was not an imperial country in the sense of overseas domination. The first 
Russian mission arrived in Ethiopia already in 1885, but the mission of Ashinov failed in its 
attempt to establish a “New Moscow” on the Danakil coast (Eritrea). During the time of 
Menilek, some Ethiopian missions went to Russia in order to establish cultural and 
economic contacts, one led by Lieutanant Mashkov, the other by Captain Leontiev, who 
also joined Menilek’s army with a number of doctors, nurses and medical advisors.451 The 
Russian Red Cross then continued in its activity in Ethiopia until the 1930’s by sending 
medical equipment to Ethiopia.452 Probably the best known Russian to have friendly 
relations with Ethiopia was a young cavalry officer Alexander Bulatovich, whose two books 
From Entoto to the River Baro and With the Armies of Menelik II have already been 
translated into English by Seltzer.453 In 1898 St. Petersburg established a regular diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                                   
a vydatně přispíval siru Samuelovi Hoarovi v jeho akci pro uplatnění sankcí proti útočníkovi. Byl jsem za to 
doma od naší pravice rozhodně kritisován. Ale tento okamžitý odpor byl brzy zkompromitován tím, že Laval 
jednak odmítl sankce důsledně provádět, jednak se nakonec dohodl s týmž britským ministrem věcí zahraničních 
Samuelem Hoarem, který prosadiv v Ženevě nejdříve sankce, tak neuvěřitelně rychle opustil své dřívější zásadní 
hledisko a dal souhlas, aby se území habešské ještě před koncem habešské války rozdělilo mezi Mussoliniho a 
císaře habešského.”; Beneš 2004: 19-20. 
 
450 Beneš 2004: 43. 
 
451 Eshete, A. (1977): Ethiopia and the Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1935. Africa (Roma) 32 (1): 1-27. 
 
452 See Haile Selassie I 1976: 211. 
 
453 In the Introduction, Seltzer writes about Bulatovich’s engagement in Ethiopia: “Bulatovich sensed that 
Ethiopia is in a delicate state of transition, that what he was seeing would not remain or even be remembered in a 
generation or two. He had the instincts, although not the training, of an anthropologist, trying to preserve some 
records of fast-desappearing cultures. But he was not a scientist who observed with cool detachment. Rather, he 
was actively involved in the events he described, particularly on the expedition to Lake Rudolf. He became 
ambivalent, torn by his military duty (as an officer attached to the army of Ras Wolda Giyorgis) and by his 
personal values and sense of justice. Time and again, he found himself party to the decimation of the very people 
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mission at Addis Ababa, which functioned until the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Most of 
the Russian refugees who came to Ethiopia after 1917 were military officers who had 
participated in the Civil War against the Red Army. Ethiopia was not a direct destination for 
these people since an image of Ethiopia in Russia was rather missing. These people did not 
know about Ethiopia and came here thanks to various circumstances mainly after spending 
some time in two or more different countries.454 Most of the Russians became Ethiopians 
and many of them were employed in the Government service. The Russian colony in 
Ethiopia had also its own church called St. Nicholas where masses were celebrated by 
Archbishop Veronowsky.455 
 
In his newspaper article of 1928, Alois Musil describes Russia as the only true friend of 
Abyssinia: “Russians saw in the Christian Abyssinians their suffeirng fellow-believers, they 
supported them politically and materially and could do very much for a revival of their 
cultural and economic life, if their own homeland did not collapse.”456 After the Adwa 
victory, Russia established in Addis Ababa as one of the first foreign country its embassy, 
together with France, Britain, Germany, and Italy.  
 
Having a vision of modernizing the coutry, Ras Tafari employed in the mid-1920’s “tens of 
low-cost White Russian émigrés as technicians”.457 In early 1932, it is reported by Harold 
Marcus458 that the Ethiopian government had about one hundred westerners on the payroll, 
mostly Russian émigré engineers and technicians, who worked in the municipality and in 
the Ministry of Public Works for less than 100 US dollars. In the spring 1935 Colonel 
Konovaloff, a Russian living in Ethiopia since 1919, was commissioned to go to the 
Northern Ethiopian border in order to supervise the defense of the areas seen as principal for 
                                                                                                                                                   
whose culture he wanted to preserve. […] Emphatizing with many of the peoples he encountered, he witnessed 
the tragedy of the clash between traditional ways and modern arms. He considered modernization inevitable, but 
preferred that it be done in the most humane manner. Hence he considered conquest and gradual change under 
the Amharic rulers of Ethiopia as preferable to the total destruction, which would be likely in case of conquest 
by a European power.”; See Seltzer, R. (2000): Ethiopia through Russian Eyes. Country in Transition 1896-1898 
by Alexander Bulatovich. Asmara: Red Sea Press. 
 
454 Eshete 1977: 6-7. 
 
455 Eshete 1977: 8. 
 
456 Venkov June 3, 1928. 
 
457 Marcus 1998: 72. 
 
458 Marcus 1998: 138. 
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the possible Italian invasion. He went to Makalle and met Ras Seyum of Tigre as well as 
many other military and political officials. After the invasion on October 3, Konovaloff 
followed the Ethiopian army until the defeat at Mai Chew where he was an eyewitness of 
the decisive battle.459 
 
Table 4: Positions held by foreigners in the Ethiopian administration before 1935 
Ministry/Department Position Name Nationality From-To 
M. of Foreign Affairs Advisor J. Kolmodin Swede 1931-1933 
 Advisor E. Virgin Swede 1934-1935 
 Advisor J.H. Spencer American 1936 
Dpt. of Foreigners Advisor D. Hall Ger./Ethiopian  
M. of Agriculture 
Lab. of Chemical 
Analysis 
Director K. Ewert Austrian  
M. of Commerce 
Dpt. of General 
Inspection 
Director P. Yazelijan Armenian  
Dpt. of Chemistry Director K. Ewert Austrian   
M. of Finance Advisor E. Colson American  1930-1035 
 Inspector F. Reaggli Italian  
 
Adm. 
Customs 
A. Koeurhadjian Armenian  
Bank of Ethiopia Governor C.S.Colliers British  
M. of War 
Munition Factory 
Director A. Talminakis Greek  
Ethiopian Army Major B. Dothée Belgian 1929-1930 
 Major G. Polet Belgian 1930-1935 
 
3 
Lieutenants 
 Belgian 1929-1935 
Cadet School at 
Holeta 
Captain V. Tamm Swede 1934-1936 
 Lieutenant A. Thorburn Swede 1934-1936 
 Lieutenant N. Bouveng Swede 1934-1936 
 Lieutenant G. Heuman Swede 1934-1936 
 Lieutenant A. Nyblom Swede 1934-1935 
                                                
459 Richard Pankhurst discusses diverse versions of Colonel Konovaloff’s testimony of the Fascist invasion. See 
Pankhurst 1995.  
 
 127 
M. of Education and 
Fine Arts 
Advisor S. Papazian Armenian  
 Expert E. Work American 1932-1935 
M. of Interior Advisor F. de Halpert British          -1933 
Dpt. of Public Health Director K. Ewert Austrian  
Health Commission  J. Zervos Greek  
  K. Hanner Swede  
  G. Argyrepoulos Greek  
Security Department Major K. Mosshopolous Greek  
M. of Justice Advisor J. Auberson Swiss  
M. of Post, 
Telegraph and 
Telephones 
Advisor A. Bousson French 1923-1932 
 Tech. 
Director 
E. Sibilensky French 1932-1935 
 Tech. 
Advisor 
F. Hammar Swede 1932-1935 
M. of Public Works Tech. 
Advisor 
A. Trahtenberg French          -1928 
 Polytechnic P. Pane French 1929-1933 
 
Source: Norberg, V. H. (1980): Swedes as a Pawn in Haile Selassie’s Foreign Policy 1924-1952. In: Tubiana, J. 
(ed.): Modern Ethiopia. From the Accession of Menelik II to the Present. Proceedings of the Fifth International 
Conference of Ethiopian Studies. Valbenna (p. 333). 
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Ethiopia and the United States of America 
 
It has already been stated, and has to be repeated over and over again, that one of the 
reasons why Italy could conquer Ethiopia was the passivity of the League of Nations and 
neutrality of the United States of America. Although the USA. did not recognize the Italian 
Empire over Ethiopia, it was not willing to make any action to stop the Italian 
expansionism. The most important act thus remains the Briand-Kellog Pact, based on 
American initiatives to prevent conflicts. In the United States, political discourse in regard 
to foreign policy was led between isolationists and internationalists. While isolationists 
“saw external political commitments invariably leading to entangling alliances”, 
internationalists strongly argued that after World War I the United States “could no longer 
escape the effects of foreign problems”.460 The fact that the USA withdrew from the 
political affairs of the world and that it did not want to enter the League played a crucial role 
in many parts of the world. With the existence of the colonial empires, the growing 
totalitarian tendencies in Italy and Germany, Ethiopia could hope only for help of the power 
that was not involved in these aspects.  
 
Haile Selassie relied on the United States also in the economic sphere as he wished to 
employ American engineers for the construction of the Tana Dam. The British partners 
asked him why not to employ American enigeers and he gladly accepted this idea.461  
Dr. Warqenah Martin, a British-educated physician, traveled to New York and negotiated a 
20 million USD contract with the J. G. White Engineering Company for the construction of 
the Tana Dam. As Marcus462 shows, the American press was fascinated by this arrangement 
with an African country. The New York Times published an interview with an eminent 
scholar who explained that in Addis Ababa, there is a feeling that America offers no threat, 
that American engagement has no political connotation and thus it does not threaten the 
Ethiopian independence.463 Already in the late 1920’s, Ras Tafari expressed his desire for 
employing foreign advisors, and he thought that Americans would be “particularly 
                                                
460 Harris, jr. 1964: 20. 
 
461 Haile Selassie I 1976: 125. 
 
462 Marcus 1998: 87. 
 
463 Quoted in Marcus 1998: 87. 
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acceptable”.464 Ras Tafari’s ideas were far from what the ones the United States could 
accept, since while the European advisors were employed for 150-500 USD per month, it 
would be difficult to employ an American engineer in Ethiopia for less than 15,000 USD 
per annum, which Tafari, according to diplomatic sources, could not believe.465 American 
economic interests were also blocked by insufficient infrastructure in Ethiopia and, of 
course, a certain dissapointment prevailed in the official description of the country, which 
would rather complicate further American engagement: 
“An Ethiopian has, from the American and the British viewpoint, one of the most 
peculiar temperaments in the whole world of people. As I estimate, my fellow 
countrymen, an average one would find it exceedingly difficult to work 
successfully in the relation of an advisor to an Ethiopian official. We lack, for 
instance, the unlimited patience to deal efficiently with the typical Ethiopian 
mental, nervous, and physical inertia, and with their peculiarly indirect and 
involved thinking processes. An advisor employed by this government would 
never at the present status of development receive a really effective authority. An 
Ethiopian has as yet an inelastic form of national and official pride, which would 
prevent any delegation of the authority. The European advisors employed here at 
present do almost menial tasks and are more or less forced into intrigues to 
accomplish what little is credited to them. Their salaries are not always punctually 
paid. I sincerely opine that an average American would be very unhappy here as 
an official advisor under the present-day circumstances, no matter how excellent 
his training and how extensive his experience.”466 
 
According to the official opinion, Americans did not fully wish to be employed in Ethiopia as 
official government advisors. In order to maintain the scope of this work concerning rather 
creating images of Ethiopia in the international affairs, it is indubitably interesting that the 
relation between Ethiopians and Americans was at official levels described according to the 
racial terms of the era. The relation of Ethiopians towards America is described as friendly, 
and polite, though every Ethiopian “is quite aware of our alleged racial prejudices, as glorified 
and exemplified in certain sort of news dispatches which he reads and follows with a painful 
eagerness, and expects most Americans to call or consider him a ‘nigger’ until a certain 
amount of association proves the contrary. […] The Ethiopian is ethnollogically not a negro 
                                                
464 Addison E. Southard to The Secretary of State on November 8, 1928.; DEP 1977: 122. 
 
465 Addison E. Siuthard in his correspondence to the Secretary of State thinks that any advisors could ask more 
than the average official salary given by the Ethiopian government: “My impression is that he did not fully 
believe me, but was too polite to say no.”; Addison E. Southard to The Secretary of State on November 8, 1928.; 
DEP 1977: 123. 
 
466 Addison E. Southard to The Secretary of State on November 8, 1928.; DEP 1977: 123. 
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and objects to being so classified. He resents being considered racially inferior in any respect. 
No one can convince him other than that if superiority does not exist it is in his favor.“467  
 
Further construction plans of the Tana Dam were delayed but the United States kept the idea 
of constructing the dam until the eve of the war. The American chargé d’affaires in Paris, 
Mr. Hanson, on his way to Addis Ababa on July 18, 1935, declared in Marseilles that the 
United States still perceived the development of the Italian-Ethiopian tensions and that the 
Americans did not give up their industrial intentions in Ethiopia.468  
  
Cordell Hull, a successor to Kellog in the office of the Secretary of State did not bring 
delight to the Emperor, when he neither discouraged Italy, nor comforted Ethiopia.469 The 
American public, especially journalists, carefully monitored the situation in 1935 and 
followed the principles of untouchability of sovereign states. In an interview with 
Mussolini, an American journalist asked a question whether Italy has the right to invade 
Ethiopia. The Duce answered that for centuries, a lot of states gained their territory by 
absorbing the territory of other countried, and he pointed at the example of the United States 
of America.470 Mussolini saw the right for expansion in the historical experience of other 
countries. 
 
Far more important is the relation of the American black community to Ethiopia that was 
already accelerated by Marcus Garvey and his movement. Ethiopia became among the Afro-
American community an inseparable component of the nationalist rhetoric, as was also the 
case of pan-African movements. The Italian aggression soon gained racial connotation and 
thus Joe E. Thomas, a physician from Cleveland, could express his indignation with the 
international situation in 1935 using the following words: “We must not descent our Race in 
Africa. We must stand, One for all, All for one.”471 It was William E. B. DuBois who 
                                                
467 Addison E. Southard to The Secretary of State on November 8, 1928.; DEP 1977: 124. 
 
468 Československé slovo July 13, 1935. 
 
469 Haile Selassie I 1976: 221. 
 
470 Published in Star Times in St. Louis, quoted by Československé slovo July 13, 1935. 
 
471 Scott, W. R. (1978): Black Nationalism and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict, 1934 – 1936. The Journal of Negro 
History 63 (2): 118-134.; Scott 1978: 121. 
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proclaimed his understanding of the Italian aggression as a part of “the program of the white 
world” whose aim is economic exploitation and racism.472 
 
In 1935, a number of proclamations and statements of Afro-American leaders increased. 
One of these was a militant poem written by Langston Hughes: 
All you coloured people 
No matter where you be 
Take for your slogan 
Africa Be Free 
All you coloured people 
Be a man at last 
Say to Mussolini  
No! You shall not pass!473 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
472 Scott 1978: 122. 
 
473 Cited in Procacci 1984: 226. 
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Ethiopia and the world of Islam 
 
Ethiopia has been traditionally viewed as a Christian country, or, as we have already seen, a 
country of “black Christians”. Though this cliché still prevails in literature and in the minds 
of people, the number of Muslims and Christians in the contemporary Ethiopia is at least 
equal. Ethiopia’s relations with the world of Islam would probably need a separate thesis to 
notice and express all aspects of development of the mutual relations that had been created 
already early in the times of Prophet Muhammad.474 As the modern history of Ethiopia is 
interpreted as a clash of the last African country struggling for independence and 
surrounded by the European powers, its precolonial history was usually interpreted as a 
clash of a Christian country surrounded by Islam,475 though we have to emphasize that some 
specialists on Islam do not consider Islam the major threat to the Abyssinian/Ethiopian 
independence, coherence or integrity. John S. Trimingham adds that the “Islamic threat has 
been less serious than that of the Galla [Oromo] hordes and Western Imperialism.”476 In this 
sub-chapter, we will analyze the development of relations between Ethiopia and Islamic 
countries in the 1920’s and the 1930’s, originating in the reign of Lej Iyyasu. 
 
One of the major aspects regarding to Ethiopian-Islamic relations can be seen in the reign of 
Lej Iyyasu (1913 – 1916).477 After the death of Menilek, Lej Iyyasu, a son of Ras Mikael of 
Wallo, was crowned as his successor. The most important factor why Lej Iyyasu is 
remembered in connection with Islam is that he represented a challenge to the long-
established hegemony of the Orthodox Christian Church in Ethiopia.478  
                                                
474 The first contacts of Ethiopia and Islam can be found in the period when the Arabian Prophet’s followers 
were being persecuted in Mecca by the Quraish. Muhammad told his followers to go to Abyssinia where they 
would “find a king under whom none are persecuted. It is a land of righteousness where God will give you relief 
from what you are suffering.” Ibn Hisham, quoted by Trimingham, J. S. (1952): Islam in Ethiopia. London-New 
York-Toronto: Oxford University Press; Trimingham 1952: 44. 
 
475 For detailed descriptions and explanations, see e.g. Robinson 2004; Trimingham 1952; Touval 1963. 
 
476 Trimingham 1952: 93. 
 
477 His de facto reign lasted from 1911, since Menelik was – because of his deteriorating health – not able to lead 
the country, though he oficially remained on the throne until his least breath. Marcus (2004: 113) describes 
Iyyasu as a prince, who was “hardly ready to govern: during his adolescence, he had mostly abandoned the 
classrooms of the gibbi (Menelik’s palace) for the capital’s bars and brothels. Undoubtedly bright, he was, 
however, ignorant about running an increasingly complex administration. He had a short attention span, and he 
lacked political common sense, if not a grand vision.” 
  
478 Detailed primary information and the discussion over Iyyasu’s Islamic affiliation is to be found in Letters 
from Abyssinia 1916 and 1917. Written by Major. H. D. Pearson, Ed. By F. A. Sharf, with Commentary and 
Annotations by R. Pankhurst. Hollywood: Tsehai Publishers. 
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As Zewde479 interestingly presents, this fact provided a good propaganda material for his 
opponents. His marriages with daughters of Muslim leaders were given prominence while 
his marriages to daughters of Christian rulers were played down. While his construction of 
mosques was highlited, his founding of churches of Qachane Madhane Alam or his 
endowments to monasteries in Dabra Libanos were largely ignored.  
 
During and after his reign, the image of Lej Iyyasu as an enemy of Ethiopian Christians was 
created and many scholars then accepted this vision without any deeper analysis. Of course, 
Lej Iyyasu, more than any other Emperor before or after him favored Islam, but we have to 
see also his pragmatical reasons to do so, though it is easy to admit that Lej Iyyasu remains 
one of the most controversial persons in the modern history of Ethiopia. A critical study to 
explain and describe the era of Lej Iyyasu’s reign still remains to be done. If I use in this 
work the word “cliché”, in my opinion it can well fit into the image of Lej Iyyasu as being 
the one who converted to Islam, which means the one who betrayed, as we can read 
between the lines of many works. One such a cliché can be found in the work of a man who 
on the other hand presented a “symbol of independence”, Haile Selassie, who gives us ten 
proofs of Iyyasu’s conversion to Islam: 
“1) He married four wives claiming: ‘the Qur’an permits it to me.’[…] 
(2) He built a mosque at Jijjiga with government funds and gave it to Muslims. 
(3) At the time he sent to Mahazar Bey […] our Ethiopian flag […] on which he 
had caused to be written the following words (in Arabic): ‘There is no god but 
Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.’ 
(4) He wore Somali Muslim clothes and the Muslim turban, held the Islamic 
rosary, and was seen to prostrate himself in the mosque.  
(5) He was seen praying and reading the Qur’an having had it transcribed in 
Amharic characters. 
(6) On the headgar of his special guards he had embroidered the legend ‘there is 
no other god but Allah’. 
(7) H. H. Ras Makonnen had built a church at Harar and had made the area 
adjoining the church into a dwelling for the clergy; giving the Muslims a place in 
exchange; then, 32 years later, he (Ledj Iyasu) expelled the clergy and restored it 
to the Muslims. 
(8) When a girl was born to him he saw to it that she would grow up learning the 
Muslim religion, and he gave her to the Muslim Madame Hanafi and said: ‘Bring 
her up on my behalf.’ 
(9) He despised the descent of Menilek II, which comes direct from Menilek I, 
and claimed to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad; assembling the great 
                                                
479 See especially Zewde, B. (1993): The Ethiopian Intelligentsia and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935 – 1941. The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 26 (2): 271-295; Zewde 1993: 124-125. 
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Muslim sheikhs, he spent the day convincing them of his genealogical 
calculations. 
(10) The day on which our great king, Emperor Menilek […] died, instead of 
mourning and of arranging lamentations, he went out horse-riding to Jan-Meda 
and spent the day playing combat-games.“480 
 
Accepting Marcus’s view of Lej Iyyasu as a not very well educated young prince who did 
not have a concrete political vision, we may think of an influence of his father, Ras Mikael 
of Wallo, who possibly supported the idea of riving Islam politically, and the means to make 
it the dominant religion in Ethiopia had to lead through his son, Iyyasu.481 If Iyyasu 
represented a challenge to the Orthodox Church in Ethiopia, within the international 
“chessboard” he was a challenge to the three European powers most interested in the region, 
Great Britain, France, and Italy. As World War I was nearing, his foreign policy became 
more “Central-Power” oriented, since he established strong diplomatic relations especially 
with Germany. The Ottoman Empire, as a predecessor to the modern Turkey, made efforts 
to awaken Muslim movements all around the colonial world. Their main aim focused on 
India, Libya, Yemen, or even Darfur, where Sultan Ali Dinar revolted until 1916, when he 
was suppressed by the British army.  
 
Muslims in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa were marginal as compared to the situation of 
the Sanussis in Libya, etc. The only major effort of the Muslims in the Horn came from the 
British Somaliland, where, under the leadership of Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan482, 
called “Mad Mullah”, the local Somalis successfully revolted against the British, though it 
has to be admitted that for Britain Somali was a marginal, unimportant area, where they 
never wanted to be engaged very much. The idea of cooperation of Ethiopia and the 
Ottoman Empire came from the consul general in Harar, Mazhar Bey, who believed in 
successful military collaboration of both countries. In his correspondence with the Sublime 
Port we can find the origin of Iyyasu’s willingness to make a step further to have a harbor: 
“The Ethiopians want to have a harbor. If the British are thrown out of Somalia, it 
might work to give Ethiopia part of the coast between Zeila and Bulkar and the 
territory between the coast and the eastern border of Harar. If an agreement is 
reached with the Ethiopians, this need can be covered from this place. The mawla 
                                                
480 Haile Selassie I 1976: 48-49. 
 
481 Some statements regarding the role of Ras Mikael of Wallo are to be found in Haggai, E. (1994): Ethiopia 
and the Middle East. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
482 For further details concerning the Somali movements, see e.g. Lewis 2002; Touval 1963. 
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is ready to conquer whatever the Sublime Port orders, and his power is enough. 
He only applied for our help in ammunition for next year.”483 
 
Although there had been correspendence and at least an “ideological” concordance between 
Ethiopia and the Ottoman Empire, a visible action was missing. At the end of 1915, Mazhar 
tried to push things forward by corresponding to the Sublime Port but the answer came half a 
year later, including a decision of Enver Pasha:  
“We are following with interest your relations with mawla of Somalia. It is 
understood that he is ready for every action under Ottoman supremacy. A 
guarantee can be given that in case he conquers any place from the Italians or the 
British, that place will be given to him. The Ottomans and their allies are 
defeating their enemies and shall win…If Ethiopia takes action against our 
common enemy as we hope, you have the permission to say that whatever they 
capture from Britain, Italy or France, we will support the Ethiopians so that they 
will keep these territories even in peacetime. [These territories] were captured [by 
the British, Italians, and the French] from the Ottomans in older times. We will 
support them [the Ethiopians] even in peacetime to keep their conquests. This 
suits the Ottoman interest too.”484 
 
Finally, no direct action happened because of the incompatible interest of both sides 
underlined in the previous letter. While the Ottomans supported Mad Mullah, or mawla, to 
create an autonomy in the Horn, Lej Iyyasu wanted to see Somalia’s autonomy within a new 
Ethiopian configuration. The entrance of Ethiopia into the War remained only a dream written 
in correspendence. Iyyasu’s secret talks and letters with the leaders of the Central Powers 
were revealed in 1916 and since this time a remarkable press on his resignation started. In his 
autobiography, Haile Selassie writes about these events in the following way: 
“When the leaders of Ethiopia found out about this whole affair, they became 
convinced of the need to depose Ledj Iyasu. But as it appeared to them likely that 
their secret would be betrayed if they were assembled together for consultation, 
they chose servants as trusted messengers and began to correspond through them 
as go-betweens. But some met by night at a hidden place and, after talking to each 
other face to face, separated again. Others again were asking: ‘Inform us first 
about the successor once Ledj Iyasu is deposed’; but the party which approved of 
Ledj Iyasu’s deposition began to grow steadily, since they gladly accepted the 
opinion when they were told: ‘We shall put Emperor Menilek’s daughter, 
Wayzäro Zawditu, on the throne and shall appoint H. H. Ras Makonnen’s son, 
Dejazmatch Tafari, as crown Prince and Regent.’”485 
                                                
483 Quoted by Haggai 1994: 86. 
 
484 Quoted by Haggai 1994: 87-88. 
 
485 Haile Selassie I 1976: 47. 
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After the deposition of Lej Iyyasu, Ethiopia turned with Queen Zewditu and the heir to the 
throne, Ras Tafari, to the continuity of foreign policy directed primarily to Great Britain, 
France, and Italy.486 Unlike Ethiopia, the Muslim world has undergone a remarkable, almost 
fundamental change after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when the last all-embracing empire 
in the world of Prophet Muhammad went to an end. New states have been created, new 
governments with new policies, European powers sought to strengthen their influence in the 
new areas, and new relations with Christian Ethiopia had to be established. If World War I 
was a period of growing contacts between the Muslim world and Ethiopia, the 1920’s showed 
only a limited interest of Islamic countries in the Middle East to increase relations with 
Ethiopia. People in the newly independent countries from Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan to Iraq 
had to deal with their own daily problems and had to struggle for their new independence. 
Finding a new integrity and identity was the major task, and Ethiopia in this sense played only 
a marginal role.  
 
In Ethiopia itself, there has been a remarkable development of a complex set of relations 
between Islam and the Christian centre, at least since Ahmad Gragn’s campaign in the first 
half of the 16th century. During the major part of the Ethiopian history, Muslims have been 
prohibited from participating in the Ethiopian political life. Of course, there have been some 
exceptions, but, in general, state administration was traditionally in hands of Christian 
Abyssinias. The reasons can be also found in the development of Ethiopian national identity 
being almost synonymous with Orthodox Christianity. Even though Emperor Menilek II is 
usually viewed as the one who led wars with many Ethiopian nations especially south of 
Addis Ababa487, on the other hand, we can see a tolerance of Menilek and Haile Selassie 
towards Islam and Muslims. Since Islam was a major religion in many conquered regions and 
Orthodox Christians were in a minor position, being tolerant was the only way to co-operate.  
 
Haile Selassie’s approach to Islam was reflected in the constitution of 1931 which established 
equal rights for all Ethiopians.488 However, this does not mean that Islam was given the same 
                                                
486 See Marcus 2004; Zewde 2001. 
 
487 The most obvious campaign was led against the Oromo, Gurague and many small nations and nationalities in 
the Southern region what is now Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region. For more information, see 
articles in Donham-James 2002, or Jalata 1998. For Gurague and their struggle, see Hailemariam 1991. 
 
488 For the development of mutual Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia, see Trimingham 1952, and Eide, O. 
M. (2000): Revolution and Religion in Ethiopia, 1974-85. Oxford: James Currey. 
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value in the sense of historical memory and legacy, and this can be well documented also on 
the example of Haile Selassie’s own words when he blamed Iyyasu for converting to Islam, 
which means betraying the tradition of a Christian ruler. Ethiopia had undergone a very 
similar situation in the 17th century when Emperor Susneyos,489 influenced by a Spanish 
Jesuit, Afonso Mendez, converted to Catholicism, but after he had realised that his decision 
had led to a disaster, he abdicated in favor of Fasiladas, who then expelled Jesuits from the 
country. 
 
After Ethiopia’s admission to the League of Nations, Ras Tafari visited not only several 
European countries, but also Cairo, the capital of Egypt, where he met H. M. King Fuad 
who received the Ethiopian heir to the throne at his palace. Ras Tafari’s visit was meant to 
be more symbolical rather than practical. According to his own words, the major aspect of 
his visit – read between the lines – was directed towards religious and cultural reconciliation 
and friendship:  
“The following are the sights which We visited during Our stay at Cairo and 
which have remained memorable to Us: the pyramids and the Sphinx, the great 
museum of antiquities, the great schools and hospitals of the government and of 
the Copts, the old churches of early times, the antiquities of Luxor and the tomb 
of Tutankhamun which had been discovered at the excavations near-by, as well as 
great mosques and the famous Islamic college called Al-Azhar. Subsequently, 
when We saw four students from Ethiopia, We were pleased as their teacher said 
that they would return to Ethiopia within two years upon conclusion of their 
studies.”490 
 
This tour including the visit in Cairo was the only important event that occurred in regard to 
relations of Ethiopia and the Middle East. In Ethiopia, little was known about Islamic 
countries, as the first newspaper Berhanena Selam, first published in the mid-1920’s, brought 
only scarce information about the neighboring countries on the Arabian Peninsula. The major 
interests of the Ethiopian public were headed towards their relations with Egyptian Copts, and 
not Muslims. Thus the only visible connection between Ethiopia and (specifically) Egypt 
were those of Ethiopian students coming to the University of Al-Azhar,491 as has been 
underlined by the citation from Haile Selassie’s autobiography.  
                                                
489 The Emperor ordered the suspension of male circumcision and the observance of the Sabbah as outmoded 
Jewish customs. He directed that churches be reconsecrated, altars rebuilt, priests removed or reordained, people 
rebaptized, fasts and festivals rescheduled, etc. For more, see Marcus 2002: 40. 
 
490 Haile Selassie I 1976: 89.; a brief account on Ras Tafari’s visit in Cairo can be found in Marcus 1998. 
 
491 Islam was another source of indigenous education, besides Christian schools. In Ethiopia, and not only there, 
Islam grew along trade centres or coastal towns. As Christian schools relied on ge’ez as a language removed 
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Egypt played a major role among the Muslim countries with its relations to Ethiopia, not only 
thanks to the fact that it was a gate to the Red Sea, but especially thanks to the existence of 
the Coptic Church which connected Ethiopia and Egypt religiously, emotionally, historically, 
and spiritually. For Italy, Egypt was important because of the neighborhood of its colony, 
Libya. Egypt was also close to Ethiopia because of its ambiguous independence, limited 
sovereignty, which Ethiopia was dealing with at least economically since the battle of Adwa 
or the Tripartite Treaty signed in 1906. In Egypt, the growing Italian aggression had the same 
connotation as the British occupation, though we may suggest that the methods and the spirit 
of each had different causes, means, and results as well. Symbolically, Italy was perceived as 
being supported by the British if only because of the existence of the Suez Canal through 
which Facsist military equipment could pass. Then, of course, Italians seemed to occupy the 
vital source of Egypt, the River Nile.492 Thus the growing solidarity with Ethiopia had, in my 
opinion, a lot to do with an antagonism against the British who suspended the constitution of 
1923 in order to undermine the power of the popular Wafd Party, which had serious causes in 
the anti-British struggle.493 The Egyptian question in the 1920’s was one of the main issues of 
daily newspapers all around Europe.494  
 
As Erlich Haggai states, the Wafd Party still wanted to express its willingness to support of 
British-Egyptian relations unlike their anti-parliamentarian rivals, and thus did it through 
sending messages of sympathy to Ethiopia.495 Important Egyptian thinker who has to be 
mentioned in regard to Ethiopia is William Makram ‘Ubayd, the moving power of the Wafd, 
                                                                                                                                                   
from daily communication, students in Islamic schools learned Arabic as the language of Qur’an, though they 
spoke Amharic in daily life. The Islamic educational system had two levels: tehaji, or majlis Qur’an, where 
pupils learned Arabic and Qur’an, and higher schools, where students learned Islamic law and commentaries to 
Qur’an. The most important thing for Muslim students in Ethiopia was an international net of education. 
Students from important Muslim centres, Harar or Wallo, went to Al-Azhar and other universities in the Islamic 
World where they got prestigiuos education.; For more information, see Zewde, B. (2005): Pioneers of Change 
in Ethiopia. The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century. James Currey: Ohio University Press.  
 
492 Abir shows how important natural resources were for emerging of the Egyptian-Ethiopian border problem 
already in the 19th century.; Abir, M. (1967): The origins of the Ethiopian-Egyptian Border Problem in the 
Nineteenth Century. Journal of African History 8 (3): 443-461. 
 
493 Haggai 1994: 98-99. 
 
494 It is senseless to present all the newspapers informing about the crisis in Egypt after 1923. During my 
research in the National Archive of the Czech republic, Prague, I have discovered at least several dozens of 
articles from the British, French, Italian, German, and Czechoslovak press informing daily about the latest 
development of the crisis. Since it is out of the scope of this work, I do not intend to inform about these events in 
detail.  
 
495 Haggai 1994: 99. 
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who always expressed his sympathies for “the nation in the Upper Nile, those who sacrifice 
their lives for their country, who had bought their existence with death”.496 One of the most 
remarkable thinkers of the Egyptian Islam, Rashid Rida, the leader of the Salafiyya 
movement, expressed his teaching based on the idea that modernization was a part of Islam, 
and Western values of liberalism and diversity, unlike Western aggression and occupation, 
were not to be rejected. In his view, Mussolini was the embodiment of crude Western 
brutality and Ethiopia a victim, and of course, a neighbor. Rida was also a close associate of 
the al-‘Azm brothers who published in 1908 Rihlat al-habasha, where they managed to 
convey the notion of “Ethiopia as the land of righteousness”497 to Arabic readers and to 
Islamic modernizers. 
 
In August 1935, public engagement was increasing since it was becoming apparent that 
Mussolini could not be stopped or prevented from invading Ethiopia. The Coptic Church in 
Egypt sent a letter to Geneva in order to express its exhaustion and to inform about sending a 
sanitary mission to Ethiopia. Young Muslims in Egypt, under the leadership of Abdul Hamid 
Said, formed the Committee for Ethiopia (see below) and appointed Ismail Daud, a cousin of 
the King Fuad, as its president. Several members of the Coptic Church were also involved in 
these activities. In Alexandria, a local League for peace was established on August 5, 1935, 
and several manifestations for the support of Ethiopia took part in it.  
 
An Italian response to the anti-colonialist activities and demonstrations came already in July 
1935, when Pellegrino Ghigi was appointed an ambassador to Cairo. One of his tasks was to 
weaken the anti-Italian voices and to strengthen the pro-Italian ones. The results came quickly 
as he got into contact with Hafez Ramadan Bey, an advocate who, after splitting off the Wafd 
party, turned his political confession to the right. Together with Ahmed Hussein, he founded a 
youth association of nationalists, which adopted blue shirts as a sign of the organization, and 
modeled the group after being inspired by the Fascist thoughts, denying any form of 
parliamentarism. They also promoted neutrality in the Italian-Ethiopian crisis, but they were 
against any help to Ethiopia.498  
                                                
496 Quoted by Haggai 1994: 99: 
 
497 Haggai 1994: 99. 
 
498 Procacci, G. (1984): Dalla parte dell’Etiopia. L’aggressione italiana vista dai movimenti anticolonialisti 
d’Asia, d’Africa, d’America. Milano: Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Editore.; Procacci 1984: 100. 
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Thus, probably the most important event that occurred in Cairo in 1935 in regard to Ethiopia 
remains the foundation of the General Committee for the Defense of Ethiopian Independence 
(Lajna ‘amma lildifa’ ‘an istiqlal al-habasha). The Committee supported a campaign in the 
press to prevent hiring of Egyptian workers by Italian firms contracted to help with the 
military buildup, especially by constructing roads in Eritrea. More significant, and in the 
social and political context of that time even surprising was the initiative to enlist volunteers 
to fight in the Ethiopian army. By August 1935, it was reported that some eight  thousand 
people from Egypt had signed up, although only a small number really reached Ethiopia. 
These volunteers were led by Muhammad Tariq called al-Ifriqi, an ex-Ottoman officer.499 
Otherwise, we cannot say that the support of Ethiopia was a massive process, but the 
involvement of people, whether on the right or left wing of the political spectre, were the case 
of only a limited numbers of intellectuals or politically active scholars. The information about 
Ethiopia among the public or lower class people was minimal as shown by Erlich Haggai.  
 
Haggai500 shows reflections of the Abyssinian crisis in the Egyptian press and books. As he 
discovered, there were only four books focused on Ethiopia in Cairo in 1935 that had been 
published especially after the conflict had started. The first book concerning the history of 
Ethiopia, The Ethiopian Question from Ancient History to the Year 1935 was written by a 
lawyer and judge, ‘Abdallah al-Husayn. He, as a liberal Egyptian nationalist, emphasizes 
freedom in the Ethiopian society and points at the fact that many features of Ethiopian culture 
came from the ancient Egyptians. This is the only book being published just before the war, or 
better to say with the beginning of the war. Another one, written by Muhammad Lufti Jum’a 
was called Between the African Lion and the Italian Tiger, published in the last weeks of 
1935. There he writes:  
“Egypt and the rest of the East both Near and Far, and Arabism (‘uruba) 
embracing its many peoples and states, are all concerned with Ethiopia, with its 
centrality in the world and its present crisis. If Europe is interested in the 
Abyssinian Crisis because of fear for the world order, or resistance to Italian 
aggression, with us it is different. We are interested in Ethiopia because it 
represents both the East and Africa at their very best and most lofty - in terms of 
beauty, quality and dignity. What is more honorable than maintaining freedom, 
generation after generation and era after era, and resisting foreign enemies 
                                                
499 Haggai 1994: 100. 
 
500 Haggai 1994: 101-109. 
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whatever their might? And indeed the Ethiopians (like us) conceive freedom to be 
the most precious value.”501   
 
As we can see, especially among liberals, Ethiopia had always been a symbol of African 
independence and freedom, which contrasted to statements considering Ethiopia a country of 
slavery and barbarity (see conclusion). This was the case not only of the European political 
and prejudiced meaning, but also the case of radical Muslims in Egypt, though these were a 
minority. Yusuf Ahmad in his Islam in Ethiopia, published in November 1935, presents 
“Evidences and Authentic Documents on the Situation of Muslims in Ethiopia”, as is the 
subtitle of the book, which is a “hate-filled condemnation of Ethiopia’s culture and 
history”.502 
 
Besides the educational and, let us say, symbolical contacts between Ethiopia and Egypt, it 
can be stated without any scruples that Ethiopia was ignored by Islamic countries at least in 
the 1920’s. The 1920’s were a period of Western-oriented modernization in the Middle East, 
as can be proved on the example of Kemal Atatürk’s Turkey. Besides these, some rare 
contacts occurred in the early 1930’s when an Ethiopian delegation sought to establish 
diplomatic collaboration between Addis Ababa and Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as a result of 
Mussolini’s propaganda. The Ethiopian mission, led by Walder Masqal, was received by 
Imam of Sana’a who emphasized the role of Ethiopia in the early period of the existence of 
Islam, as Ethiopia gave hospitality to the followers of Prophet Muhammad.503 The main scope 
of this mission was the foundation of friendly relations between the aforementioned countries, 
and as a proof of friendship, the government of Yemen published in a journal “Al-Imam” 
salutes to the Ethiopian government and expressed its hopes that Italy would not have bad 
intentions in Ethiopia.504 
 
                                                
501 Haggai 1994: 103. 
 
502 Not only in this book Yusuf Ahmad discusses an inherent hatred Ethiopians had felt for Arabs since the early 
times. Similar questions are depicted in his famous study The Life of Muhammad. According to his version, in 
the Medieval times Ethiopians fought Ahmad Gragn and Muslims because Muslims were prosperous and 
Abyssinians were jealous. Ahmad Gragn’s campaign was then according to him a defensive war. Another author 
discussed by Erlich Haggai is a Lebanese Christian resident of Cairo, Bulus Mas’ad. His book Al-habasha or 
Ethiopia in a Turning Point of Her History he describes the Ethiopian-Islamic relations and echoes of Yusuf 
Ahmed’s condemnation of Tewodros, Yohannes, and Menelik.; Haggai 1994: 106-107. 
 
503 Procacci 1984: 107. 
 
504 Procacci 1984: 108. 
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As for the relations between Ethiopia and the countries of Maghreb, almost nothing is known 
until 1935, when the tensions became apparent and many “leftish” North-African intellectuals 
– especially those living in France – were disappointed by the Italian aggression, while some 
politicians did not hide their sympathies to the Italian Fascism. This was an example of the 
new Tunisian president General Peyrouton, who invited Italo Balbo505 to his country in May 
1935. Algerian immigrants in Paris, mostly originating in leftish circles, organized during the 
spring of 1935 a series of demonstrations to support  Ethiopia. With the help of l’Etoile Nord-
Africaine (ENA), the Comité de défense de la race nègre was created and the awareness of its 
existence was quickly increasing. On September 6, a large meeting of “people of all races” 
was successfully organized in Paris and ENA then adhered to the Comité international pour 
la défense du people éthiopien et de la paix led by Velio Spano and together they participated 
in a series of demonstrations and actions to support Ethiopia’s independence against the 
Italian aggressive Facsist policy.506 
 
As the Italian-Ethiopian tensions were growing and becoming more visible within the 
international public sphere, the view of Ethiopia in the Middle East slowly began to change. 
Mussolini’s propaganda was focused (besides many other things) on the support of Islam all 
around the world, though its time had not come yet. Italians were aware of the multiethnicity 
and multireligiosity of Ethiopia. Before the invasion, Italians tried to express their support to 
Muslims in its colonies, especially in Libya and Somalia, though massacres of the Sanussis in 
Libya at the beginning of the 1930’s do not fully correspond with this policy. In Somalia, the 
Italian government sought to collaborate with traditional local leaders in order to act as 
“supporters of Islam”. Catholic missions did not have a proselytizing function, which was a 
long-lasting process since the early colonial period.507  
 
                                                
505 Italo Balbo belonged to a group of Fascist officials known as ras after the Ethiopian word for “chieftain”. 
Italo Balbo in Ferrara, Roberto Farinacci in Cremona, and Dino Grandi in Bologna belonged to the most 
important local authoritites that became the core of Mussolini’s Facsist party in the early 1920’s. It was not a 
unified group but they were united in the opinion that politics required violent suppression of the opposition. By 
early 1922, Balbo, Grandi and Farinacci became full-time party officials financially supported by agricultural 
and business circles, which was crucial since all of them came from relatively poor backgrounds; See more in 
Eatwell 2003. 
  
506 Procacci 1984: 121. 
 
507 Buonasorte 1995: 58. 
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From the legislative point of view, Fascist relation to religion in the colonies was regulated by 
Law no. 999 from 1933, whose article 21 said that: 
“It is guaranteed the respect of those religions and local traditions, which are not 
contrary to public order of the colony and to general principles of society. In the 
same manner care is taken of laws of religions, land and kin of colonial subjects 
of Eritrea and Somalia, except for norms established by special orders.”508  
 
This article had one major effect – it resonated as if Italy really supported Islam in Africa and 
the Middle East. The public opinion in the Middle East was in the mid-1930’s in the state of 
redefining the attitude towards the European Powers and European values. Erlich Haggai509 
presents a deeper analysis of these processes. Since the French and British colonialism and 
supremacy worked for a part of Arab scholars as a bitter reality, they prayed for their 
humiliation. The other part of intellectuals was still giving their hopes into the hands of 
France and Britain. Whether to decide for parliamentary democracy or to follow a totalitarian 
alternative was a question that many Egyptian, Syrian, or Iraqi authorities were dealing with.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
508 “É garantito il rispetto delle religioni e delle tradizioni locali, in quanto non contrastino noc l’ordine pubblico 
della colonia e noc i principi generali della civiltà. Con la stessa riserva si applica ai sudditi coloniali eritrei e 
somali la legge propria della loro religione, del loro paese o della loro stirpe, salvo le norme stabilite dagli 
ordinamenti speciali.”; Quoted by Buonasorte 1995: 60. 
  
509 Haggai 1994: 96-109. 
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Ethiopia and Africa 
 
Being the only independent African country (besides the ambiguous independence of 
Liberia), Ethiopia did not have any official contacts with African states, since there were not 
any other independent African countries. Thus, in this part of the work I would like to 
discuss how Ethiopia was viewed from different parts of Africa, mainly the Western, as the 
Italian-Ethiopian tensions were steadily growing and as it was becoming clear that the 
conflict is the “only solution”. Of course, when discussing the African response to the 
Italian aggression, it is worthy to start with Ethiopia itself. 
 
Already in the 1920’s, Haile Selassie (or in that time Ras Tafari) used the League of Nations 
as the main platform for presenting his opinions on the European involvement in Ethiopia. 
His first major act was a protest note against the Italian-British agreement of 1925. While 
the Italian minister, Count Colli assured Ras Tafari in his correspondence of “friendly 
collaboration”,510 Ras Tafari sent the note to the League being irritated by the fact that the 
two powers agreed on economic collaboration without informing their Ethiopian partners. 
This was probably the first time when Haile Selassie felt betrayed or at least disappointed by 
behavior of some members of the League as he was fully respecting the agreement and the 
spirit if the League.511 As one can read between the lines in this work, Ethiopia was not by 
some European powers taken as a first-class, but rather as a second- or third-class member 
                                                
510 “Come V. A. potrà constatare, i due Governi italiano e inglese, noc le due suddette note hanno stipulato un 
accordo che fissa le rispetive aspirazioni e gli obblighi reciproci dei due Governi in Etiopia e stabilisce fra essi 
una amichevole collaborazione in vista della reallizzazione di queste aspirazioni.”; Comunicazione Italo-
Britanica (9 giugno 1926). Lettera del Ministro Plenipotenzario d’Italia in Addis Ababa a S. A. l’Erede al trono 
d’Etiopia, Tafari Makonnen, in: Il Conflitto Italo-Etiopico. Documenti. Volume Primo. Dal Trattato di Ucciali al 
3 ottobre 1935. Milano 1936: 94. 
   
511 “In primo luogo quando fummo ammessi alla Società delle Nazioni ci fu detto che tutte le Nazioni dentro la 
Società sarebbero state su un piede di eguaglianza e che la loro indipendenza sarebbe stata universalmente 
rispetata, poichè lo scopo della Società è quello di stabilire e conservare la pace tra gli uomini in armonia noc la 
volontà di Dio. Non ci fi detto che certi membri della Società delle Naziono avrebbero potuto stipulare accordi 
separati per imporre il loro punto di vista a un altro membro, anche se questo considerasse quel punto di vista 
incompatibile coi suoi interessi nazionali. In secondo luogo una delle questioni trattate nell’accordo era già stata 
discussa tra il Governo Britannico e noi e il fatto che non si era arrivati a conclusione era dovuto a ragioni che si 
erano imposte alla nostra mente; ma nessuna risposta definitiva era mai stata data da noi. […] Per tagli ragioni è 
necessaria grande prudenza quando noi dobbiamo convincere il nostro popolo che gli stranieri, i quali deisderano 
di stabilirsi per ragioni economiche nel nostro paese o alle frontiere di esso, sono genuinamente innocenti di mire 
politiche nascoste, e dubitiamo che l’accordo e la notifica colletiva come quella in questione sia il miglior modo 
di istillare tale convinzione.” Nota Etiopiaca di protesta alla S. d. N. (19 giugno 1926). Protesta inviata da S. A. 
I. e R. Tafari Makonnen, Regente ed erede al trono d’Etiopia, agli Stati membri della S. d. N., in: Il Conflitto 
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of the League which can be better described by the following passage concerning the Tana 
Dam discussions:  
“We accepted with pleasure and agreed orally on the main matters; and a few 
weeks later We confirmed this to him in writing. But when the Italian 
Government heard of the decision as regards the Lake Tana dam, after direct 
discussions between the British Government and Ourselves, it pressed once again 
in 1925 not to lose sight of the proposal that the British Government should assist 
the Italians to build the railway from the border of Eritrea, cutting through the 
middle of Ethiopia, up to the Italian Somaliland; and as a result the Italian 
Government negotiated and agreed with the British Government, at Rome, that 
the proposal which it had previously initiated in 1919 be implemented; an 
exchange of correspondence ensued which embodied the text of the agreement. 
The two governments arranged for the text of the agreement, though allegedlyonly 
an exchange of correspondence, to be registered with the League of Nations at 
Geneva. While they did this, they did not inform, even by a single word, the 
sovereign Ethiopian Government.”512 
 
I have already mentioned that Ethiopia and Ethiopianism played an important role in the 
Afro-American communities as a part of the pan-African movement. Scholars like William E. 
B. DuBois, Wilmot Blyden or Marcus Garvey became amazed by Ethiopia as it gained a 
meaning of “liberty”. Asante’s pioneering work513 gives a detailed insight into the process of 
creating a concept of Ethiopianism in West Africa. There, at the beginning of the 20th century, 
many West African nationalists looked upon themselves as “Ethiopian”, but what is more 
testifying is that they used the term “Ethiopian” to describe various organizations which they 
formed both “at home” and abroad.514  
 
Bronislaw Malinowski, one of the “founding fathers” of modern anthropology, in the 
introduction to Yomo Kenyatta’s Facing Mount Kenya,515 expresses his appreciation to the 
increasing African self-consciousness in the first third of the 20th century when he says that “it 
is amazing how, for instance, the Abyssinian venture has organized public opinion in places 
and among natives which one would never have suspected of having any complicated views 
of the League of Nations, on the Dual Mandate, on the Dignity of Labour, and on the 
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Brotherhood of Man. But about Abyssinia most Bantu and Negroes have their views.”516 
Kenyatta then discusses reasons of the growth of the most popular sect, as he calls it, 
Ethiopianism. In his opinion, the growth of these new religious cults can be attributed to the 
following: 
“In the early days of European colonization many white men, especially 
missionaries, landed in Africa with preconceived ideas of what they would find 
there and how they would deal with the situation. As far as religion was 
concerned the African was regarded as a cleanslate on which anything could be 
written. He was supposed to take wholeheartedly all religious dogmas of the white 
man and keep them sacred and unchallenged, no matter how alien to the African 
mode of life. The Europeans based their assumption on the conviction that 
everything that the African did or thought was evil. The missionaries endeavoured 
to rescue the depraved souls of the Africans from the “eternal life”; they set out to 
uproot the African, body and soul, from his old customs and beliefs, put him in a 
class by himself, with all his tribal traditions shattered and his institutions 
trampled upon. The African, after having been detached from his family and tribe, 
was expected to follow the white man’s religion without questioning whether it 
was suited for his condition of life or not.”517 
 
On one hand, it may be surprising that a country that had never been systematically colonized 
became a symbol of the awaken black consciousness; on the other, its independence and 
ancient origin provided a legitimate means to stregthen African nationalism. The truth is that 
not much was known about Ethiopia in the sub-Saharan Africa before the Wal Wal incident. 
As examined by Asante, the public opinion in Sierra Leone, for instance, was “quite ignorant” 
of the development in Abyssinia until 1934.518 At least for African nationalist intellectuals, 
Ethiopia became an inspiration several years before the war. Scholars like Nmandi Azikiwe or 
Isaac Theophilus Akunna Wallace Johnson were those who by forming the West African 
Youth League (WAYL) constituted a committee for the defense of Ethiopia in 1935.519 In 
Ghana, as the Ethiopian war was nearing, it became popular to express the motto “the 
Blackman is the Alpha and Omega of the World: Africa for Africans at Home and Abroad” 
and it was called on God to “cause all enemies to be rooted and flee from our Fatherland 
Ethiopia”.520  
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Ethiopia and India and Australia  
 
In 1868 Indian troops came to Ethiopia with Sir Robert Napier’s army composed of 12,000 
soldiers, two thirds of which were from India. One of the important persons was dr. 
Warqenah who studied in India and then at the beginning of the 20th century became a 
personal physician of the Emperor. From that time Indians came Addis Ababa from time to 
time to in order to establish business relations with Ethiopia. Muhammed Ali and Company 
and Keshavalal Telakchand were among the oldest Indian trading companies established in 
1913 and 1915 respectively.521 The number of traders and businessmen from India soon 
increased to several thousand just before the invasion. When Ethiopia had been invaded, the 
leaders of the Indian National Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, strongly 
condemned the aggression and expressed their support of Ethiopia. Gandhi made a comment 
on Ethiopia’s position facing Italy and Europe in the following manner: 
 “If Abyssinia were non-violent, she could have no arms, would want none. She 
would make no appeal to the League (of Nations) or any other power for armed 
intervention. She would never give any cause for complaint. And Italy would find 
nothing to conquer if Abyssinians would not offer armed resistance not would 
they give co-operation willing or forced. Italian occupation in that case would 
mean that of the land without its people. That, however, is not Italy’s exact object. 
She seeks submission of the people of that beautiful land…”522 
 
Australia was a federal state within the British Commonwealth but though being far from 
Europe and far from Ethiopia, it does not mean that there was no reflection of events in the 
Horn. By 1935 there was no Australian citizen reported in Ethiopia, and even relations with 
Ethiopia were limited. It is hard to say whether there was an image of Ethiopia in Australia, 
but in a corcondance with Great Britain there was a growth of negative public opinion 
towards the Italian aggression and expressions of support to Ethiopia.523 This does not mean 
that there was only support to Ethiopia, but also a direct opposition towards any 
international engagement of Australia and a call for neutrality. Shortly after the beginning of 
the Ethiopian war, when many countries implied sanctions on Italy, in Australia there were 
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certain anti-sanction voices. Especially the Labour Party declared its support to the Italian 
policy mainly for economic reasons. Finally, on October 17, the Australian government 
decided to apply sanctions and to express its support to Ethiopia.      
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France, Britain, and the League of Nations 
 
The League of Nations was, according to its purpose, meant to be a crucial institution 
appointed for preventing conflicts and solving of problems. However, the reality was not so 
simple. Especially during the Italian-Ethiopian dispute, the League showed its passivity and 
lack of action. Diplomatic solutions could not prevent Italy from entering Ethiopia or, as 
aptly expressed by Halden,524 “diplomacy of the Ethiopian crisis [was] filled with intrigues 
and misunderstandings”. As for the League’s passivity, we may state that its role in the 
Ethiopian crisis, from the Wal Wal incident until the Italian invasion, was rather monitoring.   
 
In order to sum up the role of the League within the decisive year of 1934/1935, it is worthy 
to have in mind that Ethiopia and Italy were bound by three different agreements preventing 
them from war. First, it was the Treaty between the United States and other Powers 
providing renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, known as the Briand-
Kellogg Pact (signed in 1928). Second, it was the aforementioned Treaty of Amity, 
Conciliation and Arbitration, signed in 1928. Last but not least, it was the Covenant of the 
League of Nations with its familiar provisions enforcing Enquiry and Delay.525 Immediately 
after the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Treaty of Amity had been signed, it became clear that 
both countries perceived their bond in a different manner. While Ethiopia requested that the 
procedure of the Treaty of Amity should be applied, it was Italy who declared several 
unprovoked attacks by Ethiopians upon the Italian post. The Wal Wal incident showed both 
passivity of the League of Nations and the long-lasted Italian effort to accuse Ethiopia from 
being responsible for worsening of the border situation.  
 
The passive attitude of the League can be seen in its resolution of January 19, 1935. The 
efforts of pacification of the conflict led the Council to mediate an agreement between both 
countries. Honestly, according to letters sent by both governments to the Council, it seems 
that the mutual agreement was rather a fiction composed by the League, while the Italian 
Government confirmed its opposition to an intervention by the Council, since direct 
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negotiations had not been broken off.526 Imaginary mutual comprehension between Ethiopia 
and Italy was based on the agreement that the conflict should be settled according to Article 
V of the Treaty of Amity. As was provable later, both Italians and Ethiopians viewed the 
Article differently.  
 
On August 8, The League of Nations permitted arbitration. It is not uninteresting that 
newspapers all around the world kept informing about the neverending process of 
arbitrating the conflict. In this sense, The New York Times discussed the impossibility to 
find a solution as the basis of the conflict remained untouched and the conflict continued.527 
 
On December 2, The New York Times published David Loyd George’s observation on the 
sanctions imposed on Italy:  
“The League offered Mussolini nothing which he could have accepted without 
being laughed off the Italian stage…and as for talk on sanctions, Il Duce knew the 
exact weight of the brain and fist of every man with whom he was dealing, and 
having carefully scanned the figures on the balance, he decided it was a safe 
chance to defy them all. He knew that if sanctions were applied they would be 
negligible. I am not the only one to suspect that he has already negotiated these 
sanctions with the French Premier. They are arranged sanctions to preserve the 
respectability of the League and its authority for future use…Britain will not act 
without France, and the French Government is in honor bound not to apply 
effective sanctions.”528  
 
French continual reapprochment with Italy ocurred in a broader context of the French-
Ethiopian relations which were getting colder as the conflict was getting nearer. Haile 
Selassie was aware of a possible danger rising from the French-Italian connection and it 
corresponded to his willingness to establish an allience between France and Ethiopia during 
the period of 1932-1935.529 Unfortunately for the Emperor, his wishes were not taken into 
consideration. Haile Selassie went as far as proposing on January 9, 1935, a “sort of moral 
and economic protectorate upon Ethiopia”.530 
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To sum up the reasons why the League of Nations did not work as a cohesive unit, we may 
give three basic reasons related to four European powers. First, in the 1930’s Britain 
followed a policy of appeasement toward Germany and Italy as well as a revision of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Britain dedicated its international policy to world peace and the wealth 
of its empire, and, of course, upholding the League of Nations. Second, Italy proposed a 
pact among the four great powers (Italy, France, Great Britain and Germany) to resolve 
peacefully the Italian claims for the expansion in Africa. Mussolini’s cordial relations with 
Britain were the basis of his foreign policy. Nevertheless, Italian colonial ambitions led to a 
period of tensions with Britain, especially after 1935. Third, the French negotiated with Italy 
in a different manner than the British resulting in the Laval-Mussolini accords of 1935, 
though the position was rather ambiguous for France since Haile Selassie had protected 
French colonial investments and France had always supported Ethiopia in its League 
membership. The French delegate to the League, Robert de Caix, promised Mussolini help 
to create an Italian East African Empire, but, in exchange, France wanted Italian 
abandonment of the 1896 treaty that guaranteed Italian nationality for Italian residents in 
Tunisia.531  
 
Italian diplomacy made the Ethiopian Emperor hopeless since he became aware of the real 
Italian intentions: “As Monsieur Mussolini said, what Italy seeks is to civilize Our people. 
From now on Italy ceased to let the matter be settled peacefully. Her idea was to take revenge 
for Adwa of old, with a lot of blood being split.”532 While the Emperor was convinced of the 
true Italian aims, the official Italian diplomacy strived to persuade its allies of aggressive 
behavior of Ethiopia. Grandi told Sir Vansittart in their personal communication that Italy had 
never thought of invading Ethiopia, while he knew that the British public is strongly against 
Italian engagement in Ethiopia. According to Grandi, it was Ethiopia who pressed Italy to the 
mutual conflict.533 Not only Ethiopia, as written by the Emperor,534 but also the British policy 
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tended to blame Mussolini of setting up plans for the invasion, though expressing friendship 
based on the Tripartite Treaty.  
 
Italians, aware of world sympathy the Emperor had gained, tried to persuade Britain and 
France to expel Ethiopia from League of Nations, though it was Italy who played a major role 
in Ethiopian accession to the League.535 In controversy with his previous statements in a 
conversation with Vansittart, Grandi built his argumentation on an arrogant will to exclude 
Ethiopia from the League. Favorite Italian arguments were based on criticism of the Ethiopian 
state of anarchy, barbarism, and slavery. Grandi went further in his speech and appealed on 
France and Britain to support his view of Ethiopia as a “state of permanent anarchy”. Italy’s 
effort to expel Ethiopia from the League and the “peaceful intentions” were ineffectual and in 
a certain sense contradictory, as it is evident from Grandi’s conversation with Vansittart.536  
 
In spite of Italy’s evident intentions, it seemed clear that, unlike Britain, France gave Italy a 
free hand in Ethiopia, though Pierre Laval denied it several times. France had its interests in 
Ethiopia based on the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway zone, but had no territorial claims. The 
so-called free hand was given to Italy not only in the political (or colonial) sense, but also in 
the economic sphere. On August 15, Laval asked Vittorio Cerutti to assure Mussolini of 
France’s support, though aware of the war and the situation of Ethiopia’s membership in the 
League of Nations.537 Moreover, Lowe and Marzari538 add that there has always been a 
“current in France willing to pay a price for, if not Italian friendship, certainly Italian 
disinterest in France’s North African holdings, by far the French empire’s most important 
resources”. France’s attitudes towards the Italian interest might be interpreted in a similar 
manner, as a ‘reciprocal service’. 
 
Anthony Eden was aware of the impossibility to force Italy to change its views. British 
diplomatic incompetence is aptly expressed in Eden’s conclusions: “Grandi was the most 
astute and experienced of ambassadors...but the only conclusion he could draw from his 
exchange with the Foreign Secretary was that we were troubled and uncertain in our 
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course.”539 While Grandi was aware of the British public opinion towards the Ethiopian 
question, Italians used a counter-propaganda to blame Britain of being biased and 
hypocritical. A press campaign in Giornale d’Italia asserted that “British opposition to Italian 
policy in Abyssinia [was] due to the fact that British designs [were] threatened thereby.”540 
  
While Mussolini won the French on his side, the British maintained careful to the extent that 
they would never give him a free hand in Ethiopia. According to the dispatch sent by Sir  
E. Drummond to Sir J. Simon,541 there was a hypothesis in the mid-1935 that the British 
thought Duce would not consider less: a) a mandate [over Ethiopia]; b) a scheme under which 
Italy should play the same role in Abyssinia that Great Britain played in Egypt; c) a kind of 
protectorate; d) outright annexation. British diplomats were aware of the (c) and (d) 
alternatives being the most probable and presenting the major challenge to the League.  
 
Mussolini repeatedly tried to persuade his European colleagues of Italy’s nonviolent 
intentions and Ethiopia’s unwillingness to solve problems peacefully. Although the British 
and the French knew a lotabout the Italian militarization, nothing seemed to stop Mussolini 
from the invasion. On July 31, 1935, Mussolini ascertained Drummond of his peaceful 
intentions stating that he had done everything possible to settle the matter with Ethiopia 
diplomatically, while the Emperor increased military preparations and armament since the 
1928 Treaty.542 He insisted on Italy’s right to the Ogaden territory claiming that the Emperor 
offered him these inhospitable areas in 1931 in exchange for accession to the Red Sea.543 
Haile Selassie544 denied Italy’s right declared by Mussolini arguing that there was no doubt 
about “the legal status of the Ogaden province belonging to Ethiopia…”. 
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It is a paradox or another irony of history that the Italian-Ethiopian dispute did not seriously 
affect the Somalis. Though several treaties (1896 and 1908) dealt with the border delineation, 
neither Ethiopians nor Italians wanted to give up their demands and settle the latent conflict. 
Ethiopians claimed a remarkable part of Somalia to within less than a hundred miles from 
Mogadishu, while Italians did not want to settle the dispute thinking of having an open access 
to the Ethiopian highlands. As affirmed by Hess,545 Somali tribes took no stand; the only 
border they were interested in was that between their tribal grazing areas. 
 
The British weakness and confusion in the Italian-Ethiopian dispute encouraged Mussolini in 
further action since he had realized that no obstacle from Europe is feasible. Mussolini felt 
that he could act without limitations because negotiations with the British had not brought any 
results. Especially after the Stresa conference, Italy could feel confident.546 Since Mussolini 
knew for half a year that preparations for the war might continue regardless of London or 
Geneva. The move to invasion was indubitable.547   
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VIII Conclusion 
 
The Italian invasion in Ethiopia in 1935 has been usually interpreted as a vengeance for Adwa 
or as a “civilizing mission.” It was supposed to legitimize the colonial expansion in the 
contemporary colonial context. With no doubt, the mutual conflict had - besides the material 
impact – also its symbolical level lying in a combat of ideological or mythological histories. 
On one hand, there was an idea of an independent, “pure” African country having never been 
controlled by any foreign power, on the other hand, there was a disseminating idea of cultural 
superiority and civilizing mission. Magic and charisma of Haile Selassie paradoxically 
influenced even the exponents of Italian colonialism.548 The Emperor’s fame was supported 
by his talks in the League of Nations, as acknowledged by Edward Ullendorff: “There could 
have been no more dramatic or moving scene in the history of the League of Nations, and 
among the delegates there must have been many who knew in their heart that the words of the 
prophet from Africa’s oldest Christian Kingdom were bound to be fulfilled – as indeed they 
were within less than half a decade.”549  
 
The Time magazine awarded him the “Man of the Year” in 1936. While Ethiopia had been 
accused of being a country of barbarism and slavery, Haile Selassie in his speech to the 
League of Nations in June 1936 imputed Italy with the same indictment: “The very 
refinement of barbarism consisted in carrying ravage and terror into the most densely 
populated parts of the territory, the points farthest removed from the scene of hostilities. The 
object was to scatter fear and death over a great part of the Ethiopian territory. These fearful 
tactics succeeded. Men and animals succumbed. The deadly rain fell from the aircraft made 
all those whom it touched fly shrieking with pain. All those who drank the poisoned water or 
ate the infected food also succumbed in dreadful suffering. In tens of thousands, the victims 
of the Italian musturd gas fell. It is in order to denounce to the civilized world the tortures 
inflicted upon the Ethiopian people that I resolved to come to Geneva.”550 In his emotional 
speech, Haile Selassie, in my opinion, promptly gave a picture of the Italian international 
policy as discussed below: “The Treaties of Friendship it (Rome Government) signed with me 
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were not sincere; their only object was to hide its real intention from me. The Italian 
Government asserts that for 14 years it has been preparing for its present conquest. It 
therefore recognizes today that when it supported the admission of Ethiopia to the League of 
Nations in 1923, when it concluded the Treaty of Friendship in 1928, when it signed the Pact 
of Paris outlawing war, it was deceiving the whole world.”551 
 
At the same time, Italian propagandists worldwide tried to attack Ethiopian sovereignty as 
much as possible, as Sorenson shows on the example of Tomasso Mari and his book “What 
do you know about Ethiopia?” (1935). In this book, he combined facts with myths and lies 
based on racial prejudice. He pointed at Ethiopian expansionism since the 1880’s accenting its 
“barbarism” and slavery. Though he admits Emperor’s credit in modernizing the country, at 
the same time he considers civilizing the local people a necessary fact.552 Racial prejudice 
accompanied also the works of famous Ethiopianists and scholars, as shows the example of 
Alberto Pollera.553 The influence of anthropological thinking and interest in measuring 
physical features thus had to have an impact on political decisions that had been made, 
moreover, in a colonial context of the era. This anthropological view existed until the 1960’s 
when it began to be replaced by cultural relativism and other theories that reappraised the 
preceding. Until the 1960’s we can read that “while the Emperor Haile Selassie might almost 
pass for a south European, his predecessor was in feature distinctly Negroid.”554  
 
In these consequences it seemed logical and pragmatic when Mussolini supported non-
Amhara ethnic groups and Muslims. Ethiopian, or Amharic mythology, was praised as a 
pattern of African kingdom and statehood, while interests of the European powers in the Horn 
of Africa were used for “protecting” traditional authorities. Discussion on the symbolical or 
ideological level of the Ethiopian-Italian clash still needs to be examined in its multiplicity. 
To conclude these remarks, we may say, that the Italian colonial ambitions in Ethiopia were 
the result of contemporary geopolitical realities and can be interpreted as a clash of two 
“mythological” ideologies, both counting upon the help from abroad. 
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Great politicians of the modern history, as e.g. Winston Churchill and many more later in the 
second half of the 20th century, have seen the Italian invasion as the beginning of World War 
II.555 The interpretations of the conflict have had many various modes, as well as 
interpretations of the Emperor’s role in it. Haile Selassie has been described both in a 
romantic and a critical way; as the one who stood lonely, slight and noble “amidst the 
holocaust of bombing and poison-gas raids as well as the futile debates of an impotent and 
frightened League of Nations”556, or as the Emperor who ruled the country of the non-Amhara 
(especially Oromo) for his own benefit.557 Berhe ruminates on the Emperor’s exile, because 
the critics of his departure perhaps underestimates his role in the anti-Italian resistance, 
though his unexpected departure might have been considered as an act that had “created a gap 
nobody seemed able to fill.”558  
 
Certainly, the Italian victory was eased by the fact that the Ethiopian army suffered from lack 
of modern weapons due to the Embargo on Arms sales, though there had been some attempts 
to channel some loads of arms in Ethiopia even from Germany, whose direct complicity in the 
supply of arms to Ethiopia as late as 1936 has been examined by Westermann.559 One of the 
major aspects of the war – the use of gas poison – was largely discussed as well.560  
 
It was evident since Mussolini had taken power in Italy, that one of his main objectives was to 
show the advanced European powers that Italy would seek its place in Africa. Moreover, 
Mussolini was convinced of that both France and Britain could not fail to see the merits of 
Italy’s colonial claims.561 In his own writings and speeches, Mussolini repeatedly argued that 
for Italy, the way to political and economic independence led through a secure access to raw 
materials. The main objective was logically seen in Ethiopia, though it is not a country rich in 
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natural resources. The reasons for the invasion can be thus seen not only in historical (Adwa), 
ideological (Fascist expansionism), racial (superiority of the “white” race) and contextual 
(growth of Hitler’s Germany) consequences, but also in Italy’s economic need for industrial 
development. There we can see a shift from the Early 19th century European explorers 
interested in “discovering” Ethiopia and the Early 20th century European colonialists seeking 
for economic gains and progresses.562 
 
The only world power which did not recognize Italy’s domain in the Horn was the U.S. 
Americans, according to the inter-war policy of non-interference and non-engagemnet, 
continued in the practical and realistic policy towards the world. The Fascist colonies in East 
Africa precipitated a series of quarrels and disputes between the powers involved. One can 
presume that these potential clashes could affect the American interests. In fact, Ethiopia’s 
effort to bring the Italian policy into the League of Nations was out of scope of the American 
diplomacy. While the possible Italian attack would be a violation of the Kellog-Briand Pact, 
the Ethiopian appeals for diplomatic support against Italy brought only a limitied attention,563 
which was caused by no political and economic interest of the U.S. in Ethiopia.  
 
This did not mean that the U.S. was completely unaware of risks of the possible Italian 
invasion in Ethiopia. Within America’s diplomacy there had been at least two policies. The 
first was represented by Secretary of State C. Hull who supported the British. In his pragmatic 
view, increasing engagement of Britain in Africa and the Mediterranean could have an 
unwelcome effect on the situation in the Far East where the Philippinnes could be exposed to 
Japanese attack. The second strategy, represented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was 
characterized by absolute independence and personal policy.564 American role in the Horn had 
to become more important just after the World War II with Haile Selassie as the major partner 
in the region.565 
 
                                                
562 Discussion over roots and reasons of the revival of the 19th century European interests in Ethiopia are 
discussed by Abbink, J. (1993): A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974 by Bahru Zewde. Review Article. 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 31 (3): 521-523. 
 
563 Braddick, H. B. (1962): A New Look at American Policy during the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-1936. The 
Journal of Modern History 34 (1): 64-73. 
 
564 Sbacchi 1997: 215. 
 
565 Marcus, H. (1995): The Politics of Empire. Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941 – 1974. 
Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press. 
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The events from October 1935 until May 1936 are already out of the scope of this work. The 
Italian-Ethiopian war in 1935-1936 was the first war after 1918 in which the Italian Air Force 
was employed on a large scale and had an important role in military operations. Airplanes 
were also used in 1911-1912 for the conquest of Libya. Successes during the 1920’s in the 
Libyan interior gave Italians confidence in using airplanes in Ethiopia.566 Although being a 
signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (ratified on April 3, 1928), Italian government sought 
to minimize expenses and losses and allowed the use of poison gas to expedite the conquest of 
Ethiopia. The aim was to break the Ethiopian will to fight. With no doubt, the decision to use 
gas was to be made already before the war, because the first documented date of its use is 
October 10, 1935, only a week after the beginning of the war.567 Italian defeated “Adwa 
army” was revenged by the generation of sons. For Italians, Adwa was not a goal but a 
symbol; for Ethiopia, the lost of Adwa meant a disgrace and the beginning of hard times.568 
These became evident after Mussolini proclaimed that Italy has no other chance how to secure 
its territory and future development of the country than by military action.569 
 
As the war was getting to its end, it was clearer that Ethiopian “light” got darker. Mockler in 
this sense gives a romantic description of the decisive period leading to proclamation of the 
Italian East African Empire and disappearance of Haile Selassie’s influential charisma: “One 
after the other the Ethiopian armies had been defeated and, with the Imperial army itself 
battered and withdrawing, it seemed to the Ethiopians that only God who had so often before 
saved their Empire from the invaders could save it again. Divine intervention apart, the 
Ethiopians could count on only two assets: the person of the Emperor, miraculously 
unharmed, and the Army of the South.”570 Politically and economically, Ethiopia was for 
another five-year period attached to Italian Empire and Mussolini thus could raise a flag of 
“imperial greatness.”  
 
                                                
566 Rochat 2005. 
 
567 Sbacchi 2005. 
 
568 Marcus 1998: 167. 
 
569 Mori, R. (1978): Mussolini e la Conquista dell’Etiopia. Firenze: Felice le Monnier.; Mori 1978: 313. 
 
570 Mockler 2003: 120. 
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Nevertheless, it is indubitable that the Italian invasion had besides its economic and political 
consequences also its symbolical meaning. Ethiopia was the only independent country in 
Africa and its support from many different parts of the world played certainly an important 
role in Italian strategy planning. Its symbolical meaning may be described in a material way 
as well, because the Italian invasion brought massive looting. As Pankhurst571 states, the 
looting had three main reasons: “…in part to gratify the desires of the fascist leadership, in 
part to remove symbols of Ethiopia’s age-old independence, and in part because Mussolini, 
seeking to establish a new Roman Empire, sought to emulate the rulers of ancient Rome, who 
had brought much booty to that city.” Probably the most important symbols of Ethiopia’s 
independence carried away were the Statue of the Lion of Judah, and the famous Axum 
obelisk.  
 
Last but not least, Adejumobi sees another dichotomy in the analyzed period preceding the 
Italian-Ethiopian war. He sees the Ethiopian “traditional system” and European “modernism” 
in Ethiopia’s centuries-long resistance to “integration into the world capitalist system by 
adhering to a tributary mode of production and by granting only select concession rights to 
foreign entrepreneurs and investors.”572 Although Ras Tafari/Haile Selassie initiated reforms 
to strengthen modernization, its old-fashioned “totality of the governmental institutions” was 
a holdout in modernization. This also includes “the concept of individualism, the centrality of 
reason, and governance by consent.” I would like to conclude these statements that there is 
also one last reason why Ethiopia could become an Italy’s war booty. This was already 
outlined in chapter VI. Ethiopia was the only independent African country in the League of 
Nations and thus had no partner with which it could share a common political and historical 
experience and knowledge.  Already during and after the Wal Wal incident, Ethiopia had no 
power (due to the abovementioned reasons) to resist Italy’s increasing emphasis on the 
economic and political aspects of the situation. In the symbolical and ideological level, the 
Wal Wal incident soon became “forgotten” in Italy since it only gave Italy a necessary 
legitimization of the further actions and weakened Ethiopia on the international chessboard. 
Border disputes and provocation thus filled their roles and goals.  
                                                
571 Pankhurst 1999: 234-235. 
 
572 Adejumobi 2007: 61-62. 
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IX Appendices 
Maps, Pictures 
A Poem on Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia! Rugged land, the Black man’s pride, 
For you our forefathers fought and died – 
Fought that this land ever might be 
Died that its children in it would be free.  
The hills and valleys have ever been thine 
Since handed down from that Royal line 
Of Sheba, that Queen in days of old 
Who matched wits with Solomon, the story’s told 
Now comes man with greed of grain, 
To take that land, through blood and grain, 
Regarding not the Black man’s right, 
But will pillage by the power of might, 
Black man will you stand and see 
Your home land taken, your life and liberty 
By those, who, of our fathers made slaves 
Beaten, chained, tortured, they filled alien graves? 
No! Ethiopia to us means far more 
And as our forefathers died of yore;  
And so shall we with loyal swords 
Ne’er give up what our fathers won 
Haile Selassie, to thee honour is due 
Ethiopians are proud to acknowledge you 
Our leader, upright, courageous and brave 
Who’d lay down thy life thy country to save 
At thy call we will rally forth 
From East and West, South and North 
To Ethiopia we’ll come, a fighting band 
To drive imposters out of the Black man’s land; 
If we win not, we will die trying 
To keep our land, and freedom flag flying 
Greedy man, let your war madness cease 
The Ethiopian wants his land, and peace. 
 
 
 
Source: Vox Populi, 21 September 1935. In: Asante, S. K. B. (1977): Pan-African Protest: West Africa and 
the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis 1934-1936. London: Longman Group Ltd. (p. 217). 
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Map 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Map of Ethiopia and North-East Africa 
 
Source: Mockler, A. (2003): Haile Selassie’s War. Oxford: Oxford University Press (p. 2). 
 
 
 163 
Picture 1 
 
 
 
Battle of Adwa 1896. One of the most important aspects of the 1935 invasion. 
 
Source: Asante, S. K. B. (1977): Pan-African Protest: West Africa and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis 1934-1936. 
London: Longman Group Ltd. (p. 53). 
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Picture 2 
 
 
 
Haile Selassie in 1935 
 
Source: Marcus, H. G. (1998): Haile Sellassie I: The Formative Years. Asmara: Red Sea Press. 
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Picture 3 
 
 
 
The way Ethiopia was portrayed in Italy before the war 
 
Source: La Tribuna, September 12, 1935. 
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Picture 4 
 
 
 
 
War would disserve to white race 
 
Source: Venkov, August 2, 1935. 
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Picture 5 
 
 
 
Propagandist poster proclaiming that Italy has her own empire at last 
 
Source: Asante, S. K. B. (1977): Pan-African Protest: West Africa and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis 1934-1936. 
London: Longman Group Ltd. (p. 54). 
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Picture 6 
 
 
 
 
Mussolini as the last Ceasar 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 176). 
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Picture 7 
 
 
 
 
The biggest hope of the goddess 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 178). 
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Picture 8 
 
 
 
 
Mussolini as Napoleon  
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 179). 
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Picture 9 
 
 
 
 
Ethiopian singer and Italian icecream man (in unison): See you in Addis Ababa. 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 181). 
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Picture 10 
 
 
 
 
 
A terrible warning (France and Britain) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 182). 
 
 173 
Picture 11 
 
 
 
 
A question 
A water serpent and gooseberry: Is this a dead season? 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 184). 
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Picture 11 
 
 
 
Will she manage to catch him? 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 185). 
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Picture 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fleet street revisited 
 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 187). 
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Picture 14 
 
 
 
The nation speaks clearly 
 
Sir Samuel Hoare: Be serene. If you keep virtuous to yourself, Great Britain won’t abandon 
you. 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 188). 
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Picture 15 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluating the costs 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 190). 
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Picture 16 
 
 
 
 
 
Tribulation of a dictator; or a well-timed appeal 
The God of War: Excuse me, Duce, but before you leave, there is another little repayment for 
a wagon. 
 
Source: Pankhurst, R. (1996): L’invasione fascista dell’Etiopia nelle vignette del settimanale satirico inglese 
Punch. Studi Piacentini 19 (p. 191). 
 179 
Picture 17 
 
 
 
 
Inauguration of the Axum obelisk in Rome, 1937 
 
Source: Palumbo, P. (ed.) (2003): A Place in the Sun. Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from post-unification to 
the present. Los Angeles: California University Press.  
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Picture 18 
 
 
 
Results of the use of gas weapons during the war 
 
Source: Del Boca, A. (2007): I gas di Mussolini. Il fascismo e la guerra d’Etiopia. Roma: Editori Riuniti  
(p. 112). 
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Picture 19 
 
 
 
 
Always a new Italy’s strain on Ethiopia, the empire of black Christians 
 
Source: Polední List, December 16, 1934. 
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Picture 20 
 
 
 
 
Series of pictures against the League of Nations and Ethiopia 
 
Source: Mignemi, A. (1984): Immagine coordinata pr un impero. Etiopia 1935-1936. Torino: Grupo 
Editoriale Forma (p. 173). 
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Picture 21 
 
 
 
 
Series of picture against France and Great Britain 
 
Source: Mignemi, A. (1984): Immagine coordinata per un impero. Etiopia 1935-1936. Torino: Grupo 
Editoriale Forma (p. 169). 
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Picture 22 
 
 
 
 
Adolf Parlesák with a friend in Ethiopia, 1928 
 
 
Source: Parlesák, A. [1948] (1989): Habešská odyssea. Praha: Panorama. 
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Picture 23 
 
 
 
Adolf Parlesák with his interpreter and bodyguards at war, 1935 
 
Source: Parlesák, A. [1948] (1989): Habešská odyssea. Praha: Panorama. 
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Picture 24 
 
 
 
 
Musicians in Addis Ababa, first days of war 
 
Source: Parlesák, A. [1948] (1989): Habešská odyssea. Praha: Panorama. 
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Abbreviations 
 
AB – African Boundaries 
DBFP – Documents on British Foreign Policy 
DDI – Documenti diplomatici italiani 
DEP – Documents on Ethiopian Politics 
MAT – Map of Africa by Treaty 
WWA – The Wal Wal Arbitration 
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Práce Ethiopia in international relations, 1923-1935. Creating myths and images, si klade za 
úkol analyzovat postavení Etiopie v mezinárodních vztazích s přihlédnutím ke dvěma 
aspektům: zaprvé, objasnit, jakou úlohu hrálo vytváření image Etiopie jako „barbarské, 
zaostalé země, kterou je nutné civilizovat“ v mezinárodním kontextu; zadruhé, ukázat Etiopii 
z pohledu evropského mediálního světa se zvláštním zřetelem na československý tisk. Práce 
tak není zaměřena čistě historicky, ale její poselství se nese spíše v rovině symbolické. Na 
pozadí historické imagologie se snažím ukázat proměny vnímání Etiopie od symbolického 
vstupu do Společnosti národů a tedy i na mezinárodně-politickou šachovnici, až do vstupu 
italských vojsk na etiopské území, čímž končí období čekání na pomoc ze zahraničí. Práce tak 
ukazuje, jak se osudy malých zemí, jako Etiopie a Československo, psaly spíše v mocenských 
a koloniálních centrech té doby.  
 
Tak, jak Etiopie vstupovala do Společnosti národů jako jediná nezávislá země Afriky, tak 
vzrůstal v kontextu tehdejšího koloniálního světa potenciál některých evropských mocností – 
Itálie a Německa – schopný přetavit koloniální plány ve skutečnost. Evropské mocnosti 
Francie a Velká Británie, v obavách před možnou spoluprácí Itálie s nacistickým Německem, 
politikou „appeasementu“ nepřímo umožnily Itálii zvyšovat napětí v oblasti Rohu Afriky, kde 
Mussolini spatřoval tradiční italské koloniální nároky, narušené prohranou bitvou u Adowy 
v roce 1896. 
 
Právě bitva u Adowy a její reflexe v Itálii let třicátých se stala jedním ze symbolů, jež bylo 
třeba odstranit. Nastolení image protivníka ve všech negativních konotacích je základním 
aspektem a předstupněm legitimizace konfliktu. Tím, že Itálie (ale i celá Evropa) vnímala na 
stránkách denního tisku Etiopii jako zemi barbarskou, necivilizovanou, vytvářela prostor pro 
legitimizaci italského postupu, jež i přes porušení mezinárodních úmluv zapadal do kontextu 
koloniální doby let meziválečných. Na základě studia primárních pramenů a literatury tak 
ukazuji proměnlivou podstatu vytváření image protivníka jajko nástroj k ospravedlnění 
vojenské akce, a zároveň s tím související limitované možnosti z globálního hlediska 
nepodstatného státu, jehož dějiny se právě v této době psaly mimo Addis Abebu.  
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The work Ethiopia in international relations, 1923-1935. Creating myths and images, aims to 
analyze a position of Ethiopia in international relations with a special focus on two aspects: 
first, to clarify a role of creating image of Ethiopia as a “barbarous, backward country, which 
is necessary to civilize” in an international context; second, to show Ethiopia from the 
European media point of view with a particular interest in the Czechoslovak press. The work 
is thus not directed as clearly historical work but its message lies rather in symbolical level. 
On the background of historical imagology I try to show changes of imagining Ethiopia from 
the symbolical admission to the League of Nations and international political chessboard until 
the invasion of the Italian troops in the Ethiopian territory and thereby an end of waiting for 
foreign help. The work shows how fates of small countries like Ethiopia or Czechoslovakia 
have been written rather in power and colonial centres of that time.   
 
When Ethiopia entered the League of Nations as the only independent African country, it was 
the time of growing potential of several European countries – Italy and Germany – who were 
able to recast their colonial or expansive plans into reality. The European powers France and 
Great Britain, in distress of possible cooperation of Italy with the Nazi Germany, enabled 
Italy by their appeasement policy to increase tensions and quarrels in the Horn of Africa 
where Mussolini saw traditional Italian claims disrupted by the lost battle at Adwa in 1896. 
 
The battle of Adwa and its reflexion in 1930’s Italy became one of the symbols necessary to 
eliminate. The invention of an image of an enemy in all negative conotations is a basic apsect 
and first stage of the legitimization of conflicts. As Italy (and all Europe) perceived Ethiopia 
on pages of daily press as a barbarous, uncivilized country, created space for legitimization of 
the Italian advance which in spite of violating international agreements fit into the context of 
colonial time of the inter-war period. Based on the study of primary sources and literature I 
show a changing character of creating image of an enemy as a tool for justifying military 
actions. Together woth these apsects there are closely relating limited potentials of (from a 
global point of view) unimportant state whose history was during this era written outside of 
Addis Ababa.  
 
